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General Introduction
General motivation
Health and safety at work is one of the most important aspects of the EU policy in the ﬁeld
of employment and social aﬀairs. Over the last decades, the adoption and implementation of
a substantial corpus of Community legislation1 have improved working conditions in the Mem-
ber States and have already borne fruit : workplace accidents have been markedly fewer in
number. Member States have acknowledged under the Lisbon Strategy that health and safety
policy makes an important contribution to economic growth and employment.2 The 2007 coun-
cil resolution on a new community strategy on health and safety at work (2007-2012) stated
that “occupational safety not only safeguards workers’ life and health [...] but also plays a
vital role in increasing the competitiveness and productivity of enterprises and in contributing
to the sustainability of social protection systems by reducing the social and economic costs of
occupational accidents, incidents and diseases.”
Work-related injury and illness challenge health systems’ ability to preserve and restore the
capacity of workers to maintain economically active. This is particularly relevant in the light
of the ongoing demographic, as EU populations are rapidly ageing. Increasing the economic
activity of older workers is considered essential to relieving the economic pressures generated
by demographic trends as well as trends towards early retirement. As a result, half of OECD
countries are raising retirement ages or will do so in the coming decades, and most governements
try to reduce retirement incentives. However, these measures will not necessarily be eﬀective,
especially if work is too health-demanding at old age3 or if ill health is a motive of labour market
1Based on Article 137 of the EC Treaty of Nice.
2Workplace accidents and work-related illnesses are costly in not only human but also economic terms. Every
year there are more than 4 million accidents at work in the EU. In macroeconomic terms the cost of accidents at
work and of occupational diseases in EU-15 ranges from 2.6% to 3.8% of gross national product (EUCommission,
2007).
3On this topic, the 2007 council resolution on a new community strategy on health and safety at work
(2007-2012) stated that “workplaces must be designed in such a way that the employability of workers is ensured
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withdrawal at old age. New risks at the workplace – such as the risks arising from new forms
of work organisation or from the intensiﬁcation of work pressure – make this issue even more
critical.
More generally, good health at work helps improve public health. Recognizing that occupational
health is closely linked to public health and health system development, the World Health Or-
ganization developed a Global Plan of Action on Workers’ Health (2008-2017). The plan seeks
to address all determinants of workers’ health, including risks of disease and injury in the oc-
cupational environment, social and individual factors, and access to health services. It also
aims at reducing inequalities in workers’ health – as some groups, such as temporary workers,
immigrants, disabled and young and old workers are at greater risk of suﬀering from poor health
and safety conditions at work.
Beyond workplace health and safety, a new policy challenge lies in the health impact of
more insecure careers on the labour-market. The growth of precarious work since the 1970s
– i.e. employment that is uncertain, unpredictable, and risky from the point of view of the
worker – has emerged as a core contemporary concern. Uncertain and unpredictable work
contrasts with the relative security that characterised the three decades following World War II
(Kalleberg, 2009). Although the EU legislation is much less developed on this topic, the health
consequences of precarious careers are likely to be large, too. Various career shocks over the
lifecourse may be harmful to health, and may challenge health systems’ ability to preserve and
restore the capacity of workers to remain in the labour force. The main objective of this thesis
is to analyse the health consequences of career shocks.
Is work (that) bad for health?
Whether and to what extent work may aﬀect health is an open question, however. Of course,
various aspects of work may be a hazard and pose a risk to happiness and health. Cases of
burnout, or even suicides at work regularly make the headlines of the press. Several tragic
episodes, such as the asbestos scandal, have proved that harsh working conditions may damage
health, and even kill. But we also know that job loss and unemployment may have severe
consequences on health, too. This apparent contradiction is far from new. The XVIIIth cen-
tury initiated this still ongoing debate, opposing two views of work : work as a contribution to
throughout their working lives. At the same time, workplaces should be tailored to the individual needs of older
and disabled workers.”
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human progress, the foundation of social ties and a source of fulﬁllment and happiness; work as
an alienating job, that condemns individuals to waste their life trying to earn one’s living.
Employment is generally the most important means of obtaining adequate economic re-
sources. It is also important to meet important psychosocial needs in societies where em-
ployment is the norm; ﬁnally, it is central to individual identity, social roles and social status
(Waddell and Burton, 2006; Layard, 2004; Dodu, 2005; Nordenmark and Strandh, 1999). In a
French survey on happiness (1996-1999), one person out of four answered “work” – or closely-
related concepts such as “profession”, “job” etc. – to the following question : “What is the most
important factor to your happiness?”.4 This proportion amounted to 65% among unemployed
individuals or individuals predicted to be at a high risk of unemployment, e.g. blue-collar work-
ers under 35, and temporary workers (Baudelot et al., 2003). Correspondingly, the subjective
value of work has steadily increased in France during the last decades. French unemployment
rates have not fallen below the level of 8% since 1983, and polls keep reminding us that French
people consider employment as the ﬁrst priority on the political agenda.
Richard Layard says that “when a person becomes unemployed his welfare falls for two reasons
– ﬁrst the loss of income, and second the loss of self-respect and sense of signiﬁcance (the psychic
loss). The pain caused by the loss of self-respect is (we ﬁnd) at least as great as the pain which
a person would feel if he lost half his income. So unemployment hits with a double whammy
– the loss of the income hurts, but so does the loss of self-respect”. Job loss can be a highly
traumatizing event indeed. Sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld and his team grasped evidence of this
as soon as in the 1930s, in the small Austrian town of Marienthal (Lazarsfeld et al., 1933). The
mine, which was then the principal economic resource in the town, was forced to close in the
wake of the 1929 economic crisis. Social life, which was particularly rich before the crisis, dras-
tically declined after the plant closure and symptoms of “apathy” emerged afterwards among
long-term unemployed individuals.
Beyond happiness and welfare, there is evidence that losing one’s job is also detrimental to
health. Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) consider high-tenure male workers displaced during
the early and mid-1980s in the course of mass layoﬀs in Pennsylvania. They show that they
experienced a 50 to 100% increase in the mortality hazard during the immediate years following
job loss. The eﬀect decreased as time passes but converged to a 10-15% increase in the long
4The question in French was labelled as “Qu’est-ce qui est pour vous le plus important pour être heureux ?”
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Overall, job loss and unemployment are likely to be detrimental to health. However, we should
not be too hasty in concluding that work is beneﬁcial to health.
That work is likely to deteriorate health is quite a widespread idea. When asked how work
inﬂuences their health, 25% of Europeans declared work to be pathogenic. Conversely, only
7% reported it to be positive to their health (EWCS 2010, reported in Barnay (2014)). Of
course, these subjective ﬁgures reﬂect various norms regarding eﬀort, health and work, but they
indicate that the objective health-damaging impact of work is likely to be non-negligible.
Public health and epidemiology have long suggested that various dimensions of work were likely
to be harmful to health. As far back as in 1840, Dr. Villermé depicted the harsh working and
living conditions of workers in French textile centers in Lille, Rouen and Lyon. His “Tableau de
l’état physique et moral des ouvriers employés dans les manufactures de coton, de laine et de
soie” reported that many textile workers were living in insanitary conditions. Of all the work-
ers Villermé observed, the handloom weavers (“tisserands à bras”) fared the worst. Villermé
vividly described their bad health, attributing it to harmful working conditions, long working
hours, and inadequate nutrition (La Berge, 2002). His “Tableau” – together with his various
reports on work accidents – were the foundation of laws on health at work, medical surveillance
of occupational risks.6 Today, various surveys of health at work7 – continue to provide data to
explore the work-health connection.
Smith (2004) notes that medical scientists are often convinced that the dominant situation
is that working conditions, psychosocial aspects of work and career outcomes produce large
health disparities. Their main debate is about why they lead to poor health. That a reverse
causation may be at play – e.g. health aﬀects the capacity to work or even working conditions
– is often ignored in empirical studies. These endogeneity issues – which mostly come down to
selection issues – are at the core of the empirical analysis of work and health. We come back
to this question in the methodology section.
5Bassanini and Caroli (2014) provide a recent and substantial review of the literature on the health impact
of job loss. They ﬁnd that “the results are mixed, ranging from strong health damaging eﬀects to insigniﬁcant
ones. However, no article ever ﬁnds a positive health eﬀect of becoming unemployed.”
6In particular, Villermé’s work was instrumental in passing a French 1843 law preventing children under 8 to
work in factories with more than 200 employees.
7In the French context, see for instance the SUMER survey on the medical surveillance of exposure to
occupational risks, the ESTEV survey on health, work and ageing or the GAZEL survey. For Europe, see for
instance the health module of the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS).
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Overall, the health impact of work has received considerable attention by the past. Does
this question even matter today? There are some reasons to wonder. Work is indeed less
dangerous than it used to be. In France, work accidents have declined by a third between 1955
and 1975 – twenty years characterised by strong economic growth and a modernisation of the
industrial equipment (DGT, 2011). The study of whether and to what extent work may aﬀect
health, however, needs our attention more than ever. The speed of work has quickened and
the pressures of working to tight deadlines have also risen. At the same time, popular concern
about precarious work and insecure careers has increased. Both the growing intensiﬁcation of
work pressure and career insecurity may be detrimental to health.
The health consequences of a changing world of work
Growing intensification of work pressure, and health
There is evidence that the speed of work and the pressures of working to tight deadlines – as
reported by workers in surveys – have risen since the 1980s. This growing intensiﬁcation of the
work pressure (which may originate from new forms of organisation inside ﬁrms – such as the de-
centralisation of authority, delayering of managerial has functions, and increased multitasking –
or from the introduction of information and communication technologies) has been hypothesised
to aﬀect worker’s health. The relationship between stressful working conditions, psychosocial
aspects of work and the possible development of pathologies has mainly been analyzed with two
theoretical frameworks : the Eﬀort-Reward Imbalance Model initially developed and tested by
Siegrist (1996) and the Job Demand Control Model of Karasek (1979) – see for instance Ferrie
et al. (1998); Askenazy et al. (2006) for empirical evidence of the health-damaging impact of
work pressure and organisational change.
Career insecurity and health
In parallel, popular concern about job security has increased in a large number of industrialized
countries over the past thirty years. Newspapers and other popular sources described the im-
pact of major ﬁrm downsizings and changes in workers’ perceived job security (Valletta, 1999).
Careers indeed seem to be more uncertain and unpredictable than they used to be. Unemploy-
ment spells and temporary work are more common than ever. Careers are particularly insecure
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among the youth. In 2013, the unemployment rate for the 15-24 in the OECD was equal to
16.2% – as compared to 7.3% for prime-age workers. It was as high as 20.9% in the UK, 23.9%
in France, 40% in Italy and above 50% in Spain and Greece. Only 16.7% of prime-age indi-
viduals were in their job for less than 12 months in 2013, while this proportion amounted to
50.4% among the youth. At the other end of the age spectrum, elderly workers have particu-
larly few job opportunities. In the OECD, employment rates of those aged 55-64 – 56.4% in
2013 – were particularly low. The incidence of long-term unemployment (12 months and over)
among people aged 55 and over was as high as 43.8%. Most elderly workers prefer to take early
retirement routes, sometimes after unemployment or disability periods. In-between these two
critical periods, permanent-contract holders represent the main bulk of prime-age workers in
the OECD (83% in 2013). However, the incidence of long-term unemployment increases with
age (38.4% for the 25-54), so that ﬁnding another job or even ﬁnding a job with a similar salary
if ﬁred or quitting one’s job is likely to be diﬃcult.
Overall, this growing career insecurity is likely to deteriorate health. The recent success of
“Deux jours, une nuit”, a French ﬁlm by Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne is evidence of this
concern. This award-winning ﬁlm stages Sandra, a young woman who works in a small factory.
Sandra suﬀers from a nervous breakdown and is forced to take time oﬀ from her job. In her
absence, her workmates realise that are able to cover her shifts by working slightly longer hours.
The management oﬀers a signiﬁcant pay bonus to each member of staﬀ if they agree to make
Sandra redundant. In this ﬁlm, the link between health and career insecurity is particularly
well depicted : bad health leads to more insecure careers, and even job loss; conversely, ca-
reer insecurity is detrimental to health – or at least increases depressive symptoms, as Sandra
attempts suicide once she learns that she may lose her job.
Objective of the thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to analyse the health consequences of career shocks.
We ﬁrst focus on two critical periods over one’s career : the entry on the labour market and,
at the other end of the age spectrum, retirement. The ﬁrst chapter considers low-educated
individuals in England and Wales who left full-time education in their last year of compulsory
schooling immediately after the 1973 oil crisis. Recent labour economic research shows that
poor macro-economic conditions at labour-market entry lead to persistent and negative career
eﬀects. This chapter investigates whether it also entails negative health consequences. This
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question is a topical issue in the current context. As young cohorts who left full-time education
in the Great Recession faced historically high unemployment rates and experienced diﬃculties
accessing employment, it will most likely generate health disparities in the future.
The second chapter considers another critical period in one’s career, i.e. retirement. Retire-
ment is the most common transition out of employment. Most older workers withdraw from
the labour-force long before reaching the oﬃcial retirement age, either because employment
opportunities are too scarce, or because health problems make it diﬃcult to exert or retain
their jobs. We focus on individuals who take early routes to retirement and build on the large
literature on the eﬀects of retirement on health. The results in this literature are very ambigu-
ous, and whether or not retirement has a detrimental eﬀect on health is still an open debate.
This is mainly due to the fact that analysing the long-term health consequences of retirement
– which are not easily disentangled from the eﬀect of age – remains a hard task. A promising
way to solve this “retirement puzzle” is to look, as we do, at behavioural outcomes following
retirement. These behavioural outcomes can be rapidly modiﬁed in the short-run and precede
the longer-run health outcomes (such as chronic diseases, mortality etc.). We thus analyse how
weight change is modiﬁed in the short-run. There is a good reason to look speciﬁcally at weight
change and obesity, as they are indeed strong predictors of health at old age.
Our last chapter also deals with career shocks and health. The focus, however, is slightly diﬀer-
ent : we do not speciﬁcally focus on a critical period in one’s career. Neither do we consider an
actual or realized career shock. Rather, we investigate the health impact of the anticipation of a
career shock, and more speciﬁcally, the anticipation of job loss. Psychologists have long shown
that the anticipation of a stressful event represents an equally important or even greater source
of anxiety than the event itself (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Although job loss is a highly
traumatizing event, it is fortunately not very frequent. In contrast, the fear of involuntary job
loss, i.e. perceived job insecurity, is likely to be much more widespread, and one may wonder
whether its health impact is as negative as that of actual job loss.
Methodology
Our methodology relies on three key elements. We ﬁrst argue that health is probably better
understood in a lifecourse perspective, and show that this thesis makes an attempt to build in
that direction. A second feature of our methodology is that we pay special attention to the
identiﬁcation of causal relationships between career shocks and health. Finally, we use rich data
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from several surveys : this allows us to widen the geographical scope of our analysis and to
consider a wide range of health indicators.
A lifecourse approach
The lifecourse approach – which was ﬁrst developed in epidemiology – focuses on the long-term
eﬀects on health of physical and social exposures during gestations, childhood, adolescence and
young adulthood. Growing evidence suggests that there are critical periods of growth and
development, not just in utero and early infancy but also during childhood and adolescence,
when environmental exposures do more damage to health and long-term health potential than
they would at other times (WHO, 2000). Recent and often insightful studies in health economics
have indeed shown that socioeconomic circumstances during infancy and early-childhood years
have a bearing on health outcomes and mortality later in life (Almond, 2006; Kesternich et al.,
2014; Lindeboom et al., 2010; Van den Berg et al., 2006). Overall, circumstances early in life play
a crucial role in determining the co-evolution of socioeconomic status and health throughout
adulthood (Cutler et al., 2008). To assess the impact of early-life circumstances on later health
outcomes is an empirical challenge. To investigate this question, life sciences have developed
experimental set-ups – see for instance Herborn et al. (2014) and the extensive literature review
by Gluckman et al. (2008). But economists have mainly used natural experiments. They
exploit sources of independent variation in early-life circumstances that aﬀects later health – but
only via childhood conditions. This independent variation is typically provided by epidemics,
famines, war episodes, the state of the business cycle (e.g. GDP variation) at birth etc.
The lifecourse approach is likely to improve our understanding of how health is determined at
older ages. It also sheds light on how health disparities across socioeconomic status evolve over
time (Cutler et al., 2008). Evidence of this new interest in the lifecourse can be found in Galama
and Van Kippersluis (2010) : in an extension of the Grossman model of the demand for health
(Grossman, 1972),the authors develop an innovative conceptual framework in which multiple
mechanisms and their cumulative long-term eﬀects can be studied in a structural model of
socioeconomic status and health over the lifecourse. From an empirical point of view, however,
data permitting to take such a lifecourse perspective are scarce : most data do not cover a
suﬃcient time span to examine full lifetimes of individuals.
This thesis is a modest attempt to build in this direction. Our ﬁrst two chapters focus on
two critical periods in the lifecourse. The ﬁrst chapter investigates how a shock during early
adulthood – poor economic conditions at labour-market entry – aﬀects health in the long run.
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We exploit the 1973 oil crisis as an exogeneous shock on macroeconomic conditions at school-
leaving. We use data from a repeated cross-section of individuals over 1983-2001 – from 7 to 26
years after school-leaving – to study how their health is impacted in the long-run. The second
chapter focuses on another critical period in the lifecourse, i.e. retirement. Retirement is a
critical period to health as it implies major changes in individual lifestyles. Overall, retirement
is likely to play a major role in shaping post-retirement health.
Identifying causal relations
This thesis studies the impact of career shocks on health in an empirical setting. More speciﬁ-
cally, it exploits observational data from pan-European or British surveys. To assess the causal
impact of work on health from observational data is not always an easy task. This is mainly due
to endogeneity problems that plague the analysis. These endogeneity problems mostly come
down to selection issues which can be either “static” or “dynamic” (Bassanini and Caroli, 2014).
Static selection is known as “the healthy worker eﬀect” : healthy workers are more likely to
be in employment than unhealthy ones; they are also more able to work in jobs with adverse
working conditions – see McMichael (1976); McMichael et al. (1974) for empirical evidence of
this. Dynamic selection happens when changes in workers’ health generate changes in their
employment status or in the number of hours they work. Empirical evidence of such a dynamic
selection can be found for instance in Smith (2004) and García-Gómez et al. (2013). These
two articles provide convincing evidence that health changes – e.g. the onset of a chronic dis-
ease or an acute hospitalization – have non-trivial and long-lasting impacts on labour-market
outcomes. García-Gómez et al. (2013) identify the causal eﬀects of sudden illness, represented
by acute hospitalizations, on employment and income up to six years after the health shock.
The authors use a unique set of linked Dutch hospital and tax register data. Their identifying
assumption is that acute hospitalizations are likely to be exogeneous to socio-economic status –
including labour-market outcomes –, by virtue of being unexpected.8 In addition, the authors
take account of observable diﬀerences between employed individuals with and without an acute
admission by using propensity-score matching and combine this with diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
(DiD) regressions to correct for any selection on time-invariant unobservables. They show that
an acute hospital admission lowers the employment probability by seven percentage points and
results in a 5 percent loss of personal income two years after the shock.
8This assumption is likely to hold as only individuals aged between 18 and 64 who had not been admitted in
hospital in the previous year are included in the sample.
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If not properly dealt with, these endogeneity problems – either static or dynamic selection –
plague the empirical analysis and lead to biased estimates. This is a problem that we face in all
chapters. Let us ﬁrst consider the case of retirement. Retirement is often a choice, and there
is indeed widespread evidence in the literature that workers with poor health status tend to
retire earlier (Currie and Madrian, 1999). A simple correlation between retirement and health
would lead us to overestimate the negative health impact of retirement. Now, turning to job
insecurity, it may be the case that healthy individuals are more likely to be employed in inse-
cure jobs, because they know that they will be able to get a desirable job if ﬁred. If it is the
case, a simple correlation between job insecurity and health would lead us to underestimate the
negative health impact of job insecurity. Endogeneity problems also arise when we assess the
impact of poor economic conditions on long-term health, although in a slightly diﬀerent man-
ner. In essence, time of school-leaving may be endogeneous to the contemporaneous economic
conditions, so that pupils leaving school at compulsory age may be selected. On the one hand,
school-leavers who avoid leaving school in a bad economy may have unobserved characteristics
(e.g. parental socio-economic characteristics) that allow them to postpone their entry on the
labour market. On the other hand, it is likely that only the most capable and hardworking
types are able to leave school during a bad economy since their abilities allow them to secure
desirable jobs regardless of the economic conditions. If, by any chance, these characteristics are
correlated with subsequent health, our estimates will be biased.
In the past three decades, a counterfactual model of causality has been developed, and a uniﬁed
framework for the study of causal questions is now available (Morgan and Winship, 2014). A
wide range of techniques are now widely used in applied economics to answer simple cause-and-
eﬀect questions : matching methods, instrumental-variable models, diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
regressions etc. We use these econometric tools – instrumental-variable methods, typically – to
deal with these causal inference problems. In each chapter, we try to come up with a convincing
identiﬁcation strategy to provide causal estimates. We use natural experiments – the 1973 oil
crisis for instance – as well as the the variation in institutional features to exert exogeneous
shocks on careers.
Surveys and health indicators
We exploit data from three diﬀerent surveys : the British General Household Survey (GHS), the
Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and the 2010 European Work-
ing Conditions Survey (EWCS). Each survey focuses on the speciﬁc population relevant to our
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analysis : individuals in Great-Britain over 1972-2011 (Chapter I), persons aged 50 and over
across European countries over 2005-2010 (Chapter II); and persons in employment in 2010 in
Europe (Chapter III).
These various surveys allow us to consider a wide range of health indicators. Of course, mea-
suring health using survey data is always a challenge : various sources of bias may aﬀect the
assessment of health, such as reporting and justiﬁcation biases (Barnay, 2014). This section
provides a brief overview of these surveys and discusses the various health indicators used in
the thesis.
The General Household Survey. Our ﬁrst chapter exploits British data from the Gen-
eral Household Survey (GHS). The GHS is an annual survey of over 13,000 households and a
nationally representative survey of private households in Great-Britain. It ran from 1972 to
2011 as a repeated cross-sectional survey. The GHS is a new cross-section in each year, so that
although we cannot track any individual over time, we can track birth cohorts. This survey
is particularly adequate for to our analysis since a number of GHS respondents left full-time
education immediately after the 1973 oil crisis. We use the 1983-2001 survey waves and take a
life-course perspective, from 7 to 26 years after school-leaving. The GHS questionnaire included
health measures as far back as the 1970s, although some measures were inconsistent over the
years. It contains information on health, health care and health behaviours. We use a measure
of self-reported health status. Respondents are asked to rate their health on a 3-point scale :
good, fair or bad. We dichotomise the responses into good and bad health (fair or bad). There
is evidence in the literature that self-rated health is a good indicator of individual overall health
(Ferrie et al., 1995). It has been found to be a good predictor of mortality even after control-
ling for more objective measures of health (Idler and Kasl, 1991; Bath, 2003). However, the
probability of reporting good or bad health may suﬀer from individual reporting heterogeneity
(Tubeuf et al., 2008; Etilé and Milcent, 2006). This is why we also include more objective mea-
sures of health, such as the presence of a longstanding illness. These health indicators measure
rather severe conditions, and are particularly well-suited when one is interested in the long-run.
Finally, the GHS includes measures of health care (GP and hospital consultation) as well as
health behaviours (smoking and drinking behaviours). To the extent that reporting bias in self-
reported health measures remains the same across individuals regardless of economic conditions
at labour-market entry, it should not bias our analysis.
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The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. The Survey of Health,
Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel
database containing individual information on health, socio-economic status and social and
family networks. This cross-country dimension is particularly interesting as it gives us the op-
portunity to exploit the European variation in retirement systems to design a neat identiﬁcation
strategy. Approximately 85,000 individuals over 50 years old and their spouses/partners (in-
dependent of their age) from 19 European countries (including Israel) have been interviewed
so far. By now, four waves have been conducted and further waves are being planned to take
place on a biennial basis.9 These panel data are particularly relevant when one is interested in
transitions across waves – retirement, typically – and their short-term consequences. SHARE
includes a wide range of health indicators, which are measured in a consistent way across waves.
The Body Mass Index (BMI) is calculated in each wave as the self-declared weight in kilograms
divided by the square of the self-declared height in meters (kg/m2). The BMI is a rather crude
measure of body composition, as it does not distinguish fat from lean mass (Prentice and Jebb,
2001; Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008). However, it has been shown to be highly correlated with
more precise measures of adiposity. When reported – as it is the case here, the BMI may ad-
ditionally suﬀer from measurement error (Niedhammer et al., 2000; Burkhauser and Cawley,
2008). Following Brunello et al. (2013), we note that the rank correlation between country
level self-reported and objective measures of weight is however very high in Europe (Sanz de
Galdeano, 2007). We summon the existing literature to show that reporting bias in BMI is not
likely not vary with retirement behaviour.
The 2010 European Working Conditions Survey. Since its launch in 1990, the EWCS
measures and monitors trends and changes in working conditions in Europe. It has been con-
ducted every ﬁve years on a random sample of workers (salaried employees and self-employed)
in a growing number of European countries (from 12 in 1990 to 34 in 2010). The European
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions commissioned the ﬁfth wave
of the EWCS to be carried out in winter-spring 2010. This single cross-section is particularly
relevant to our analysis of job insecurity as it is a snapshot of persons in employment across
Europe. Its European dimension allows us to exploit the cross-country variation in Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) to develop an original identiﬁcation strategy. In 2010, the EWCS
survey introduced a detailed health module. Previously, the EWCS had only a few questions
9A ﬁfth wave has been made available to researchers by the beginning of April 2015.
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related to health, such as “Do you think your health or safety is at risk because of your work?”
or “Does your work aﬀect your health, or not?”. The formulation of these questions is problem-
atic, as it is likely to suﬀer from framing eﬀects. This is why we do not use EWCS data prior
to the 2010 wave. The 2010 EWCS module provides information on self-reported health status
(not work-related) as well as on more objective measures of health capturing speciﬁc diseases or
symptoms. In the EWCS database, respondents are asked whether they have suﬀered over the
last 12 months from either backache, skin problems, muscular pain in shoulders, neck and/or
upper limbs, muscular pain in lower limbs, headache or eyestrain, stomach ache, cardiovascular
diseases, depression or anxiety, overall fatigue, or insomnia or general sleep diﬃculties. Most of
these health symptoms are mild – except cardiovascular diseases – and likely to be aﬀected in
the short-term by job insecurity.
Outline of the thesis
This thesis analyses the health impact of three key career shocks – anticipated or not. The ﬁrst
chapter focuses on the entry on the labour market in a bad economy. At the other end of the
age spectrum, the second chapter deals with retirement, while the last chapter considers job
insecurity in prime age.
Chapter I
Our ﬁrst chapter investigates whether leaving school in a bad economy deteriorates health in
the long-run. It focuses on individuals in England and Wales who left full-time education in
their last year of compulsory schooling immediately after the 1973 oil crisis. Our identiﬁcation
strategy relies on the comparison of very similar pupils – born the same year and with a
similar quantity of education (in months) – whose school-leaving behaviour in diﬀerent economic
conditions was exogeneouly implied by compulsory schooling laws. This original identiﬁcation
strategy is diﬀerent in spirit from the ones previously used in the literature. Rather than
considering long periods of economic ﬂuctuations and exploiting the variation in country (or
state) school-leaving unemployment rates, we focus on two birth cohorts only – the 1958 and
1959 cohorts. As a consequence, our results cannot possibly be biased by country-speciﬁc (or
state-speciﬁc) cohort eﬀects. Unlike school-leavers who did postpone their entry on the labour
market during the 1980s and 1990s recessions, we provide evidence that pupils’ decisions to
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leave school at compulsory age immediately after the 1973 oil crisis were not endogeneous
to the contemporaneous economic conditions at labour market entry. We use a repeated cross
section of individuals over 1983-2001 from the General Household Survey (GHS) and take a life-
course perspective, from 7 to 26 years after school-leaving. Our results show that poor economic
conditions at labour-market entry are particularly damaging to women’s health. Women who
left school in a bad economy are more likely to report poorer health and to consult the General
Practitioner over the whole period under study (1983-2001). Additional evidence suggests that
they are also more likely to suﬀer from longstanding illnesses. As for men, the health impact
of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry is more mixed. Men who left school in a
bad economy seem to be negatively aﬀected in various dimensions (smoking status, and to some
extent health status), although these eﬀects are not robust across all speciﬁcations. Finally,
we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry on
subsequent labour-market outcomes from 7 to 26 years after school-leaving.
Chapter II
Our second chapter contributes to the literature on retirement and health. Its originality lies in
the fact that it considers a behavioural outcome not much studied, i.e. weight. Weight change
and obesity are strong predictors of health at old age and can be rapidly modiﬁed following
retirement. We estimate the causal impact of retirement among the 50-69 year-old on Body
Mass Index (BMI), the probability of being either overweight or obese and the probability of
being obese. Based on the 2004, 2006 and 2010-11 waves of the SHARE survey, our identiﬁcation
strategy exploits the European variation in Early Retirement Ages (ERAs) and the stepwise
increase in ERAs in Austria and Italy between 2004 and 2011 to produce an exogeneous shock
in retirement behaviour. Our results show that retirement induced by discontinuous incentives
in early retirement schemes causes a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of being
obese among men within a two to four-year period. We ﬁnd that the impact of retirement is
highly non-linear and mostly aﬀects the right-hand side of the BMI distribution. Additional
results show that our results are driven by men having retired from strenuous jobs and who
were already at risk of obesity. No eﬀects are found among women.
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Chapter III
Our last chapter estimates the causal eﬀect of job insecurity on health. To our knowledge, we
are the ﬁrst to provide such a causal estimate in the literature. We improve on the literature by
using an instrumental-variable strategy which allows us to control for both time-invariant and
time-varying omitted variables and/or reverse causality. We rely on an original instrumental
variable approach based on the idea that workers perceive greater job security in countries where
employment is strongly protected by the law, and relatively more so if employed in industries
where employment protection legislation is more binding, i.e. in industries with a higher nat-
ural rate of dismissals. Using cross-country data from the 2010 European Working Conditions
Survey, we are able to identify the causal impact of perceived job insecurity and show that job
insecurity triggers mild health symptoms. Even in the short-run, the fear of unemployment
gives rise to headaches, eyestrain as well as stomach ache.
Outline
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 explores the link between poor macro-economic
conditions at labour-market entry and health in the long-run. Chapter 2 presents our analysis
on the impact of retirement on weight. The last chapter provides evidence that job insecurity
can be harmful to health. The ﬁnal section concludes.

Chapter 1
The lasting health impact of leaving
school in a bad economy.
Abstract
This paper investigates whether leaving school in a bad economy deteriorates health in the long-
run. It focuses on individuals in England and Wales who left full-time education in their last
year of compulsory schooling immediately after the 1973 oil crisis. Unemployment rates sharply
increased in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, so that between 1974 and 1976, each school cohort
faced worse economic conditions at labour-market entry than the previous one. Our identiﬁ-
cation strategy relies on the comparison of very similar pupils – born the same year and with
a similar quantity of education (in months) – whose school-leaving behaviour in diﬀerent eco-
nomic conditions was exogeneouly implied by compulsory schooling laws. Unlike school-leavers
who did postpone their entry on the labour market during the 1980s and 1990s recessions,
we provide evidence that pupils’ decisions to leave school at compulsory age immediately af-
ter the 1973 oil crisis were not endogeneous to the contemporaneous economic conditions at
labour market entry. We use a repeated cross section of individuals over 1983-2001 from the
General Household Survey (GHS) and take a lifecourse perspective, from 7 to 26 years after
school-leaving. Our results show that poor economic conditions at labour-market entry are
particularly damaging to women’s health. Women who left school in a bad economy are more
likely to report poorer health and to consult a general practitioner over the whole period under
study (1983-2001). Additional evidence suggests that they are also more likely to suﬀer from
This chapter was jointly written with Clémentine Garrouste (Université Paris-Dauphine).
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a longstanding illness/disability over the whole period. As for men, the health impact of poor
economic conditions at labour-market entry is more mixed, and not robust across all speciﬁca-
tions. However, we never ﬁnd that leaving school in a bad economy is beneﬁcial to their health.
Finally, our results show that leaving school in a bad economy does not have a lasting impact
on labour-market outcomes from 7 to 26 years after school-leaving, neither for men, nor for
women.
1.1 Introduction
“Chaque tournant torpide de ce monde engendre des enfants déshérités auxquels rien de ce qui
n’a été, ni de ce qui sera, n’appartient.” Rainer Maria Rilke, Septième Élégie de Duino.
Recent studies in health economics show that socioeconomic circumstances during infancy
and early-childhood years have a bearing on health outcomes and mortality later in life (Al-
mond, 2006; Kesternich et al., 2014; Lindeboom et al., 2010; Van den Berg et al., 2006). There
is indeed growing evidence there are critical periods for health – in utero and early infancy,
but also during childhood and young adulthood (WHO, 2000). This paper investigates whether
leaving full-time education in a bad economy is such a critical period for health, i.e. whether
it is detrimental to health in the long-run. This is an important question from a policy per-
spective, as the youth has suﬀered disproportionately during the Great Recession (Bell and
Blanchﬂower, 2011). Young cohorts who left full-time education in the late 2000s faced his-
torically high unemployment rates. To the extent that leaving school in a bad economy has a
lasting and negative impact on health, this situation will most likely generate important health
disparities in the future.
There are some reasons to believe that poor economic conditions at school-leaving1 lead to
lower health in the long-run. First, higher unemployment rates at school-leaving may lead to
greater stress and trigger addictive behaviours or mental disorders in the short-run. There is
indeed evidence that individuals at a high risk of unemployment are more likely to adopt risky
health behaviours and suﬀer more from depressive symptoms in bad times (Dee, 2001; Dave
and Kelly, 2012; Charles and DeCicca, 2008).2 As a result, health may fall immediately after
1We use the phrase “school-leaving” or “leaving school” in this paper to mean leaving full-time education.
2There is an important literature on the short-term health eﬀect of contemporaneous economic ﬂuctuations.
Most studies consider the whole population and use aggregated data. Quite surprisingly, they point to health
1.1 Introduction 19
school-leaving. If this initial decrease in health is not compensated over the lifecourse, it will
generate lasting health disparities between individuals who left school in a bad economy and
their luckier counterparts. A second empirical pattern motivating this study has to do with
the fact that poor economic conditions at labour-market entry lead to persistent and negative
career eﬀects. Recent evidence in labour economics indeed shows that those who graduate in
bad economies suﬀer from underemployment and are more likely to experience job mismatching
since they have fewer jobs from which to choose (Kahn, 2010). For instance, graduating from
college in a recession has a large, negative and persistent eﬀect on men’s wages in the USA and
Canada (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012).3 Poor economic conditions at labour-market
entry also have adverse eﬀects on men’s probability of being employed, especially among the
low-educated – although this negative eﬀect generally fades out over the next few years (Genda
et al., 2010; Stevens, 2007; Gaini et al., 2012). Workers who enter ﬁrms in economic down-
turns may initially be placed in lower-level jobs with less important tasks and less promotions
(Gibbons and Waldman, 2006), so that graduating in a recession may have negative eﬀects on
various dimensions of job quality e.g. job stress, perceived job security, working hours, career
prospects or more generally working conditions.4 Overall, there is evidence that adverse eco-
nomic conditions at graduation have negative consequences on labour-market outcomes – with
highly-skilled workers and individuals with a strong attachment to the labour force suﬀering
from larger penalties. As there is both theoretical and empirical evidence that career outcomes
are linked to health, one may expect that leaving school in a bad economy has a negative and
lasting impact on health through the cumulative impact of these worse career outcomes. In-
come is indeed generally thought to improve health (Duleep, 1986; Grossman, 1972; Currie,
2009; Gardner and Oswald, 2007), job loss is associated with lower health, adverse health be-
haviours and higher mortality rates (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Deb et al., 2011; Salm,
2009; Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Eliason and Storrie, 2009a), while other job dimensions
– such as job stress, perceived job insecurity, long working hours, harmful working conditions,
downward occupational mobility – have been shown to deteriorate health (Fischer and Sousa-
and health behaviours being countercyclical, at least in the short-run (Buchmueller et al., 2007; Gerdtham and
Ruhm, 2006; Neumayer, 2004; Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005). In contrast, recent researchers’ ﬁndings show
that the impact of contemporaneous macroeconomic conditions is highly heterogeneous across worker’s ex-ante
employment probabilities.
3According to Kahn (2010), the catch-up process for wages is as long as 15 years in the US. Similarly, Kondo
(2007) ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of a recession at labour-market entry on wages in the USA, although the eﬀect is
weaker for women than for men.
4There is not much work on these aspects to date. A notable exception is Schoar and Zuo (2011), on career
prospects. The authors show that economic conditions when CEOs enter the labour market have a long-lasting
impact on their career paths and managerial styles – they are less promoted and are in less prestigious occupations
than their luckier counterparts.
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Poza, 2009b; Fletcher et al., 2011; Caroli and Godard, 2014; Llena-Nozal, 2009; Robone et al.,
2011). Overall, these three empirical patterns make a strong case for the study of the long-term
health consequences of leaving school in a bad economy.
In this paper, we examine the impact of leaving full-time education in a bad economy on
middle and long-term health in England and Wales. We focus on individuals who left full-time
education in their last year of compulsory schooling after the 1973 oil crisis. The proportion of
pupils who left full-time education at compulsory age in the 1970s was remarkably high in the
UK – 50 percent, according to Micklewright et al. (1989). Our identiﬁcation strategy builds
on two sources. First, it relies on the comparison of very similar individuals – born the same
year and with a similar quantity of schooling (in months) – whose school-leaving behaviour in
diﬀerent economic conditions was exogeneously induced by compulsory schooling laws. More
speciﬁcally, within a same birth cohort, pupils born at the end of the calendar year (September
to December) were forced to leave school almost a year later than pupils born earlier in the year
(January to August). Second, it exploits the sharp increase in unemployment rates generated
by the 1973 oil crisis. Between 1974 and 1976, each school cohort indeed faced worse economic
conditions at labour-market entry than the previous one.5 As a consequence, unlucky pupils
born in September-December faced higher unemployment rates at labour-market entry than
pupils born in January-August of the same calendar year.
Of course, a potential selection issue has to do with the fact that pupils’ decisions to leave school
at compulsory age may be endogeneous to the contemporaneous economic conditions at labour-
market entry. Prior research has indeed linked schooling choice to decreased labour-market
opportunities (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1981; Card and Lemieux, 2001; Betts and McFarland,
1995) and shows that individuals tend to remain in school during economic downturns. We
show, however, that this is not the case in our setup. Unlike school-leavers who did postpone
their entry on the labour market during the 1980s and 1990s recessions, pupils’ decisions to
leave school at compulsory age between 1974 and 1976 were not endogeneous to the contem-
poraneous economic conditions at labour-market entry. We argue that the 1973 oil crisis was
highly unexpected and that pupils who were in their last year of schooling at that time did not
anticipate the adverse career eﬀects of leaving school when unemployment rates were high.
5We focus on pupils who left school at compulsory age between 1974 and Easter 1976 – e.g. the 1958 and
1959 birth cohorts. We do not consider older individuals so as to abstract from the eﬀect of the increase in
school-leaving age from 15 to 16 from September 1972 on. In our setup, all individuals are aﬀected by the 1972
reform, so that our identiﬁcation strategy does not rely on the comparison on pre-reform cohorts and post-reform
cohorts.
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We use a repeated cross section of individuals over 1983-2001 from the General Household
Survey (GHS) and take a lifecourse perspective6, from 7 to 26 years after school-leaving. We
investigate the middle to long-term impact of leaving school in a bad economy on health status,
health care and health behaviours. We examine the potential labour-market mechanisms by
which adverse economic conditions at school-leaving may aﬀect later health. Our results show
that poor economic conditions at labour-market entry are particularly damaging to women’s
health. Women are more likely to report poorer health and have a higher probability of con-
sulting a general practitioner over the whole period (1983-2001). Additional results suggest
that they have a higher propensity to suﬀer from a longstanding illness or disability. As for
men, the health impact of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry is more mixed, and
not robust across all speciﬁcations. Depending of the speciﬁcation used, our eﬀects range from
health-damaging eﬀects to insigniﬁcant ones. However, we never ﬁnd a positive health eﬀect of
poor economic conditions at labour-market entry on men’s health. Finally, we ﬁnd that leaving
school in a bad economy does not have a lasting impact on labour-market outcomes from 7 to
26 years after school-leaving, neither for men, nor for women.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First and foremost, it contributes to
the emerging literature investigating the long-term health consequences of graduating in a bad
economy. To our knowledge, only a very limited number of studies (Maclean, 2013; Hessel and
Avendano, 2013; Cutler et al., 2015) have addressed this question. So far, results turn out
to be mixed. Maclean (2013) uses US data – the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 79
(NLSY79) – and exploits the variation in school-leaving state unemployment rates to identify
the eﬀect of leaving school in a bad economy on health at age 40. Members of her sample left
school between 1976 and 1992. As time or location of school-leaving may be endogeneous to
the contemporaneous unemployment rate, she uses instrumental-variable (IV) methods to deal
with selection problems related to what she refers to as “endogeneous sorting”. She ﬁnds that
men who left school when the state unemployment rate was high have a higher probability to
report poor or fair health as well as depressive symptoms and have lower physical functioning
at age 40. Surprisingly, she ﬁnds that women leaving school in a bad economy tend to have
fewer depressive symptoms at age 40. Hessel and Avendano (2013) use European data, namely
the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). They consider individuals
6The GHS is a new cross-section in each year so that, although we cannot track any particular individual
over time, we can track birth cohorts.
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aged 50 and over who left school from 1957 onward. They use country-speciﬁc unemployment
rates and trend deviations based on the reported year of leaving full-time education. According
to their results, poor conditions at school-leaving predict worse health status among women
and better health status among men. They provide evidence that highly-educated women are
particularly aﬀected. However, the authors acknowledge that both selection into higher educa-
tion and causation mechanisms may explain this association. Finally, Cutler et al. (2015) use
the Eurobarometer data and consider economic ﬂuctuations over 50 years across 31 countries.
They show that higher unemployment rates at graduation are associated with lower income,
lower life satisfaction, greater obesity, more smoking and drinking later in life, for both men
and women. According to their results, education seems to play a protective role, especially
when unemployment rates are high. In a series of recent papers Maclean (2014c,a,b) speciﬁcally
tests whether leaving school in an economic downturn persistently aﬀects drinking behaviour,
body weight and the probability of access to an employer-sponsored health insurance. She uses
the same methodology and data as in Maclean (2013) and ﬁnds that men, but not women,
who leave school in a bad economy consume more drinks and are more likely to report heavy
and binge drinking than otherwise similar men. Unlucky men have lower bodyweight and are
less likely to be overweight and obese at age 40. Finally, she ﬁnds that both men and women
are less likely to have access to an employer-sponsored health insurance up to 18 years after
school-leaving.
Overall, the evidence provided by the literature is rather mixed. Of course, diﬀerences in the
age groups considered may account for these conﬂicting results. Diﬀerences in terms of labour
markets, social security schemes and social policies between the US and Europe may also play
a role. In spite of this, additional evidence is needed to understand the long-term health conse-
quences of leaving school in a bad economy – and particularly its heterogeneous impact across
gender.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, our identiﬁcation
strategy is diﬀerent in spirit from the ones previously used in the literature. Rather than con-
sidering long periods of economic ﬂuctuations and exploiting the variation in country (or state)
school-leaving unemployment rates, we focus on two birth cohorts only – the 1958 and 1959
cohorts. Our strategy relies on the comparison of similar individuals – born the same year
and with a similar quantity of education – whose school-leaving behaviour in diﬀerent eco-
nomic conditions was exogeneously induced by compulsory schooling laws. As a consequence,
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our results cannot possibly be biased by country-speciﬁc (or state-speciﬁc) cohort eﬀects. Sec-
ond, we show that pupils’ decisions to leave school at compulsory age between 1974 and 1976
were not endogeneous to the contemporaneous economic conditions at labour-market entry –
unlike school-leavers during the 1980s and 1990s recessions. There is no need, then, to deal
with problems related to endogeneous sorting of school-leaving and our results do not rely on
the usual assumptions when implementing instrumental-variables models. Third, our data al-
low us to adopt a lifecourse perspective, which is only present in the paper by Cutler et al.
(2015). Finally, we focus on low-educated individuals. There are some good reasons to focus
on pupils leaving school at compulsory age : ﬁrst, they represent a sizeable proportion of pupils
in England and Wales in the mid-70s (approximately 50%). Second, whether they should be
more aﬀected than highly-educated individuals by high unemployment rates at labour-market
entry – i.e. whether education plays a protective role – remains an open question. On the one
hand, economic theory predicts less persistence of poor economic conditions at school-leaving
for low-skilled workers and those with weak attachment to the labour force. On the other hand,
education has been hypothesised to increase one’s ability to cope with negative shocks and
uncertainty (Cutler et al., 2015; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Smith, 2004). If, according
to Cutler et al. (2015), education does play a protective role, leaving school at compulsory age
in a bad economy will act as a double whammy. Individuals who leave school early typically
have worse health statuses, and more rapidly declining health statuses over the lifecourse than
higher-educated ones. If they are disproportionately aﬀected by poor economic conditions at
labour-market entry, this will further exacerbate health disparities among education groups.
In this context, investigating the long-term health impact of leaving school in a bad economy
among low-educated individuals seems crucial.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1.2 sketches an economic model
of the link between poor economic conditions at labour-market entry and long-term health.
Sections 1.3 presents the institutional framework and Section 1.4 the empirical approach. Sec-
tion 3.3. describes the data that we use. Section 1.5 reports our results and Section 1.6
concludes.
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1.2 An economic model
In this section, we propose an economic model of the link between economic conditions at school-
leaving and health in the long-run. Our model is an extension of the Grossman model of the
demand for health (Grossman, 1972). More speciﬁcally, it relies on the innovative conceptual
framework developed by Galama and Van Kippersluis (2010) in which multiple mechanisms and
their cumulative long-term eﬀects can be studied in a structural model of socioeconomic status
and health over the life cycle.
Following the usual formulation, health is treated as a form of health capital and individuals
derive both consumption (health provides utility) and production beneﬁts (health increases
earnings) from it. Health is modeled as a stock that deteriorates over the lifespan and its
deterioration can be counteracted by health investment in curative and/or preventive care.
Individuals maximize their life-time utility functions :
∫ T
0
U(t)e−βtdt (1.1)
where T denotes the life span and β is a subjective discount factor. Individuals derive utility
U(t) = U [Ch(t), Cu(t), H(t)], where Ch(t) denotes healthy consumption (e.g. healthy food,
healthy neighborhood), Cu(t) unhealthy consumption (e.g. smoking or drinking) and H(t)
health status. In our framework, time t is measured from the time an individual completes her
education and joins the labour force. Utility increases with healthy consumption ( ∂U(t)
∂Ch(t)
≥ 0),
unhealthy consumption ( ∂U(t)
∂Cu(t)
≥ 0) and with health ( ∂U(t)
∂H(t) ≥ 0). Individuals maximise their
life-time utilities given a budget and a time constraint, and health is deﬁned as :
H(t) = Im(t)α + (1− d(t))H(t− 1) (1.2)
where H(0) and H(T ) are respectively the initial and end conditions. Health can be im-
proved through investment in curative medical care Im(t) and deteriorates at rate d(t) =
d[t, Ch(t), Cu(t), z(t), Ip(t); ξ(t)]. The health production function Im(t)α is assume to exhibit
decreasing-returns-to-scale (0 < α < 1). d(t) depends on healthy consumption Ch(t), unhealthy
consumption Cu(t), “job-related health stress” z(t) (which is interpreted broadly as all physical
working conditions and psychological aspects of work that can be harmful to health), investment
in curative care Ip(t) and on a vector of exogenous functions ξ(t).
Consumption can be healthy ( ∂d(t)
∂Ch(t)
≤ 0) or unhealthy ( ∂d(t)
∂Cu(t)
> 0). Preventive care is
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modeled analogous to curative care as an activity that provides no utility ( ∂U(t)
∂Ip(t)
= 0) but is
demanded for its health beneﬁts ( ∂d(t)
∂Ip(t)
< 0). Greater job-related health stress z(t) accelerates
the “ageing” process (∂d(t)
∂z(t) > 0).
In this framework, poor economic conditions at school-leaving can aﬀect health through two
distinct – although not mutually exclusive – mechanisms :
1. An “initial shock effect”. In this scenario, higher unemployment rates at school-leaving
lead to greater stress. This triggers addictive behaviours as well as mental disorders in the
short-run, so that health falls immediately after school-leaving. This decrease in health
causes the desired level of medical care to rise, but not necessarily enough to restore the
health status at the counterfactual level – i.e. the health status of luckier individuals.
To be more speciﬁc, let us consider two identical individuals a (who left school in a bad
economy, i.e who is “treated”) and c (“non-treated”) that diﬀer only in their health at
school-leaving. Individual c is supposed to be in better health than individual a (Hc > Ha)
at school-leaving but is otherwise identical to individual a. A smaller health status (Ha <
Hc) results in a higher optimal level of investment in curative care Iam > I
c
m. Following
Galama and Van Kippersluis (2010), two scenarios can be considered. In scenario 1, the
elasticity of health investment with respect to health is assumed to be small. In this
scenario, the gap between individuals a and c tends to widen over time.7 In scenario 2,
the elasticity of health investment with respect to health is assumed to be high. In this
case, the gap between individuals a and c is likely to close as individuals age.8
2. A “cumulative effect”. In this scenario (3), we do not assume an “initial shock eﬀect” at
school-leaving. Rather, we assume that leaving school in a bad economy has a negative and
lasting impact on health through the cumulative impact of worse career outcomes – and
in particular through the eﬀect of lower life-time earnings. In our framework, diﬀerences
between individuals in life-time earnings operate similar to an increase in endowed wealth.9
Wealthier individuals invest more in curative and preventive care, and their level of healthy
consumption is higher. They also engage in work that is more conducive to health, i.e. jobs
associated with lower levels of job-related health stress. Overall, higher life-time earnings
7In this scenario, individual a tends to consume less healthy consumption Ch(t) and invests less in preventive
care Ip(t), while the eﬀect on unhealthy consumption Cu(t) and job-related health stress is ambiguous.
8In this scenario, individual a consumes less unhealthy consumption Cu(t), engages less in job-related health
stress z(t), and invests more in preventive care Ip(t), while the eﬀect on healthy consumption Ch(t) is ambiguous.
9There are indeed reasons to believe that the life-time wealth eﬀect dominates the eﬀect of the increased
opportunity cost of time due to higher current earnings (Galama and Van Kippersluis, 2010).
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protect health by encouraging healthy life styles and enabling individuals to work and live
in healthy environments. In this scenario, poor economic conditions at school-leaving lead
to lower health in the long-run through the cumulative impact of lower earnings.
Figure 1.1 presents the evolution of health during the lifespan. The red dashed curves
show the potential scenarios for treated individuals, whereas the black solid curve presents the
evolution of health for those who are untreated. The blue vertical line stands for the entry on
the labour market. The “initial shock” hypothesis is consistent with the idea that health status
among treated individuals falls in the short-term (scenarios 1 and 2). In scenario 1, the desired
level of medical care rises in order to restore health, but not enough to restore the counterfactual
level of health in the long-run. In scenario 2, this level rises as its counterfactual level, so that no
health disparities are observed in the long-run. The “cumulative eﬀect” hypothesis is depicted
by scenario 3. In this scenario, diﬀerences in life-time earnings lead to a widening health gap
between treated and non-treated individuals. Note that this health gap may be persistent in the
long-run even if earnings among treated and non-treated individuals ﬁnally catch up at some
point.
1.3 Institutional framework
This section describes the compulsory schooling laws in England and Wales (see section 1.3.1)
and provides graphical evidence of the sharp increase in unemployment rates after the 1973 oil
crisis (see section 1.3.2).
1.3.1 Compulsory schooling in England and Wales
The British compulsory schooling laws specify the maximum age at which pupils have to start
school and the minimum age at which pupils are allowed to leave school.
The oﬃcial school-starting age is the beginning of the term starting after the child’s ﬁfth birth-
day. Hence, entry rules determine that a school cohort consists of children born between the
ﬁrst day of September and the last day of August in the following calendar year (Del Bono and
Galinda-Rueda, 2007). In other words, due to the discontinuity introduced by the school-entry
rule, students within a same birth cohort belong to diﬀerent school cohorts. There is evidence
that compliance with school-entry requirement is almost perfect and that grade repetition (or
grade skipping) is almost non-existent in England and Wales (Sharp et al., 2002; Grenet, 2013).
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The current school leaving age of 16 was increased twice in England and Wales10, from age 14
to 15 in 1947 and from age 15 to 16 in 1972.11 The proportion of children leaving education at
the ﬁrst legal opportunity in the UK is high by the standards of other industrialised countries
(Micklewright et al., 1989). In the early 1960s, only about 20% of pupils stayed in full-time
education after having reached the minimum school-leaving age (Del Bono and Galinda-Rueda,
2007; McVicar and Rice, 2001). In our data, this proportion amounts to 50% in the mid-1970s.
After the 1972 Raising Of the School-Leaving Age (ROSLA), students in their last year of
compulsory schooling were normally attending secondary school (Year 11) while the less aca-
demically inclined were in vocational training. Two types of qualiﬁcations could be obtained at
the end of Year 11 : the General Certiﬁcate of Education Ordinary Level (GCE O level) or the
Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education (CSE). Both credentials were awarded at the end of junior
secondary school, after an examination (Grenet, 2013).
Unlike other countries – and unlike the USA –, the implementation of compulsory schooling in
England and Wales diﬀers in that a student is not allowed to leave school on the exact date
(birthday) in which she reaches the school-leaving age. Between school years 1963-1964 and
1996-1997, (see the Education Act of 1962, Appendix A-1.3.), the rules governing school exit
implied that pupils who reached age 16 between the 1st of September and the 31st of January
had to complete their education until the following Easter. Students who reached the age of
16 between the 1st of February and the end of August were forced to leave school at the end
of the summer term, typically in May/June. Pupils born between the end of the summer term
and August – i.e. pupils born in July or August – were thus allowed to leave school before their
16th birthday, i.e. at age 15.
To show how these exit rules support our identiﬁcation strategy, we present in Figure 1.2
the authorised school-leaving date with respect to students’ month-year of birth. It makes it
clear that students born in the same calendar year belonged to diﬀerent school cohorts due to
the discontinuity introduced by the school entry rule (see column 3). It also provides evidence
that, within the same birth cohort, the oldest pupils – born between January and August –
were allowed to leave school at Easter or in May/June of year t whereas the youngest – born
10The education system in Scotland is diﬀerent and not considered here.
11Several studies use these changes in minimum school-leaving age to identify the returns to education on
labour market outcomes and health (Harmon and Walker, 1995; Oreopoulos, 2006; Devereux and Hart, 2010;
Grenet, 2013; Clark and Royer, 2013). Note that in our setup, however, all individuals are aﬀected by the
1972 ROSLA reform. Our identiﬁcation strategy does not rely on the comparison on pre-reform cohorts and
post-reform cohorts.
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between September and December – were not allowed to leave school until the following Easter
of year t+1. Figure 1.3 provides an illustration of how the compulsory schooling rules operate by
taking the 1958 birth cohort as an example. Note that, due to the discontinuities introduced by
both school-entry and school-exit rules, pupils born in diﬀerent months had a similar quantity
of schooling (in months) at the end of full-time education. A maximum diﬀerence of three
months of education upon reaching the ﬁnal year of schooling was induced by the existence of
two speciﬁc school-leaving dates (Easter or the end of the summer term). It is highly unlikely,
however, that this three-month diﬀerence should have an impact on health. Clark and Royer
(2013) indeed show that the additional year of schooling induced by the 1972 ROSLA reform
had no eﬀect on health whatsoever. In this context, it seems highly unlikely that a three-month
diﬀerence in compulsory schooling may have a determinant impact on health – especially as the
pupils considered by Clark and Royer (2013) are very similar to the pupils considered here.
1.3.2 Unemployment rates
The sharp and unprecedented increase in the oil price from three to ten dollars a barrel in
October 1973 had serious eﬀects on the balance of payments of the industrial nations, which
were oil-importer countries. This ﬁrst world-wide recession had strong eﬀects on unemployment
rates in a number of industrialised countries, including the UK (Bhattarai, 2011).12
Figure 1.4 provides evidence of the sharp increase in unemployment rates after the 1973 oil
crisis. The 1973 oil crisis – which occurred in October 1973 – is symbolised by the vertical dark
blue line on the left-hand side. The blue line shows the unemployment rates for all individuals
aged 16-6413 and the red and green lines show the unemployment rates for men and women
respectively. As shown in Figure 1.4, unemployment rates gradually increased between 1974 and
1978 – when the economy recovered – with the sharpest increase between 1974 and 1976. The
vertical blue areas on Figure 1.4 indicate the periods at which each school cohort was allowed
to leave school, i.e. at Easter/May/June. As made clear by the graph, each school cohort faced
signiﬁcantly higher unemployment rates than the previous school cohort.14
12Thus, it can reasonably be argued that the 1973 crisis was not endogenous to health in the UK.
13Unemployment rates (UR) are provided by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS). UR for individuals aged
16-25 are not available on a monthly basis from the ONS for the period under study. We compute UR for the
16-25 on an annual basis using the 1975 and 1977 waves of the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). Our computations
show that UR among the 16-25 were high, and increased from 7.34% in 1975 to 9.05% in 1977, corresponding to
a 23% increase within a two-year period. This increase lies in the same range of magnitude as the increase in UR
experienced by individuals aged 16-64 – from 4.5% in 1975 to 5.6% in 1977, corresponding to a 24% increase.
14The unemployment rate increased by 0.7 percentage point between Easter/May/June 1974 and
Easter/May/June 1975. It increased by 1.1 percentage point between Easter/May/June 1975 and
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1.4 Empirical approach
Section 1.4.1 presents our main identiﬁcation strategy as well as the model we estimate. Sec-
tion 1.4.2 discusses the validity of this identiﬁcation strategy and presents a placebo test. Sec-
tion 1.4.3 introduces a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences strategy as an additional speciﬁcation.
1.4.1 Identification strategy and model
We consider pupils who left school at minimum school-leaving age and who entered the labour
market between Easter 1974 and Easter 1976, i.e. the 1958 and 1959 birth cohorts. We do not
consider older individuals so as to abstract from the eﬀect of the increase in school-leaving age
from 15 to 16 from September 1972 on.
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the comparison of similar individuals – born the same
year and with a similar amount of education (in months) – whose school-leaving behaviour in
diﬀerent economic conditions was exogeneously induced by compulsory schooling laws (both
school entry and exit rules). More speciﬁcally, within a same birth cohort, pupils born at the
end of the calendar year (September to December) were forced to leave school almost a year
later than pupils born earlier in the year (January to August). We exploit the fact that be-
tween 1974 and 1976, each school cohort faced worse economic conditions at labour market
entry than the previous one (due to the sharp increase in unemployment rates generated by the
1973 oil crisis). Thus, within each birth cohort, pupils born between September and December
faced higher unemployment rates at labour-market entry than pupils born between January and
August. Note that our identiﬁcation strategy does not rely on the comparison on individuals
who left school before and after 1973.15 In our setup, all individuals are aﬀected by the 1973
oil crisis. However, some pupils (the “treated”) left school in worse conditions than otherwise
similar pupils.16
Easter/May/June 1976. This increase was somewhat milder between 1976 and 1977 as well as between 1977
and 1978 (a 0.1 percentage point increase in both cases).
15This is because pupils who left school at minimum school-leaving age before and after the 1973 oil crisis are
not comparable. Those who left school at compulsory age before the crisis were 15 years old, while those who
left school at compulsory age after the crisis were 16 years old (due to the 1972 ROSLA reform). This diﬀerence
in years of education makes it diﬃcult to attribute the diﬀerences in health outcomes to economic conditions at
labour-market entry.
16The 1973 oil crisis had a disproportionate impact on some regions – typically in Wales and the North of
England. However, we do not use this additional regional variation. First, we do not have reliable data on UK
regional unemployment rates at a suﬃciently disaggregated level in the 1970s. Second, we do not have information
on the actual region in which the individual lived at age 16.
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We use a repeated cross-section of individuals over 1983-2001 to estimate the following
equation by standard probit, for men and women separately :
H∗i = α+ γTi +BirthY eari + f(BirthMonthi) + InterviewY eari + ǫi (1.3)
where H∗i denotes the latent health status of individual i and is only observed as:
Hi = 1{H∗i >0}
(1.4)
and where Ti is a dummy variable taking value 1 if individual i is treated, i.e. born between
the 1st of September and the 31st of December and value 0 if non-treated, i.e. born between the
1st of January and the 31st of August. BirthY eari is a dummy variable for individual i’s year of
birth. InterviewY eari is a dummy variable for individual i’s interview year.17 f(BirthMonthi)
is a linear function of age in months within a birth year. We deﬁne it as (12−BirthMonthi),
where BirthMonthi denotes the month of birth of respondent i and varies from 1 to 12.18 We
include this linear function of age in Equation (3.3) to account for the fact that within each
birth cohort, treated individuals (born September-December) are younger than non-treated
pupils (born January-August). As age and health are negatively correlated, not taking into
account this age diﬀerence – which is a diﬀerence in months within a birth cohort – may lead us
to underestimate the negative impact of leaving school in a bad economy.19 Finally, ǫi denotes
the error term.
Equation (3.3) estimates the average eﬀect of leaving school in a bad economy on health over
the whole period (γ̂). But our empirical approach also allows us to take a lifecourse perspective.
To do so, we compute the marginal eﬀects of the treatment associated with each interview year
17We control for InterviewYear to account for the fact that we observe individuals at diﬀerent points in
time. We choose to include a dummy indicating the year in which an individual is interviewed rather a dummy
indicating the survey wave in which she is interviewed. This is because a survey wave can be conducted over
several years – usually two.
18One may worry that introducing simultaneously the variables Ti, BirthY eari and (12 − BirthMonthi) in
Equation (3.3) should lead to multicollinearity issues. When estimating Equation (3.3), we ﬁnd that the VIF
(Variance Inﬂation Factor) criterion is lower than 10 for all variables, suggesting inconsequential multicollinearity
(see the rule of thumb provided by Hair et al. (1995)).
19As expected, estimating Equation (3.3) without the linear function of age in months yields very similar
estimates, although of lower magnitude and less signiﬁcant (results are not shown but available upon request).
1.4 Empirical approach 31
over 1983-2001.20 This allows us to investigate whether the impact of poor economic conditions
at labour-market entry on health is driven by middle or long-term eﬀects.
A key assumption is that pupils in their last year of compulsory schooling do not stay
strategically in school when the economy deteriorates, i.e. do not engage in what we refer to as
“endogeneous timing”. If pupils anticipate the adverse eﬀects of leaving school in a bad economy
and enroll in an additional year of schooling, our estimates will be biased. We discuss this point
in section 1.4.2.1. A second identifying assumption is that if there are no other institutional
diﬀerences within each birth cohort generating diﬀerences in health among the treated and the
non-treated apart from school-exit rules (see section 1.4.2.2 for a discussion on school-entry rules
and section 1.4.2.3 for a discussion on the diﬀerential incentives to take GCE O-level/CSE ex-
aminations induced by the January/February discontinuity), we can safely attribute observed
diﬀerences in health to the impact of labour-market conditions at labour-market entry. To
the extent that individuals born between January and August and individuals born between
September and December are identical in all observable and unobservable characteristics (see
section 1.4.2.4 for a discussion of the potential eﬀects of season of birth) the diﬀerences in
health status will be driven only by school-exit rules and hence diﬀerent unemployment rates
at labour-market entry, thus allowing us to identify the health consequences of leaving school
in a bad economy.
1.4.2 Validity of the identification strategy
1.4.2.1 Endogenous timing of school-leaving
Time of school-leaving may be endogeneous to the contemporaneous economic conditions. The
sign of the bias arising from endogeneous timing, however, is diﬃcult to predict. On the one
hand, school-leavers who avoid leaving school in a bad economy may have unobserved charac-
teristics (e.g. ﬁnancial resources, other parental characteristics) that allow them to postpone
their entry on the labour market. On the other hand, it is likely that only the most capable
and hardworking are able to leave school during a bad economy since their abilities allow them
to secure desirable jobs regardless of the economic conditions. These characteristics may be
20More speciﬁcally, we estimate Equation (3.3) and substitute the interaction term Ti ∗ InterviewY eari for
Ti. Interview-year speciﬁc marginal eﬀects correspond to the estimated marginal eﬀects associated with the
interaction terms.
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correlated with subsequent health, in which case our estimates will be biased.
Whether pupils in their last year of compulsory schooling stay strategically in school when the
economy deteriorates is an empirical question. For each birth cohort, Figure 1.5 shows the pro-
portion of pupils who left school at compulsory age among the treated and non-treated group.
It also pictures the one-year growth in school-leaving unemployment rates (calculated for the
March-June period) faced by the youngest school cohort (treated) – as compared to the previ-
ous school cohort (non-treated). When considering the 1958 and 1959 birth cohorts, Figure 1.5
shows that within each birth cohort, the proportion of pupils who left school at compulsory age
among the treated and the non-treated group is equal, indicating that school-leaving behaviour
in last year of compulsory schooling was not shaped by the sharp increase in unemployment
rates generated by the 1973 oil crisis. Although treated pupils from the 1958 (1959) birth cohort
faced a 21% (resp. 23%) increase in unemployment rates as compared to luckier pupils born
January-August, they did not enroll in an additional year of schooling.21 When considering
younger birth cohorts, however, we do ﬁnd that a sharp growth in unemployment rate (e.g. the
1980s and 1990s recessions) is associated with a signiﬁcant decrease in the proportion of treated
pupils leaving school at compulsory age.22
Overall, we ﬁnd no evidence that school-leavers born in 1958-1959 – the cohorts that we consider
– did engage in endogeneous timing of school-leaving. When considering younger birth cohorts,
however, we do ﬁnd that a sharp growth in unemployment rate (e.g the 1980s and 1990s reces-
sions) is associated with a decrease in the proportion of treated pupils leaving school at age 16.
It can be hypothesised that pupils in their last year of compulsory schooling in 1974-1976 did
not anticipate the adverse consequences of high unemployment rates at labour market entry –
contrary to school-leavers in the 1980s and 1990s recessions. It may be due to the fact that the
1973 oil crisis was highly unexpected and was the ﬁrst post-war crisis to generate such a sharp
increase in unemployment rates.
21One may argue that even if the proportion of pupils who left school at compulsory age is equal in the treated
and non-treated group, the composition of each group might be diﬀerent. Due to the lack of information on
individual characteristics at age 16, we cannot test this assumption in a proper way. However, we use information
on father’s occupation and show that among pupils born the same year who left school at compulsory age, the
proportion of pupils whose father was in a manual occupation was equal whether they were treated or not.
22The two proportions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the 1963-1964 and 1973-1974 birth cohorts. Interestingly,
this result seems to suggest that rather than high unemployment rates or even increasing unemployment rates,
it is a sharp increase in unemployment rates – typically occurring during recessions – that induces endogeneous
timing among pupils in their last year of education.
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1.4.2.2 School-entry rules
School-entry rules introduce a discontinuity between August-born and September-born children.
This discontinuity implies that students within a same birth cohort belong to diﬀerent school
cohorts. This institutional feature may generate health diﬀerences within a same birth cohort
between treated and untreated pupils by means of age-relative rank, school-cohort size or job-
experience eﬀects. We discuss these issues in what follows.
Age-relative rank
School-entry rules imply that treated individuals (born September-December) are the oldest
pupils in their school cohort, while untreated pupils are the youngest.23 Yet, there is evidence
that relative age eﬀects play a role in school performance. More speciﬁcally, older people in
a given school cohort tend to have higher wages than younger individuals in the same school
cohort – which is interpreted as an indication of the persistence of maturity eﬀects related to
age diﬀerences between students in the same class (Plug, 2001). As treated pupils are the oldest
in their school cohort – and to the extent that relative maturity eﬀects positively aﬀect adult
labour market and health outcomes – we should measure a lower bound, i.e. underestimate
the negative impact of poor economic conditions at labour market entry on long-term labour
market and health outcomes.
School-cohort-size eﬀects
Since treated and non-treated pupils belong to diﬀerent school cohorts, another concern has to
do with school-cohort sizes. School-cohort size has been shown to have a negative impact on
labour market outcomes due to an excess of supply on the labour market (Welch, 1979; Berger,
1985, 1989; Macunovich, 1999; Korenman and Neumark, 1997; Morin, 2011). We focus on three
school cohorts only, which are not likely to be diﬀerent in size.24 To the extent that cohort-size
eﬀects exist, however, we should measure a lower bound : the fertility rate peaked in 1957 and
declined after that, so that for a given birth year the youngest school cohort (treated) would
have higher wages on average than the previous school cohort.
23Conversely, treated individuals (born September-December) are the youngest pupils in their birth cohort,
while untreated pupils are the oldest.
24Cohort sizes do not vary substantially from one year to the next. This is why studies have focused on
long-term (typically 8-25 years) variations in cohort size (Morin (2011)).
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Job-experience eﬀects
School-entry rules imply that within a birth cohort, treated pupils start school one year later
than non-treated pupils. As starting school later entails the opportunity cost of entering the
labour market later, treated pupils lack one year of job experience as compared to non-treated
pupils. However, whether an additional year of job experience has a positive or negative impact
on health is not clear. On the one hand, it leads to higher life-time earnings, which is beneﬁcial
to health. On the other hand, it implies a longer exposure to adverse working conditions, if any.
To the extent that we consider low-skilled individuals, this possibility is not to be discarded.
Hence, the direction of the eﬀect of an additional year of job experience on health is not clear.
1.4.2.3 Differential incentives to take GCE O-level/CSE examinations
Depending on their date of birth (before or after January 31st), individuals within a same
school cohort were allowed to leave school only after one of two speciﬁc dates (Easter or the
end of the summer term) upon reaching their ﬁnal year of schooling. Pupils who left school
at the end of the summer term, however, had higher incentives to take the exam at the end
of Year 11 (O-Level/CSE qualiﬁcations) in which they could be awarded nationally-recognized
qualiﬁcations.25 In this context, the January/February discontinuity might introduce a bias in
our analysis : treated pupils (born between September and December) are allowed to leave at
Easter, and have less incentives to take the exam at the end of the year. It might impact their
educational achievement as well as their adult labour market and health outcomes.
We check in the robustness section that this diﬀerential incentive in taking the exams at the
end of Year 11 is not likely to bias our results.
1.4.2.4 Season-of-birth effects
Our identiﬁcation strategy assumes that individuals born between January and August and indi-
viduals born between September and December are identical in all observable and unobservable
characteristics. Yet, a growing body of literature has shown the importance of season-of-birth
eﬀects on subsequent labour and health outcomes (Bound and Jaeger, 1996).
25Del Bono and Galinda-Rueda (2007) exploit this January/February discontinuity in a regression discontinuity
design and estimate the impact of three additional months of compulsory schooling on educational attainment
and longer labour market outcomes. In this paper, we do not exploit this January/February discontinuity for
two reasons : (i) unemployment rates do not vary enough between Easter and the end of the summer term and
(ii) our sample would probably be too small to detect any eﬀect.
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First, the seasonality of births varies from one social group to another. On US data, Kesten-
baum (1987) reports that children born to high-income families are more likely to be born
in spring.26 In our framework, it implies that untreated pupils should have more favourable
parental socio-demographic characteristics. To the extent that children born to high-income
families are in better health on average, this would lead us to overestimate the impact of poor
economic conditions at labour-market entry on adult health outcomes. Beyond parental socio-
economic characteristics, some health diﬀerences have been proved to show dependence with
respect to birth date, too (Bound and Jaeger, 1996). Doblhammer and Vaupel (2001) have
shown a positive relationship between being born in October to December and longevity at age
50.27 This month-of-birth eﬀect suggests that even in the presence of parental socio-demographic
characteristics, treated pupils should be in better health than untreated pupils, which would
lead us to underestimate the impact of economic conditions at entry on adult health outcomes.
1.4.2.5 Placebo test
Overall, only job-experience eﬀects should lead us to overestimate the negative health impact of
poor economic conditions at labour-market entry. As a ﬁrst step, we check that our estimates
are not upward-biased due to job-experience eﬀects by running a placebo test on the 1953-1954
birth cohorts. The 1953-54 birth cohorts faced very similar school-leaving unemployment rates
at the end of compulsory schooling. Moreover, the same schooling rules applied for these cohorts
(see the 1962 Education Act, Appendix A-1.3.), except that the minimum school-leaving age
was then 15. School-leaving unemployment rates (averaged over March-June) varied from 2.475
to 2.675 over a three-year period (1968-1970).28 Importantly, all pupils born in 1953-1954 who
left school at compulsory age did so after the major events of 1968.
26Note, however, that we do not ﬁnd evidence of this in our data. When considering the whole GHS sample
and using information on father’s occupation (manual or not), we ﬁnd that the proportion of individuals whose
father was in a manual occupation was the same whether individuals were born in September-December or earlier
in the year.
27They show that those born in the northern hemisphere in October to December live about as much as
0.6 year longer than those born in April to June. As expected, data for Australia show that, in the Southern
Hemisphere, the pattern is shifted by half a year. They conclude that the month-of-birth eﬀect is most likely
explained by the seasonal availability of fresh fruit, vegetables and eggs to the pregnant mother in the ﬁrst and
second trimesters.
28Unemployment rates from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) are not available prior to 1973. We use instead
unemployment rates from administrative data – namely the monthly “registrant count” (borrowed from Denman
and McDonald (1996)) – to compute these averages.
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1.4.3 A differences-in-differences approach
As a second step, we implement a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis. This strategy allows us to
eliminate any systematic diﬀerences between September-December born children and January-
August born children (e.g. job experience, season-of-birth, or any other time-invariant charac-
teristic). We use the 1953-1954 cohorts as a “control” group and estimate the following equation
by a linear probability model :
Hi = α+χTi+ δDi+ βTi×Di+BirthY eari+ f(BirthMonthi) + InterviewY eari+ ǫi (1.5)
where Di is an indicator variable taking value 1 if individual i is born in 1958-1959 and
value 0 if born in 1953-1954. β̂ is the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences estimator. It corresponds to
the diﬀerence in health between the treated and untreated individuals across the 1958-59 and
1953-54 cohorts. We assume that if the treated had not been subjected to the treatment (i.e. an
increase in unemployment rates at school-leaving as compared to the previous school cohort),
both treated and untreated groups would have experienced the same trend in health (Lechner,
2010).
1.5 Results
1.5.1 The impact of leaving school in a bad economy on health
In this section, we successively present our main results (see section 1.4.1), the placebo test (see
section 1.4.2.5) as well as the results obtained when implementing the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
approach (see section 1.4.3).
1.5.1.1 Main results
Probit estimates of Equation (3.3) are presented in Table 1.4 for men and women respectively.
Each line presents the marginal eﬀect (resp. standard error and number of observations used in
the model) of having left school in a bad economy (i.e. being treated) for a diﬀerent health out-
come. All our models include dummy variables for interview and birth years as well as a linear
function of age – see Equation (3.3). Our results show that over the whole period (1983-2001),
men who left school in a bad economy face a 17 percentage-point increase in the probability
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of having ever smoked (at the 5% signiﬁcance level). As regards the other health outcomes,
the marginal eﬀects for men do not appear to be statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
Leaving school in a bad economy, however, seems to be particulary health-damaging for women.
Marginal eﬀects in Table 1.4 imply that women who left school in a bad economy have a 11
percentage-point higher probability of reporting poor self-rated health (at the 10% signiﬁcance
level) over the whole period (1983-2001). Consistently, women are also more likely to consult a
GP during the last two weeks (a 12 percentage-point probability increase, at the 5% signiﬁcance
level) over the whole period. In contrast, leaving school in a bad economy does not seem to
aﬀect women’s propensity to restrict their activities due to illness or injury, to suﬀer from a
longstanding illness/disability, nor to go to the hospital during the 12 months preceding the
interview. It does not seem to be particularly harmful to women’s health behaviours such as
smoking and drinking, either.
Figures 1.6 to 1.8 present the impact of having left school in a bad economy on health
outcomes in a lifecourse perspective. While estimates in Table 1.4 provide the average impact of
poor economic conditions at labour-market entry over the whole period (1983-2001), Figures 1.6
to 1.8 allow investigating whether this impact is driven by middle or long-term eﬀects. Each
ﬁgure pictures interview-year speciﬁc marginal eﬀects over 1983-2000 of having left school in
a bad economy (i.e. of being treated) for a diﬀerent health outcome, for men and women
separately. For the sake of conciseness, these ﬁgures are only presented for health outcomes
previously found to be signiﬁcant in Table 1.4. For instance, Figure 1.6 shows the interview-year
speciﬁc marginal eﬀects of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry on the probability of
having ever smoked for men. Correspondingly, Figure 1.7 (resp. Figure 1.8) shows the marginal
eﬀects of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry on the probability of reporting poorer
health (resp. consulting a GP) for women.
Overall, these ﬁgures show that the average impact of leaving school in a bad economy on health
does not seem to be particularly driven by middle or long-term eﬀects – for each ﬁgure, the
majority of marginal eﬀects lie above the zero line for all interview years. This suggests that
men’s smoking behaviour as well as women’s health seem to be negatively aﬀected by poor
economic conditions at labour-market entry over the whole period under study.
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1.5.1.2 Placebo test
We investigate to which extent being born between January and August (as compared to being
born between Semptember and December) inﬂuences health and labour outcomes not in terms
of economic conditions at labour-market entry but by means of unobservable characteristics (age
relative rank, season-of-birth eﬀects etc.). As a ﬁrst step, we re-run our probit models on the
1953-1954 cohorts. Results are presented in Table 1.5. As expected, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of being born between January and August – as compared to being born between September
and December – on any health outcome. All coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant at conventional levels.
1.5.1.3 A differences-in-differences approach
The placebo test has provided ﬁrst evidence that our main results were not likely to be biased by
any systematic (unobservable) diﬀerences between September-December and January-August
born children. To further investigate this matter, we implement a diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences
(DiD) strategy. This strategy uses the 1953-54 cohorts as a “control” group. It controls for any
systematic diﬀerences between September-December born children and January-August born
children. Linear probability estimates of Equation (1.5) are presented in Table 1.6 for men and
women respectively. Marginal eﬀects in Table 1.6 imply that women who left school in a bad
economy face a 6 percentage-point increase in the probability of reporting poor self-rated health
(at the 10% signiﬁcance level) over the whole period (1983-2001). Correspondingly, poor eco-
nomic conditions at labour-market entry increase by 6 percentage points women’s probability of
consulting a GP during the last two weeks (at the 5% signiﬁcance level). When controlling for
any systematic diﬀerences between September-December and January-August born children,
we ﬁnd that women are also more likely to suﬀer from a longstanding illness/disability (a 8
percentage-point increase, signiﬁcant at the 1% level) over the whole period. Overall, the re-
sults obtained for women when implementing a DiD strategy conﬁrm our ﬁndings from the
main analysis. In particular, the DiD estimates are in the same range of magnitude as those
presented in Table 1.4. Our main results for men, however, are not robust to the DiD speciﬁca-
tion. Results from Table 1.6 show that the eﬀect of poor economic conditions at labour-market
entry on men’s smoking behaviour is no longer signiﬁcant.
Overall, our ﬁndings when implementing the DiD strategy make us conﬁdent that our main
estimates for women capture the true eﬀect of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry
1.5 Results 39
– as opposed to any systematic diﬀerences between September-December and January-August
born children.
1.5.2 The impact of leaving school on labour-market outcomes
Labour market characteristics can be viewed as mechanisms by which leaving school in a bad
economy aﬀects long-term health. To investigate this, we regress labour market proxies on the
treatment variable Ti, on year-of-birth and interview dummies as well as on the linear function
of age. Models are estimated by OLS or probit – depending on the nature of the dependent
variable (continuous or dichotomous)).
Table 1.7 presents the eﬀect of leaving school in a bad economy on labour-market outcomes
for men and women respectively. We ﬁnd no eﬀect on unemployment, inactivity patterns and
earnings29, neither for men, nor for women. While women who left school in a bad economy
do not seem to have been in their current job for a shorter period of time, men have a higher
probability of being in their current job for less than one month (coeﬀ : 0.074, signiﬁcant at
the 5% level). This is consistent with the idea that poor economic conditions at labour-market
entry have a negative eﬀect on job tenure. However, the fact that untreated individuals have an
additional year of job experience as compared to treated ones (which is due to the fact that they
entered the labour market one year earlier) could also account for this result. This eﬀect should
be captured by our DiD estimates, though. When implementing the DiD model on labour-
market proxies, the eﬀect on job tenure (i.e. being in a current job for less than one month) for
men vanishes, suggesting that our previous result was mostly driven by job-experience eﬀects.
Other DiD estimates (not shown) are very similar to the ones presented in Table 1.7.
Overall, we do not ﬁnd that leaving school in a bad economy has a lasting impact on labour-
market outcomes 7 to 26 years after school-leaving. This is not really surprising, though, as
we do consider low-educated individuals. Economic theory indeed predicts less persistence of
poor economic conditions at school-leaving for low-skilled workers subsequent labour-market
outcomes. Stevens (2007), Gaini et al. (2012) and Genda et al. (2010) provide evidence that
the negative eﬀect of graduating in a bad economy on labour-market outcomes vanishes after a
few years (usually four or ﬁve) when considering low-educated individuals in Germany, France
and the USA.
29Our results hold when estimating Tobit models for earnings (results not shown but available upon request)
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1.5.3 Robustness Checks
This section performs several robustness checks using our main speciﬁcation (see Equation
(3.3)).
1.5.3.1 Differential incentives to take GCE O-level/CSE examinations
One may worry that treated pupils have fewer incentives to take examinations at the end of
Year 11. It might impact their educational achievement and later health outcomes. To control
for this potential bias, we re-run our regressions controlling by a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual holds a Year-11-equivalent qualiﬁcation (O-level, CSE etc.). Our results
are virtually unchanged.
1.5.3.2 Alternative empirical approach
Up to now, our treatment variable has been a dummy variable indicating whether an individual
was born at the end of the calendar year or earlier in the year (see Equation (3.3)). A possible
drawback of this approach is that it linearises the impact of the treatment across the two birth
cohorts – which may be problematic to the extent that treated pupils do not face the same
increase in school-leaving unemployment rates as compared to non-treated pupils across the
two birth cohorts (a 0.7 and a 1.1 point increase respectively).
To deal with this potential problem, we estimate the following equation by standard probit :
H∗i = λ+ πURi +BirthY eari + f(BirthMonthi) + InterviewY eari + ηi (1.6)
where H∗i denotes the latent health status of individual i and is still observed as a dummy
variable. URi stands for the school-leaving unemployment rate faced by individual i and the
other variables are presented in section 1.4.
Probit estimates of Equation (1.6) are presented in Table A-1.1 and are very similar to the ones
presented in the main analysis (see Table 1.4), although less precisely estimated. In particular,
estimates in Table A-1.1 imply that a one-point increase in school-leaving unemployment rates
leads to a 10 percentage-point increase in the probability of reporting poor health (at the 10%
signiﬁcance level), and a 8 percentage-point increase in the probability of consulting a GP (at
the 15% level) among women. As for men, a one-point increase in school-leaving unemployment
1.5 Results 41
rates leads to a 14 percentage-point increase in the probability of having ever smoked (although
the eﬀect is marginally signiﬁcant at the 15% level). Using this speciﬁcation, we also ﬁnd that
men’s health is negatively aﬀected by poor economic conditions at labour-market entry : a one
percentage-point increase in school-leaving unemployment rates leads to a 13 percentage-point
increase in the probability of reporting poor health (at the 15% signiﬁcance level) and a 7
percentage-point increase in the probability of restricting one’s activity due to illness or injury
(at the 10% signiﬁcance level).
1.5.3.3 A “bad economy”?
Until now, we have implicitly considered that leaving school in a bad economy was equivalent
to leaving school at a time when unemployment rates sharply increased. But more generally,
the term leaving school “in a bad economy” should measure the propensity to suﬀer from
underemployment and to experience job mismatching at labour-market entry. To this extent,
unemployment rates may be important, but so may hiring practices or seasonal ﬂuctuations of
the labour-market. Hiring practices may play an important role, especially as the 1972 ROSLA
reform induced the removal of a whole year’s school leavers from the labour market in 1973. To
this extent, pupils who left school at minimum school-leaving age in 1974 (untreated) did enter
the labour-market at a time when (i) unemployment rates were relatively low (ii) and when
employers were eager to hire low-skilled individuals due to the recent shortage. This implies
that within the 1958 birth cohort, treated individuals did leave school in a worse economy than
untreated ones, which is consistent with our interpretation. Turning to seasonal ﬂuctuations of
the labour-market, one may worry that leaving school at Easter (rather than at the end of the
summer term) should be beneﬁcial in terms of labour-market outcomes. It may indeed be easier
to ﬁnd a job at Easter rather than during the summer term. In this case, seasonal ﬂuctuations of
the labour-market should be beneﬁcial to the treated – who were all allowed to leave at Easter. It
would imply that although treated pupils left school a year later than untreated pupils – a period
during which the state of the economy deteriorated – this deterioration would be partly oﬀset by
the seasonal ﬂuctuations of the labour-market. Figure A-1.1 displays monthly unemployment
rates (not seasonally adjusted) over the 1973-1976 period30 and shows that seasonal labour-
30Monthly unemployment rates (UR) come from an administrative source, namely the “monthly registrant
count”. The registrant count method counts the number of people who registered themselves as unemployed.
Note that people who registered themselves as unemployed did not automatically go on to make a claim for
unemployment-related beneﬁts, but registration was a prerequisite for entitlement. Note also that during this
period, school leavers aged 16 and 17 fell within the eligibility criteria for unemployment beneﬁts. UR calculated
from the “monthly registrant count” diﬀer from the UR measured from the Labour Force Survey used previously
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market ﬂuctuations between Easter and May/June were not likely to play an important role.
It provides evidence that unemployment rates did not follow a particular seasonal pattern
between Easter and the end of the summer term (May/June) over the period under study.
Overall, it appears that both hiring practices and seasonal ﬂuctuations of the labour market
do not invalidate the interpretation of our results, as untreated pupils do seem to enter the
labour-market in a bad economy anyway.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of leaving school in a bad economy on long-term health
status, health care consumption and health behaviours. We consider pupils in England and
Wales who left school in their last year of compulsory schooling immediately after the 1973
oil crisis and whose school-leaving behaviour in worse economic conditions was exogeneously
induced by compulsory schooling laws. We provide evidence that these pupils did not engage
in endogeneous timing. We use a repeated cross section of individuals over 1983-2001 from the
General Household Survey (GHS) and take a lifecourse perspective. We ﬁnd that poor economic
conditions at labour-market entry are particularly damaging to women’s health. Women who
left school in a bad economy are more likely to report poorer health and to consult the General
Practitioner over the whole period under study (1983-2001). Additional evidence suggests that
they are also more likely to suﬀer from a longstanding illness/disability over the whole period.
As for men, the health impact of poor economic conditions at labour-market entry is more
mixed. Men who left school in a bad economy seem to be negatively aﬀected in various dimen-
sions (smoking status, and to some extent health status), although these eﬀects are not robust
to all speciﬁcations. This may be due to a power problem, as our sample for men is smaller
in size than that of women. Finally, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects of poor economic
conditions at labour-market entry on subsequent labour-market outcomes (from 7 to 26 years
after school-leaving), which is consistent with the literature.
The large and lasting health-damaging impact that we ﬁnd among women raises the issue
of the mechanisms through which poor economic conditions at labour-market entry aﬀect long-
term health. Our results are consistent with both the “initial shock” and the “cumulative eﬀect”
(which are measured according on the ILO deﬁnition).
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hypotheses. Our data, however, do not permit to disentangle the two eﬀects. A promising av-
enue for future research would consist in investigating which hypothesis is most likely to hold
in the data.
There are some limitations to our study. The most notable is the small sample size, which
generates quite imprecise results. In particular, the subsample of men is rather small, so that
our results on this population cannot be interpreted as ruling out any damaging impact of poor
economic conditions at labour-market entry on health outcomes.
A potential extrapolation of our ﬁndings is that the Great recession will have lasting and
negative health eﬀects among lower-educated individuals. However, the external validity of our
ﬁndings depends on the similarity between the 1958 and 1959 GLS cohorts and current cohorts
of school-leavers. In the mid-1970s, 50% of pupils left school at compulsory age, while less than
20% do so nowadays. Moreover, there is evidence that the 1973 oil crisis and the current Great
recession did not have the same eﬀects on unemployment rates, wages and working conditions
in the UK Gregg and Wadsworth (2011). In this context, the extent to which our results can
be generalized to young people who entered the labour market during the Great Recession is
not clear.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1 – The evolution of health depending on the scenario.
NT
3
1
age
Health
2
16
Reading : The red dashed curves show the potential scenarios for treated individuals, whereas the black
solid curve presents the evolution of health for those who are untreated. The blue vertical line stands
for the entry on the labour market.
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Figure 1.2 – Compulsory schooling rules by month-year of birth
Birth year Month of birth School starting date Allowed to leave school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1958 January Sept. 1963 Easter 1974
1958 February Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 March Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 April Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 May Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 June Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 July Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 August Sept. 1963 May/June 1974
1958 September Sept. 1964 Easter 1975
1958 October Sept. 1964 Easter 1975
1958 November Sept. 1964 Easter 1975
1958 December Sept. 1964 Easter 1975
1959 January Sept. 1964 Easter 1975
1959 February to August Sept. 1964 May/June 1975
1959 September to December Sept. 1965 Easter 1976
Figure 1.3 – Focus on the 1958 birth cohort
01/09/57 01/12/57
Easter 1974 May-June 1974 Easter 1975
Birth date
School-leaving date
School-leaving date =1975School-leaving date = 1974
01/02 01/06 01/09
Birth year = 1958
Reading : A pupil born between the 1st of September 1958 and the 31st of December 1958 is allowed to
leave school at Easter 1975.
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Figure 1.4 – Unemployment rates for all individuals aged 16-64 over the 1973-1979 period,
seasonally adjusted.
Source : Labour Force Survey (LFS), provided by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS).
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Figure 1.5 – Proportion of pupils leaving school at compulsory age among the treated and the
non-treated; Growth in school-leaving unemployment rate.
Reading: Figure 1.5 displays the proportion of pupils leaving school at compulsory age among the
treated (in red) and non-treated group (in blue); The dashed green line shows the growth in school-
leaving unemployment rate (calculated for the March-June period) faced by pupils belonging to the
youngest school cohort (treated) – compared to pupils born the same year but belonging to the previous
school cohort (non-treated).
Figure 1.6 – Health behaviour for men over the lifecourse
(a) Ever smoked
Note : Interview-year speciﬁc marginal eﬀects of the treat-
ment are computed by estimating Equation (3.3) and sub-
stituting the interaction term Ti ∗ InterviewY eari for Ti.
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Figure 1.7 – Health status for women over the lifecourse
(a) Poor health
Note : Interview-year speciﬁc marginal eﬀects of the treat-
ment are computed by estimating Equation (3.3) and sub-
stituting the interaction term Ti ∗ InterviewY eari for Ti.
Figure 1.8 – Health care for women over the lifecourse
(a) GP consultation
Note : Interview-year speciﬁc marginal eﬀects of the treat-
ment are computed by estimating Equation (3.3) and sub-
stituting the interaction term Ti ∗ InterviewY eari for Ti.
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Table 1.1 – Summary statistics of demographic and health variables
Men Women
Mean s.e N Mean s.e N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Demographics
Age 33.20 (4.20) 1096 31.19a (5.00) 1921
Health status
Poor self-rated health (yes/no) 0.30 (0.46) 1044 0.34 (0.47) 1909
Longstanding illness/disability (yes/no) 0.26 (0.44) 1096 0.23 (0.42) 1917
Restricts activity due to longstanding illness/injury (yes/no) 0.08 (0.27) 1095 0.13 (0.33) 1920
Health care
GP consultation last 2 weeks (yes/no) 0.12 (0.32) 1094 0.21 (0.41) 1920
Outpatient/inpatient spell last 12 months (yes/no) .16 (.37) 1094 .24 (.43) 1918
Health behaviours
Smoking status 619 1029
Currently smokes (yes/no) 0.43 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49)
Has smoked but does not anymore (yes/no) 0.33 (0.47) 0.27 (0.44)
Ever smoked (yes/no) 0.76 (0.43) 0.69 (0.46)
Self-reported drinking behaviour 597 945
High to moderate alcohol consumption (yes/no) 0.52 (0.50) (0.34) 0.47
Notes : a : Women are on average younger than men because they are observed over the whole period
(1983-2001) while men are only observed over 1986-2001 (see Table 1.3).
Table 1.2 – Summary statistics of labour-market characteristics
Men Women
Mean s.e N Mean s.e N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Economic status 1096 1920
Employed or self-employed (yes/no) 0.84 (0.37) 0.58 (0.49)
Unemployed (yes/no) 0.10 (0.31) 0.06 (0.23)
Keeping house (yes/no) 0.01 (0.09) 0.34 (0.47)
Other (yes/no) 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.15)
For those currently employed or self-employed
Usual gross weekly earnings from main job (in pounds) 283.72 (880.68) 819 109.92 (99.03) 970
Time with present employer 724 861
Less than 1 month (yes/no) 0.02 (0.13) 0.03 (0.17)
Between 1 and 3 months (yes/no) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.24)
Between 4 and 6 months (yes/no) 0.04 (0.20) 0.06 (0.24)
Between 7 and 12 months (yes/no) 0.08 (0.27) 0.11 (0.31)
Between 1 and 5 years (yes/no) 0.20 (0.40) 0.34 (0.47)
Five years or more (yes/no) 0.61 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49)
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Table 1.3 – Number of observations by survey wave and birth cohort
Men Women All
(1) (2) (3)
Survey wave
1983 - 159 159
1984 - 153 153
1985 - 127 127
1986 100 130 230
1987 92 140 232
1988-1989 83 140 223
1989-1990 82 102 184
1990-1991 74 126 200
1991-1992 107 124 231
1992-1993 76 97 173
1993-1994 85 109 194
1994-1995 93 98 191
1995-1996 71 121 192
1996-1997 92 118 210
1998-1999 62 85 147
2000-2001 79 92 171
Birth cohort
1958 544 972 1516
1959 552 949 1501
Total number of observations 1096 1921 3017
Notes: (1) The GHS was conducted annually, except for breaks in 1997-1998 when the survey was
reviewed, and 1999-2000 when the survey was redeveloped. (2) Month and year of birth in 1983-1985
are only available for women who completed the Family Information section. They are available for all
respondents over 1986-2001.
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Table 1.4 – The impact of leaving school in a bad economy on health outcomes (1958-59
cohorts)
Men Women
m.e. s.e. N m.e. s.e. N
Probit regressions
Health status
Poor self-rated health 0.081 (0.078) 1043 0.106* (0.057) 1907
Longstanding illness/disability -0.034 (0.069) 1095 0.051 (0.051) 1915
Restricts activity 0.056 (0.045) 1094 0.040 (0.041) 1918
Health care
GP consultation last 2 weeks -0.001 (0.049) 1093 0.119** (0.052) 1918
Hospital consultation 0.000 (0.058) 1095 0.026 (0.051) 1919
Health behaviour
Currently smokes 0.093 (0.105) 618 0.042 (0.079) 1027
Ever smoked 0.170** (0.078) 618 0.086 (0.071) 1027
Moderate to heavy drinking -0.028 (0.107) 596 0.012 (0.080) 943
Notes : *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Marginal eﬀects (m.e.) are presented (com-
puted as marginal probability eﬀects at the sample mean value of the regressors). Robust standard errors
in parentheses (s.e.). Our models include dummy variables for interview and birth year as well as a linear
function of age in months – see Equation (3.3).
Table 1.5 – Placebo test on health outcomes (1953-54 cohorts)
Men Women
m.e. s.e. N m.e. s.e. N
Probit regressions
Health status
Poor self-rated health -0.059 (0.095) 631 -0.073 (0.071) 1204
Longstanding illness/disability -0.007 (0.092) 664 0.047 (0.066) 1210
Restricts activity 0.012 (0.058) 663 -0.002 (0.045) 1213
Health care
GP consultation last 2 weeks -0.047 (0.051) 664 -0.008 (0.056) 1211
Hospital consultation -0.105 (0.061) 664 -0.089 (0.054) 1213
Health behaviour
Currently smokes -0.035 (0.127) 390 0.073 (0.098) 653
Ever smoked 0.050 (0.089) 362 0.052 (0.081) 653
Moderate to heavy drinking -0.177 (0.132) 372 -0.001 (0.097) 617
Notes : *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1.. Marginal eﬀects (m.e.) are presented
(computed as marginal probability eﬀects at the sample mean value of the regressors). Robust standard
errors in parentheses (s.e.). Our models include dummy variables for interview and birth year as well as
a linear function of age in months – see Equation (3.3).
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Table 1.6 – Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis : the impact of leaving school in a bad economy
on health outcomes
Men Women
coeﬀ s.e. N coeﬀ s.e. N
Linear probability models
Health status
Poor self-rated health 0.014 (0.049) 1674 0.061* (0.033) 3111
Longstanding illness/disability 0.013 (0.047) 1759 0.063** (0.030) 3125
Restricts activity 0.017 (0.030) 1757 0.025 (0.023) 3131
Health care
GP consultation last 2 weeks 0.008 (0.033) 1757 0.075*** (0.028) 3129
Hospital consultation -0.052 (0.039) 1759 0.017 (0.029) 3132
Health behaviour
Currently smokes 0.010 (0.068) 1008 -0.027 (0.046) 1680
Ever smoked 0.018 (0.052) 1008 0.013 (0.042) 1680
Moderate to heavy drinking -0.084 (0.069) 968 0.035 (0.046) 1560
Notes : *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Marginal eﬀects are obtained by estimating
Equation (1.5) and computed as marginal probability eﬀects at the sample mean value of the regressors.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (s.e.).
Table 1.7 – The impact of leaving school in a bad economy on labour-market outcomes (1958-59
cohorts)
Men Women
m.e. s.e. N m.e. s.e. N
Probit regressions
Economic status
Keeping house 0.017 (0.033) 495 0.053 (0.057) 1918
Unemployed 0.017 (0.050) 1095 -0.002 (0.026) 1918
For those currently employed
Less than 1 month 0.074** (0.048) 512 0.034 (0.037) 805
Less than 3 months 0.022 (0.048) 613 0.053 (0.059) 861
Less than 6 months 0.001 (0.057) 723 0.029 (0.068) 861
Less than 1 year 0.053 (0.078) 723 -0.035 (0.077) 861
Less than 5 years 0.046 (0.098) 723 -0.091 (0.089) 861
More than 5 years -0.046 (0.098) 723 0.091 (0.089) 861
Linear regressions
Earnings (log) -0.041 (0.094) 799 -0.115 (0.151) 957
Notes : *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. Marginal eﬀects (m.e.) are presented (com-
puted as marginal probability eﬀects at the sample mean value of the regressors). Robust standard errors
in parentheses (s.e.). Our models include dummy variables for interview and birth year as well as a linear
function of age in months – see section 1.4.
Appendix 53
Appendix
A-1.1. Tables and Figures
Table A-1.1 – The impact of leaving school in a bad economys on health outcomes : An
alternative approach using school-leaving unemployment rates (LFS)
Men Women
m.e. s.e. N m.e. s.e. N
Probit regressions
Health status
Poor self-rated health 0.127µ (0.082) 1043 0.101* (0.059) 1907
Longstanding illness/disability -0.031 (0.076) 1095 0.066 (0.053) 1915
Restricts activity 0.074* (0.043) 1094 0.034 (0.041) 1918
Health care
GP consultation last 2 weeks 0.026 (0.054) 1093 0.078µ (0.051) 1918
Hospital consultation -0.029 (0.063) 1095 0.018 (0.054) 1919
Health behaviour
Currently smokes 0.076 (0.114) 618 0.043 (0.084) 1027
Ever smoked 0.144µ (0.097) 618 0.126 (0.078) 1027
Moderate to heavy drinking 0.022 (0.117) 596 0.023 (0.085) 943
Notes : *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1, µ p-value<0.15. Marginal eﬀects (m.e.) are
presented (computed as marginal probability eﬀects at the sample mean value of the regressors). Robust
standard errors in parentheses (s.e.). Our models include dummy variables for interview and birth year
as well as a linear function of age in months – see Equation (1.6).
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Figure A-1.1 – Seasonal ﬂuctuations of the labour-market (1973-1976). Monthly unemploy-
ment rates.
Source : Monthly registrant count (borrowed from Denman and McDonald (1996))
A-1.2. Data Appendix : Sample and variable construction
Changes to sampling procedures and sample sizes over time
According to the GHS Time Series Dataset User Guide (2007), “the sampling procedure used
on the GHS has changed over time, resulting in diﬀerent sample sizes between survey years.
However, the changes to the GHS sample procedures and sample size were relatively small.
As a result it was decided by ONS that these changes were likely to have little impact on the
reliability of the estimates. Particularly as a representative sample of the population has been
achieved for each survey year.”
Non-response weights are only available in the GHS after 2000. As a consequence, all our esti-
mates are unweighted.
Inconsistencies in variables over time
According to the GHS Time Series Dataset User Guide (2007), “in general variables in the GHS
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have remained fairly consistent over time. However as the GHS has been revised and research
interests have changed, some variables have been modiﬁed over the past 30 years to reﬂect this.
For example the marital status variable was revised in the 1986 survey to include a category for
cohabitation. Similarly, some questions were only included on a few survey years, or in more
recent rounds of the survey series, which limits analysis over time.”
Those variables that were only available for a few years, or had substantially changed over time
were not used in the analysis.
A-1.3. School leaving age legislation in England and Wales
Relevant extracts of the 1962 Education Act are borrowed from Del Bono and Galinda-Rueda
(2007).
Education Act 1962: relevant extracts from Section 9
Applies to 15 year old individuals in 1963, i.e. people born in 1947 or afterwards.
(2) If he attains that age on any date from the beginning of September to the end of January,
he shall be deemed not to have attained that age until the end of the appropriate spring term at
this school.
(3) If he attains that age on any date on or after the beginning of February but before the end
of the appropriate summer term at his school, he shall be deemed not to have attained that age
until the end of that summer term.
(4) If he attains that age on any date between the end of the appropriate summer term at this
school and the beginning of September next following the end of that summer term (whether
another term has then begun or not) he shall be deemed to have attained that age at the end of
that summer term. [...]
(7) In this section, “the appropriate spring term”, in relation to a person, means the last term
at this school which ends before the month of May next following the date on which he attains
the age in question, and “the appropriate summer term” [...] means the last term at this school
which ends before the month of September next following that date [...].
Education School leaving Act 1976: relevant extracts from Section 1
Subsections (3) and (4) in Section 9 of the Education Act of 1962 were substituted by the
following subsections of Section 1 of the Education School leaving Act 1976 in order to give a
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more precise meaning to the notion of school leaving dates, particularly for those born after the
end of January.
(3) If he attains that age after the end of January but before the next May school leaving date,
he shall be deemed not to have attained that age until that date.
(4) If he attains that age after the May school leaving date and before the beginning of September
next following that date, he shall be deemed to have attained that age on that date. A new
subsection was added at the end of Section 9 of the Education Act of 1962, according to which:
(8) In this section the May school leaving date means the Friday before the last Monday in May.
Chapter 2
Gaining weight through retirement?
Results from the SHARE survey.
Abstract
This chapter estimates the causal impact of retirement among the 50-69 year-old on Body Mass
Index (BMI), the probability of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being
obese. Based on the 2004, 2006 and 2010-11 waves of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retire-
ment in Europe (SHARE), our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the European variation in Early
Retirement Ages (ERAs) and the stepwise increase in ERAs in Austria and Italy between 2004
and 2011 to produce an exogeneous shock in retirement behaviour. Our results show that re-
tirement induced by discontinuous incentives in early retirement schemes causes a 13 percentage
point increase in the probability of being obese among men within a two to four-year period. We
ﬁnd that the impact of retirement is highly non-linear and mostly aﬀects the right-hand side of
the BMI distribution. Additional results show that our results are driven by men having retired
from strenuous jobs and who were already at risk of obesity. No eﬀects are found among women.
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2.1. Introduction
“Like a lot of athletes, I’ve gained weight since I’ve retired. [. . . ] The doctor said, ‘Hey dude,
if you don’t lose some weight you’re either going to get diabetes, have a stroke or drop dead.
It’s either A, B or C.’” Charles Barkley. Mr. Barkley is a former NBA champion and has
recently retired. He acts as a spokesman for Weight Watchers “Lose Like a Man” campaign.
In its 1998 report, the World Health Organization (WHO) ranked the obesity epidemic
among the leading ten global public health issues. Obesity rates in the world have more than
doubled over the last 30 years (WHO (2012)). In the 27 European Union member states, approx-
imately 60% of the adult population – 260 millions of adults – is either overweight (Body Mass
Index (BMI) from 25 to 29.9 kg/m2) or obese (BMI 30 kg/m2 and above) (International Obesity
Task Force (IASO/IOTF (2010)). Obesity has become a pan-European epidemic (IASO/IOTF
(2002)) and prevalence rates in the EU-27 range from 7.9% in Romania to 24.5% in the United-
Kingdom (OECD (2010a)).
Obesity is a risk factor for numerous highly-prevalent and costly chronic diseases (cardio-
vascular diseases, type-2 diabetes, hypertension and certain types of cancer) and for disability.
It reduces the quality of life, shortens life expectancy and lowers the levels of labour produc-
tivity (Must et al. (1999); Rosin (2008)). Moreover, it places a heavy ﬁnancial burden on the
individual and on society – particularly on public transfer programmes and private health plans
(Finkelstein et al. (2003)). At the individual level, Emery et al. (2007) ﬁnd that healthcare
costs for French obese individuals are on average twice the costs for normal-weight individuals.
At the aggregate level, obesity-related healthcare expenditures account for 1.5 to 4.6% of total
health expenditures in some European countries (see Schmid et al. (2005) and Emery et al.
(2007) for evidence on France and Switzerland respectively).
In most European countries, obesity rates reach their peak around age 60.51 (Sanz-de
Galdeano (2005)). Recent studies have highlighted the particularly strong impact of overweight,
obesity and increased BMI on morbidity and disability among adults aged 50 and older (Jenkins
(2004); Andreyeva et al. (2007); Peytremann-Bridevaux and Santos-Eggimann (2008)), thereby
1This ﬁgure does not allow us to disentangle age and cohort eﬀects. Using the 2004, 2006 and 2010 waves
of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), we ﬁnd that obesity rates among the
50-70-year-old reach their peak between age 55 and 65 for all cohorts born between 1940 and 1954.
2.1. Introduction 59
attracting policymakers’ attention to the substantial burden that obesity places on the general
health and autonomy of adults aged over 50.
Understanding the causes of obesity among the elderly is therefore a key issue. Unlike other
age groups – such as children or adolescents – it hasn’t received much attention yet. As the
elderly are characterised by low labour participation and high job-exit rates, one might wonder
whether transitions out of employment have an impact on the weight trajectories of individuals
aged 50 years and older. In this paper, we focus on the most common transition out of employ-
ment, i.e, retirement.
There are some reasons to believe that retirement might trigger weight changes. The Gross-
man model of the demand for health (Grossman (1972)) is consistent with the interpretation
that individuals are likely to adopt health-producing activities after retirement. Although re-
tirees have a tighter budget constraint, they have more time to allocate to leisure : they may
engage in physical activity or healthier diets for instance, which are time-consuming but not
money-consuming. Empirical ﬁndings seem to corroborate this view. In a three-year follow-up
of French middle-aged adults, Touvier et al. (2010) ﬁnd that retirement is associated with an
increase in leisure-time physical activities of moderate intensity, such as walking. As for food in-
take, ﬁnding are more mixed. On US longitudinal data, Chung et al. (2007) ﬁnd that households
spend less on eating out ($10 per month on average) following retirement, while their monthly
spending on food at home does not change. In a recent review of the literature, however, Hurst
(2008) argues that due to an increase in food home production, the overall food intake does
not decline following retirement. Overall, these results suggest that retirement would rather
operate on weight through changes in physical activity than via food consumption.
At the same time, new retirees may lose some incentive to invest in health as their income (pen-
sion beneﬁts) is no longer dependent on health. This could lead to lower health investments,
and to a lower health stock in the long-run. Besides, retirement might also increase the risk
of social isolation and depression (Friedmann and Havighurst (1954); Bradford (1979)), leading
individuals to potentially reduce their eﬀorts in health-producing activities and develop addic-
tive behaviours (alcohol or tobacco consumption). Finally, the loss of a structured use of time
may also encourage snacking in-between meal times and sedentary habits (television watching).
In the study mentioned before, Touvier et al. (2010) ﬁnd that retirement is also associated with
an increase in time spent watching TV.
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Overall, the direction of the eﬀect is not clear. This eﬀect, however, is likely to be highly hetero-
geneous, in particular across job types. As retirement induces a direct reduction in job-related
exercise, individuals having retired from strenuous jobs are at a higher risk to gain weight if they
do not compensate by increasing their leisure-time physical activity or by decreasing their food
intake. Conversely, retirees from sedentary jobs may lose weight if their leisure-time activities
after retirement are more physically demanding than time at work.
The purpose of the present paper is to estimate the causal impact of retirement on BMI,
the probability of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese. Iden-
tifying such a causal impact is problematic in the presence of confounding factors and reverse
causality. Retirement is indeed often a choice, and often based on unobservable characteristics
which may be correlated with weight (time preference2, health or psychological deteriorations).
Reverse causality may also be a concern. As overweight and obese individuals are on average
paid less, less promoted (Cawley (2004); Morris (2006); Brunello and d’Hombres (2007); Schulte
et al. (2007)) and in worse health, their incentives to retire might be higher than normal-weight
individuals. Burkhauser and Cawley (2006) show that fatness and obesity are indeed strong
predictors of early receipt of old-age beneﬁts in the USA.
To tackle this endogeneity issue, we use an instrumental variable approach. Our identiﬁ-
cation strategy exploits the fact that as individuals reach the Earliest Retirement Age (ERA)
at which they are entitled to either reduced pensions or full pensions – conditional on a suﬃ-
cient number of years of social security contributions – the probability that they retire strongly
increases. Said diﬀerently, this discontinuous incentive in the social security system provides
a strong exogeneous shock on retirement behaviour. We exploit the variation in ERAs across
European countries as well as its variation over time (in countries that implemented a stepwise
increase in the ERA during the period under study) to solve the major identiﬁcation problems
related to confounding factors and reverse causality. We implement a ﬁxed-eﬀect instrumen-
tal variable model in order to control for both time-invariant factors (such as genetics) and
time-varying ommited variables and/or reverse causality. We ﬁnally estimate the short-term
causal eﬀect of a transition to retirement on weight. We use the 2004, 2006 and 2010 waves
of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Our results show that
2See Smith et al. (2005), Anderson and Mellor (2008) and Ikeda et al. (2010) for empirical evidence of the
positive relationship between time preference and BMI.
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retirement causes a 13 percentage point increase in the probability of being obese within a two
to four-year period3 among men. We ﬁnd that the impact of retirement is highly non-linear
and mostly aﬀects the right-hand side of the BMI distribution. Additional results show that
this eﬀect is driven by men having retired from strenuous jobs and who were already at risk of
obesity. No eﬀects are found among women.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First and foremost, it contributes to
the literature on the eﬀects of retirement on weight. Most papers in this literature estimate
mere correlations, disregarding the possibility that retirement be endogenous. Results have
been quite consistent so far. Nooyens et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of retirement on changes
in weight and waist circumference depends on one’s former occupation : weight gain is higher
among men who retired from an active job. Forman-Hoﬀman et al. (2008) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
relation for men, but a weight gain for women retiring from blue-collar jobs. Gueorguieva et al.
(2010) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the slopes of BMI trajectories only for individuals retiring
from blue-collar occupations. To the best of our knowledge, Chung et al. (2009) and Goldman
et al. (2008) are the only studies tackling the endogeneity issue. Both use longitudinal data
from the Health and Retirement Study – the US equivalent of the European SHARE survey
– and estimate ﬁxed-eﬀect models with instrumental variables. They use social security and
Medicare eligibility (ages 62 and 65 respectively) as instruments for retirement.4 Chung et al.
(2009) conclude that people already overweight and people with lower wealth retiring from
physically-demanding occupations suﬀer from a modest weight gain. Goldman et al. (2008)
ﬁnd that males retiring from strenuous jobs gain weight (by 0.5 units of BMI) during the ﬁrst
six years of retirement, while those retiring from sedentary jobs lose some. We improve with
respect to this literature in three respects : ﬁrst, we identify a causal eﬀect of retirement on
weight, while most papers document a mere correlation. Second, the variation in ERAs across
Europe and over time allows us to explore the eﬀect of retirement on weight at diﬀerent ages, not
just ages 62 and 65, as in Chung et al. (2009) and Goldman et al. (2008). Weaker assumptions
in terms of weight trajectories by cohort and age are needed in our empirical setup. Finally, our
paper is the ﬁrst one to exploit European data. Most of the above-mentioned studies – except
Nooyens et al. (2005) – use US data from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Given the
3There is a two-year period between the 2004 and 2006 waves of SHARE and a four-year period between
waves 2006 and 2010.
4Chung et al. (2009) also use spouse pension eligibility as an additional instrument. However, recent work
highlights asymmetries in spouses’ retirement strategies (Gustman and Steinmeier (2009); Stancanelli (2012)).
Using spouse pension eligibility as an additional instrument might thus be a questionable strategy.
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diﬀerences in terms of labour markets, social security schemes and social policies, it is not clear
whether the results obtained for the USA should hold for Europe.
This paper also relates to a substantial recent literature that explores the eﬀects of retirement on
health and related health outcomes – mental health, cognitive functioning and well-being. The
results in this literature are very ambiguous, and whether or not retirement has a detrimental
eﬀect on health is still an open debate (Charles (2004); Neuman (2008); Coe and Lindeboom
(2008); Coe and Zamarro (2011)5; Rohwedder et al. (2010); Behncke (2011); Bonsang et al.
(2012); Blake and Garrouste (2012); Eibich (2014)). These conﬂicting results are mainly due
to the fact that analysing the long-term health eﬀect of retirement – which is not easily disen-
tangled from the eﬀect of age – remains a hard task. A promising way to solve this “retirement
puzzle” is to look, as we do, at behavioural outcomes following retirement. These behavioural
outcomes can be rapidly modiﬁed in the short-run and precede the longer-run health outcomes
(such as chronic diseases, mortality etc.). We thus analyse how weight change is modiﬁed in
the short-run. We also investigate to which extent this eﬀect is heterogeneous across several
dimensions, such as gender, occupational strenuousness, baseline weight category etc. As weight
change is likely to be an important mechanism by which retirement aﬀects health, this chapter
contributes to this recent and growing literature by exploring one of the potential mediating
channels between retirement and health.
Finally, this chapter contributes to a growing body of literature that investigates the impact of
various dimensions of professional activity on body weight and obesity, such as papers focusing
on unemployment (Marcus (2012)), working conditions (Lallukka et al. (2008b)), occupational
mobility (Ribet et al. (2003)), job insecurity (Muenster et al. (2011)), physical strenuousness
at work (Böckerman et al. (2008)), working overtime (Lallukka et al. (2008a)), and income
(Cawley et al. (2010), Schmeiser (2009), Colchero et al. (2008)).
This chapter develops as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical approach and Section 3
describes the data (the 2004, 2006 and 2010 waves of SHARE). Section 4 presents the results
and displays several robustness checks and Section 5 concludes.
5Our identiﬁcation strategy is similar in spirit to Coe and Zamarro (2011), who use the 2004 wave of SHARE
and use country-speciﬁc early and full retirement ages as instruments for retirement behaviour. However, we
improve with respect to this paper in two respects. First, we take advantage of the panel structure of the SHARE
data, which allows us to control for individual time-invariant unobservable characteristics. Second, we exploit
reforms in early retirement ages in Austria and Italy over the 2004-2011 period to produce an exogeneous shock
in retirement. Finally, rather than investigating the eﬀect of retirement on health, we investigate the eﬀect of
retirement on an under-investigated dimension of health and a major risk factor for numerous diseases among
the elderly, i.e, weight change and obesity.
2.2. Empirical approach 63
2.2. Empirical approach
We investigate the impact of retirement on BMI, the probability of being either overweight or
obese and the probability of being obese. As a ﬁrst step, we pool the observations from the
2004, 2006 and 2010 waves of the SHARE survey and estimate the following equation by a
standard Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) model :
Yit = α+ γRit +Xitβ +Di +Dt + uit (2.1)
where Yit denotes the weight outcome of individual i at time t.6 Rit is a binary variable indi-
cating whether individual i is retired at time t, Xit a vector of individual characteristics either
time-varying or time-invariant, Di a country dummy, Dt a time dummy and uit the error term.
However, the retirement status Rit can potentially be correlated with the error term uit, in
which case the POLS estimate of γ is inconsistent. Endogeneity may arise from several sources.
Omitted variables, such as unobservable time preference or health deteriorations may have an
impact both on the probability of retiring and on weight changes. Similarly, reverse causality
may also be a concern : obese individuals are more likely to seek early retirement beneﬁts
(Burkhauser and Cawley (2006)).
Faced with these endogoneity problems, we consider a Fixed-Eﬀects (FE) model such as :
Yit = α+ γRit +Kitβ +Dt + αi + vit (2.2)
where Yit still denotes the weight outcome, Rit the individual retirement status, Kit a vector
of time-varying individual characteristics, Dt a time dummy, αi an individual ﬁxed-eﬀect – in-
cluding the country ﬁxed-eﬀect – and vit the error term.
The FE model allows regressors to be endogeneous, provided that they are correlated only with
αi, the time-invariant component of the error, but not with the idiosyncratic error vit. If some
unobservable time-varying characteristics are correlated with Rit, however, γˆ continues to be
biased. Moreover, reverse causality is still a concern.
In order to tackle the endogeneity problem, we estimate a Fixed-Eﬀect Instrumental Variable
6Yit can be either continuous (the BMI) or binary (being either overweight or obese/being neither overweight
nor obese; being obese/not being obese). POLS (presented) and pooled probit models (not presented but available
upon request) yield very similar results when the dependent variable is binary.
64
Chapter 2 : Gaining weight through retirement? Results from the SHARE
survey.
(FEIV) model. This model allows us to control for both time-invariant factors (such as genetics,
food preferences over the life-course or time preference) and time-varying ommited variables
(such as health deteriorations) as well as reverse causality. Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits
the fact that as individuals reach the Earliest Retirement Age (ERA) in their countries, the
probability that they retire strongly increases.7 This exogeneous shock in retirement behaviour
allows us to estimate the causal impact of a transition to retirement on weight in the short-run
– within a two to four-year period.8
Retirement decisions in industrialised countries depend on a number of institutional fea-
tures. In particular, the earliest age at which individuals are entitled to pension beneﬁts has
been shown to exert a powerful inﬂuence on their retirement behaviours (Gruber and Wise
(1999)). This ERA is deﬁned as the earliest age at which individuals are entitled to either
reduced pensions or full pensions – conditional on a suﬃcient number of years of social security
contributions. The Oﬃcial Retirement Age (ORA) is the age at which workers are entitled to ei-
ther minimum-guaranteed pensions or full old-age pensions irrespective of their contributions or
work histories. It appears to be typically less important in predicting retirement behaviour than
the ERA (Gruber and Wise (1999)). Few individuals actually work until the oﬃcial retirement
age. As a consequence, there is a gap between the oﬃcial retirement age and the average eﬀective
age at which older workers withdraw from the labour force in almost all industrialised countries.
Earliest, oﬃcial and eﬀective retirement ages in Europe are presented in Table 2.1. As ev-
idenced in columns 1 and 2, the oﬃcial retirement age varies very little across countries and
genders. In contrast, the ERA varies quite a lot across countries and genders (columns 3 and
4). Eﬀective retirement ages are lower than oﬃcial retirement ages in almost every country
(see columns 5 and 6 for men and women respectively). A number of countries in our sample
implemented substantial reforms in ERAs over the period under study. In Austria for instance,
the 2004 pension reform introduced a gradual increase in the ERAs for men and women. Im-
mediately before the reform, workers in Austria could still retire at ages 61.5 (men) and 56.5
7One could use a health shock between two subsequent waves of the survey as an alternative instrument for
retirement behaviour. However in practice, the exclusion restriction – according to which this health shock does
not aﬀect weight except through the increased probability of retiring – is not likely to hold in the data.
8There is a two-year period between the 2004 and 2006 waves of SHARE and a four-year period between
waves 2006 and 2010. In this setup, we assume that the eﬀect of retirement on weight in a two-year period is the
same as in a four-year period. Another option is to consider the two and four-year periods separately and run
the regressions on two diﬀerent samples. However, we chose to consider the single sample because (i) we thus
deal with a larger sample, which is important when investigating the heterogeneous impact of retirement and
focusing on subsamples (ii) we have three observations per individual over the period.
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(women). After the reform, the ERAs were increased by two months for each quarter of birth
for men born in the ﬁrst two quarters of 1943 and women born in the ﬁrst two quarters of
1948. Following these increases, the ERAs were increased by one month for each quarter of
birth for men born in the third quarter of 1943 and later and for women born in the third
quarter of 1948 and later. Furthermore, the 2004 pension reform also created special corridor
pensions for men born in the last quarter of 1943 and later, thereby making the ERA beyond
age 62 non-binding in many cases (Manoli and Weber (2012)). Italy also introduced a stepwise
increase in the minimum age to request early retirement, from age 57 in 2004 to age 60 in 2011.
More information about the Austrian and Italian reforms are available in Table 2.1.
We take advantage of the ERA variation across countries and over time to explore the causal
eﬀect of retirement on weight. We instrument the retirement status Rit by a dummy variable
indicating whether individual i’s age at time t is above or below the ERA in force at time t in
his country c.9 10 Let ageit be individual i’s age at time t and ERAct the ERA in i’s country
c at time t. Our instrument is deﬁned as :
Zict = 1{ageit>ERAct} (2.3)
A good instrument should be strongly correlated with actual retirement behaviour but
should not directly aﬀect weight outcomes.
As shown in Table 2.1, Z appears to be well correlated with retirement status. Suggestive evi-
dence is provided by columns (7) and (8) : in each country, there is a large gap in the fraction
of individuals retired before and after the ERA cutoﬀ. For example, only 17% of individuals in
the pooled sample in France are retired before age 60 – when they are ﬁrst entitled to social
security beneﬁts – but this proportion increases to 88% after age 60. Taking advantage of the
panel structure of our data, we then compute for each country the proportion of individuals
retiring when reaching their country’s ERA between two subsequent waves of the survey (see
column (9)). This proportion is high in most countries. For instance in Belgium, 34.3% of the
individuals reaching age 60 between two waves of the survey actually retire between these two
waves.
9For countries where there was no increase in ERAs between 2004 and 2011 – i.e. all countries, except Italy
and Austria – our identiﬁcation uses a non-linear version of age, therefore identifying using the functional form
of age.
10Note that our results do not change when using both the ORA and ERA as joint instruments for retirement
behaviour.
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At the same time, once controlling for age, reaching the ERA cutoﬀ is highly unlikely to be
correlated with weight outcomes except through the increased probability of retiring. This
exclusion restriction holds if we assume there is no discontinuity in the weight trajectories of
cohorts at ERAs except for the eﬀect of retirement at these given ages. As we consider diﬀerent
cohorts and since the ERA is both country and time-varying, this assumption is likely to hold
in our data. We show in the robustness section that it is the case.
Equation (2) is then estimated by ﬁxed-eﬀect two-stage least squares where Zict is an in-
strument for Rit. In the ﬁrst stage, the retirement status Rit is regressed on Zict and other
covariates. In the second stage, equation (2) is estimated by a FE regression/FE linear proba-
bility model where Rit is replaced with its predicted value from the ﬁrst stage. The covariance
matrix of γˆ is corrected accordingly.
Our FEIV estimate γˆ can be given a causal interpretation as a Local Average Treatment Eﬀet
(LATE) without requiring constant treatment assumption. In our case, the “treatment” is de-
ﬁned as retiring between two subsequent waves of the survey. More speciﬁcally, γˆ is identiﬁed
on the subset of individuals whose behaviour is shifted by our instrument, i.e, the compliers.
In this setup, compliers are (i) individuals who became eligible to early retirement schemes be-
tween two subsequent waves of the survey and did retire then – but who would not have retired
if they had not become eligible (ii) individuals whose eligibility to early retirement schemes did
not change between two subsequent waves of the survey and did not retire then – but who would
have retired if they had become eligible. As the ERA is probably more binding for individuals
with long careers, we expect compliers to be less educated people.
Overall, our estimation strategy allows to us to measure the causal eﬀect of a transition to
retirement on weight within a two to four-year period among this subpopulation of compliers.
Our empirical setup allows us to explore the eﬀect of retirement on a wide range of ages,
not just ages 62 and 65 as in the US studies. Moreover, weaker assumptions in terms of weight
trajectories by cohort and age are needed in this setup.
Finally, as Coe and Zamarro (2011) underline, there do exist other ways to exit the labour
force, e.g., through unemployment or disability programmes. However, to the extent that these
patterns are stable within countries over the period under study, the individual ﬁxed-eﬀect will
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pick up this variation and it will not bias our results.
2.3. Data
2.1. Presentation of the sample
We use data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). SHARE
is a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database containing individual information on
health, socio-economic status and social and family networks. Approximately 85,000 individuals
over 50 years old and their spouses/partners (independent of their age) from 19 European coun-
tries (including Israel) have been interviewed so far. By now, four waves have been conducted
and further waves are being planned to take place on a biennial basis. We use the 2004, 2006
and 2010 waves of SHARE.11 In order to have a balanced panel, our sample includes the ten
European countries that took part in the 2004 SHARE baseline survey and further participated
in waves 2006 and 2010, i.e., Austria, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France,
Denmark, Switzerland and Belgium.
Our sample contains all individuals interviewed in waves 2004, 2006 and 201012, aged 50 to
69 years old13, who declared in each wave being either employed or retired. In other words, we
only consider the traditional and most frequent pattern of retirement, where individuals transit
directly from work to retirement. Transitions from employment to unemployment, invalidity
or inactivity are thus excluded. We also exclude transitions from retirement to employment,
unemployment, invalidity or inactivity. In the empirical analysis we thus compare individuals
whose job status remains stable across waves (either retired or employed) and individuals who
retire across waves. As there is no early retirement option in Denmark and since early retirement
was abolished in 2005 in the Netherlands, both countries are excluded from the analysis. Finally,
we exclude individuals reporting a height below 1.20 meters as well as individuals reporting a
weight either below 30 kilograms or above 200 kilograms. Overall, our dataset contains 2703
11The 2008-2009 wave of SHARE, SHARELIFE, is a retrospective survey that focuses on people’s life histories.
Although it can be linked to the existing data of SHARE, it is not of direct use here and we do not use it.
12We thus consider a balanced panel. Attrition rates are rather high in SHARE – 30% between the 2004 and
2006 waves of the survey. In our setup, high attrition rates are a concern if non-response is systematically related
to weight. We show that this is not the case in the robustness section. Additional robustness checks show that
our results do not signiﬁcantly vary when re-running our regressions on an unbalanced panel.
13The 50-69 age window broadly corresponds to the ages at which individuals reach the ERA in their country
and become entitled to pension beneﬁts.
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individuals14 from eight countries (Austria, Germany, Sweden, Spain, Italy, France, Switzerland
and Belgium) across the three waves.
2.2. Variables
We use a question on self-declared current job situation to determine whether an individual
is retired or not. According to this deﬁnition, anyone who declares herself as retired, whether
she has been or not in a paid job during the month preceding the interview – even for a few
hours – is considered as retired. Conversely, anyone who declares herself to be employed or
self-employed is considered as currently working. The self-declared retirement status seems to
be a reliable information in SHARE : it is strongly associated with the eligibility for either
public or private pensions in the dataset.15 We also use an alternative and more restrictive
deﬁnition of retirement as a robustness check. According to this deﬁnition, an individual is
considered as retired if (i) his self-declared job situation is “retired” and (ii) he did not do any
paid work during the preceding month. Conversely, an individual is considered as employed if
his self-declared job situation is “employed or self-employed”.16
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide summary statistics for the full sample – pooled over 2004-2010 – for
men and women respectively. Each table also presents characteristics for the individuals either
continuously employed across waves (column 2), continuously retired across waves (column 3),
or having retired across waves (column 4). According to Tables 2.2 and 2.3, 45% of men and
43% of women in the full sample were employed or self-employed, the rest being retired. Eight
hundred and sixteen individuals (23% of the individuals working in 2004) retired between 2004
and 2010. According to our alternative deﬁnition of retirement, only 395 individuals (13% of
the individuals working in 2004) retired between 2004 and 2010.
The BMI is calculated in each wave as the self-declared weight in kilograms divided by the
square of the self-declared height in meters (kg/m2). We derive clinical weight categories from
the BMI : underweight (BMI under 18.5 kg/m2), normal (BMI from 18.5 to 24.9 kg/m2), over-
weight (BMI from 25 to 29.9 kg/m2) and obese (BMI 30 kg/m2 and above). We also compute
14Once conditioning on having no missing value on weight, height and any covariate included in the model, our
sample goes down to 2493 individuals across the three waves (1353 men and 1140 women), i.e., 7479 observations
in the pooled sample (4059 men and 3420 women).
15Among the 3281 individuals retired in the pooled sample, 84% declared that they had received an income
from either a public or occupational old age pension during the year preceding the interview.
16SHARE also includes information about the year and the month of retirement. However, this measure is
not reliable in our data and we do not use it. Hence, we know if a given individual retires between two waves of
the survey, but we do not have any information on the exact month and year of retirement.
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individual weight change (in kg) as well as a dummy variable indicating if the individual expe-
rienced a weight change of at least 10% between two subsequent waves of the survey. The BMI
is a rather crude measure of body composition, as it does not distinguish fat from lean mass
(Prentice and Jebb (2001); Burkhauser and Cawley (2008)). However, it has been shown to be
highly correlated with more precise measures of adiposity. When reported – as it is the case
here –, the BMI may additionally suﬀer from measurement error (Niedhammer et al. (2000);
Burkhauser and Cawley (2008)). Following Brunello et al. (2013), we note that the rank cor-
relation between country level self-reported and objective measures of weight is however very
high in Europe (Sanz de Galdeano (2007)).
The average BMI of the full sample was 26.95 kg/m2 for men and 25.79 kg/m2 for women,
slightly above the overweight threshold in both cases. Eighteen percent of men in the full sam-
ple were obese, 49% overweight, 32% normal and less than 1% underweight. As for women, 17%
were obese, but less than 33% were overweight and 49% had a normal weight. Interestingly,
while only 15% of men employed in all waves were obese, 21% of men retired in all waves were
obese. The same pattern was found for women (the corresponding ﬁgures are 14% and 24%).
This large gap is probably best explained by the fact that individuals employed in all waves
are on average younger than individuals retired in all waves. However, it suggests that the
50-69-year-old undergo serious weight change around retirement age.
Additional descriptive statistics seem to corroborate this view : in the pooled sample – irre-
spective of retirement status –, 11% of individuals experienced a weight change (either gain or
loss) of at least 10% between two subsequent waves of the survey. Seventeen percent switched
from underweight or normal weight categories to overweight or obesity between two subsequent
waves of the survey, while 8% of overweight or obese individuals switched back to a normal
weight category during the same period. These ﬁgures give evidence of a high within-individual
weight variation in our sample, suggesting that weight change among the elderly can be rapid.
Interestingly, Figure 2.1 suggests that weight change is even more important among individuals
having retired between waves. Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of weight change for individuals
having retired across waves as well as the distribution of weight change for individuals contin-
uously employed or retired in all waves, for men and women respectively. A simple look at
each graph suggests that the distribution is ﬂatter for individuals having retired across waves :
the peak around zero – meaning no weight change – is indeed less clear-cut in both graphs.
Although the distributions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent – neither for men nor for women – it
suggests that individuals who retire experience weight change to a higher extent than individuals
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continuously employed or retired. Similarly, the proportion of individuals experiencing a weight
change of at least 10% between two subsequent waves of the survey is higher among men and
women having retired (11% and 14% respectively) than among men and women continuously
employed or retired (9% and 12% respectively).17
Diﬀerent sets of covariates are used, depending on the speciﬁcation used (POLS, FE or FEIV
models). We introduce age and age squared in all speciﬁcations to control properly for the age
trend and to account for a potential non-linear eﬀect of age on weight. Each speciﬁcation also
includes marital status (lives with a spouse-partner/does not live with a spouse-partner) and
time dummies for 2006 and 2010. The average age of men and women in the pooled sample
was 59.8 and 59.7 years old respectively. On average, men and women having retired between
2004 and 2010 were aged 60.3 and 60.4 years old respectively. Eighty-seven percent of men
in the full sample lived with a spouse or partner, while only 72% of women did so. Gen-
der, educational level18 (primary education/lower secondary/upper secondary/post-secondary),
occupation19 (blue collars/white collars/technicians/managers and professionals) and country
dummies are only included in the POLS speciﬁcation, as FE and FEIV models do not permit
to identify the eﬀects of time-invariant variables. Summary statistics for gender, educational
level, occupation and country can be found in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for men and women respec-
tively. Seventeen percent of men in the full sample had achieved primary education, 18% lower
secondary education, 33% upper secondary education and 32% post-secondary education. The
corresponding ﬁgures for women are 17%, 18%, 30% and 35%. Thirty-three percent of males
in the pooled sample were in blue-collar occupations, 13% in white-collar occupations, 20%
were technicians and 34% managers or professionals. Similarly, 20% of women in the full sam-
ple were in blue-collar occupations, 32% in white-collar occupations, 19% were technicians and
29% managers or professionals. Men and women having retired across waves exhibited the same
patterns of education and occupation than individuals in the full sample. Belgium, Sweden,
France, Italy and Germany were the most represented countries in the male and female pooled
samples. Note that we do not include health variables in our speciﬁcations. This is because
health status is co-determined with retirement as well as weight, and controlling for it is likely
to generate some endogeneity in our models.
17This is only suggestive evidence, given that the two proportions are not statistically diﬀerent according to
the khi-square test (neither for men, nor for women).
18Based on the 1997 International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED 97)
19Based on the 1988 International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO 88). Occupation is not
time-varying in our data. Given that we focus on elderly workers, it seems to be a plausible assumption.
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Finally, we supplement our dataset by the ERA in force in each country at the time of the
survey (see Table 2.1). We build a dummy variable for each individual indicating whether his
age at time t is above or below the ERA in force at time t in his country.
2.4. Results
2.1. Determinants of retirement
Almost 23% (816 individuals) of the individuals working at baseline retired between 2004 and
2010. Among them, 45% (365 individuals) had reached the national ERA during the same
period. This suggests that actual retirement behaviour is well correlated with the ERA.
First-stage results are reported in Table 2.4 for men and women respectively. As expected, they
indicate that the ERA is an important predictor of retirement. Reaching the ERA increases
the probability of retiring by 21 and 28 percentage points for men and women respectively
(both eﬀects are signiﬁcant at the 1% level). These coeﬃcients can also be interpreted as the
proportions of compliers in our sample20 (21% among men and 28% among women), which are
high. These results, combined with F-stats of the excluded instrument of 122.2 and 169.4 for
men and women respectively, show that reaching the ERA provides a strong exogeneous shock
on retirement behaviour.
Once controlling for these country-speciﬁc age breaks, the probability of retiring decreases
with age up to a certain point, where it increases again – probably when reaching the oﬃcial
retirement age. Finally, neither time dummies for 2006 and 2010 nor marital status appear to
be statistically important for retirement behaviour.
2.2. The impact of retirement on BMI, overweight and obesity
Given the diﬀerences in terms of both biological constitutions and labour market histories, we
run separate models for men and women. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the POLS estimates for the
BMI (column 1), the probability of being either overweight or obese (column 2) and the proba-
bility of being obese (column 3) for men and women respectively. All speciﬁcations include age,
age squared, time dummies for 2006 and 2010, marital status and time-invariant variables such
20This is true in our case because both Rit and Zict are dummy variables and because our model is estimated
by ﬁxed-eﬀect two-stage least squares.
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as education, occupation and country dummies. Most of the control variables are statistically
signiﬁcant and of the expected sign. A steep education gradient in BMI, overweight and obesity
is found for women and to a lower extent for men. As compared with primary education, post-
secondary education is indeed associated with a lower BMI and a lower probability of being
either overweight or obese as well as being obese for both men and women. Once controlling for
education, occupation is not signiﬁcantly associated with BMI, overweight and obesity, except
for women : females in managerial or professional occupations have a lower probability of being
overweight than blue-collar females. Living with a spouse or partner does not seem to be cor-
related with BMI or the probability of being obese but is associated with a higher risk of being
either overweight or obese among men. Most country indicators are signiﬁcant.21 Surprisingly
enough, once we control for retirement behaviour, age has a small and insigniﬁcant impact on
BMI, overweight and obesity.
Our baseline speciﬁcation reveals a positive and signiﬁcant association between retirement and
weight outcomes for men as well as women. Retirement is positively correlated with BMI : it
increases BMI by 0.50 and 0.69 units for men and women respectively (both eﬀects are signiﬁ-
cant at the 5% level).22 It also increases men’s probability of being either overweight or obese
and men’s probability of being obese by 4.8 and 3.8 percentage points respectively (both eﬀects
are signiﬁcant at the 10% level). These coeﬃcients correspond to a 7% (resp. 22%) increase in
the probability of being overweight or obese (resp. obese) for men (compared with the sample
average). Retirement also increases women’s probability of being obese by 5.2 percentage points
(at the 5% signiﬁcance level). This represents a 37% increase in the probability of being obese
for women.
However, these correlations are hard to interpret, because they potentially reﬂect the eﬀects
of unobserved characteristics that may aﬀect both weight outcomes and retirement behaviour.
The importance of confounding factors is apparent when we look at the coeﬃcents on retire-
ment once implementing ﬁxed-eﬀect regressions (see Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 for men and women
respectively). Once taken into account the potential endogeneity arising from the correlation
between retirement and time-invariant unobserved characteristics, retirement is no longer sig-
niﬁcantly associated with weight outcomes for men. The sign of the coeﬃcient even becomes
21Results not shown but available upon request. Note that our results are virtually unchanged when including
country*time ﬁxed eﬀects, suggesting that the time trend in obesity is fairly common across countries.
22For an average man measuring 1.75m and weighing 82kg, it corresponds to a 1.5 kilo gain. As for an average
woman measuring 1.63m and weighing 69kg, it corresponds to a 1.8 kilo gain.
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negative for BMI and the probability of being either overweight or obese (although both eﬀects
are insigniﬁcant at conventional levels). Conversely, retirement leads to weight gain (by 0.25
BMI, at the 5% signiﬁcance level) and increases the probability of being obese for women (at
the 10% signiﬁcance level), although the magnitude of the estimates declines as compared to
POLS results. Not controlling for time-invariant factors – such as time preference for instance,
which has a positive eﬀect both on the probability of retiring and on weight gain – may indeed
generate an upward bias and account for the larger eﬀect of retirement on weight in POLS
models.
However, the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimates cannot be interpreted as causal : a number of omitted
time-varying factors can easily generate some biases in the results. Health or psychological
deteriorations – for instance – may trigger both retirement and weight change. Hence, we
need to take into account the remaining endogeneity in the model by instrumenting retirement
behaviour. Results are presented in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 for men and women respectively. Un-
der the hypothesis that reaching the ERA is a valid instrument, our preferred IV estimates
show that retirement induced by discontinuous incentives in early retirement schemes does not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect men’s BMI nor men’s probability of being either overweight or obese, al-
though both coeﬃcients are positive. It causes, however, a 13 percentage point increase in the
probability of being obese (at the 5% level) within a two to four-year period among men.23
It corresponds to a 60% increase in the probability of being obese within a two to four-year
period.2425 At this point, it should be noted that our FEIV estimates identify a Local Average
Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) among a sub-population of compliers, i.e, the eﬀect of retirement for
those who eﬀectively retire at country-speciﬁc ERAs. As the ERA is probably more binding for
individuals with long careers, we expect compliers to be less educated people. By contrast, the
23Note that we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of retirement on men’s BMI if we restrict our sample to men who had
a BMI between 25 and 30 at baseline. The coeﬃcient associated with retirement is equal to 0.87 (standard error :
0.53) and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This result is quite consistent with the signiﬁcant impact of retirement on
men’s probability of being obese.
24When choosing an alternative threshold for obesity, e.g. 31, we ﬁnd that the impact of retirement on
the probability of being obese is marginally signiﬁcant (at the 15% level) and in the same range of magnitude
(coeﬃcient : 0.8, standard error : 0.05)
25The coeﬃcients associated with the eﬀect of retirement on BMI in FEIV models are very close to the ones
obtained for the USA using a similar FEIV strategy. We ﬁnd that retirement causes a 0.47 and 0.18 BMI increase
within a two to four-year period among men and women respectively (although both coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
at conventional levels). These estimates are comparable to Chung et al. (2009) ﬁndings : on US data, retirement
causes a 0.24 increase in BMI within a two-year period (at the 10% signiﬁcance level). Unfortunately, as Chung
et al. (2009) did not study the causal impact of retirement on the probability of being either overweight or obese
nor on the probability of being obese, other comparisons based on the magnitude of the coeﬃcients cannot be
made.
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ﬁxed-eﬀect model estimates the average eﬀect of retirement for all those who retire during the
period under study.
Overall, our results seem to suggest a non-linear impact of retirement on men’s BMI : retire-
ment would mostly aﬀect the right-hand side of the BMI distribution, thus increasing the risk
of obesity.
To inquire this further, we estimate the distribution of men’s BMI under diﬀerent treatments
for the subpopulation of compliers, following Imbens and Rubin (1997b).26 More speciﬁcally,
we estimate the distribution of BMI standardised by age under diﬀerent treatments for the
subpopulation of compliers. Figure 2.2 plots the estimated distributions of BMI standardised
by age for winning and losing compliers. In our setup, winning compliers are individuals who
became eligible to early retirement schemes between two subsequent waves of the survey and
did retire then – but who would not have retired if they had not become eligible; losing com-
pliers are individuals whose eligibility to early retirement schemes did not change between two
subsequent waves of the survey and did not retire then – but who would have retired if they had
become eligible. According to Figure 2.2, the density function of winning compliers is shifted
to the right compared to losing compliers. Winning compliers also seem to be more dispersed
than losing compliers. Interestingly, the right tail of the winning compliers’ density is fatter
after threshold 1 – broadly corresponding to a BMI around 30 for all ages.27 28 This is evidence
that obese individuals are more frequent among the winning compliers. This piece of graphical
evidence is consistent with the FEIV results discussed above and the idea that retirement has
a non-linear impact on men’s BMI.
Overall, retirement seems to have a non-linear impact on men’s BMI : it mostly aﬀects the
right-hand side of the BMI distribution and increases the risk of obesity. As for women, Ta-
ble 2.10 shows that they do not experience weight changes following retirement. The coeﬃcient
associated with retirement (although positive) is never signiﬁcant, whatever the outcome.
26We provide a brief explanation of this method in the appendix.
27For all ages between 50 and 69, the mean BMI among men is close 26.5 and the standard deviation close to
4.
28By looking at Figure 2.2, one may wonder why the distribution of the BMI standardised by age for losing
compliers takes negative values in the [1.8; 3] range. This point is discussed by Imbens and Rubin (1997b).
According to the authors, this negativity can be due either to sampling variation or to violation of the assumptions.
In our case, as the density takes negative values when it is very close to zero and for a limited range of values,
this negativity is most likely to be due to sampling variation.
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2.3. Heterogeneous effects of retirement
The impact of retirement on weight outcomes is likely to be highly heterogeneous across job
types. In particular, individuals having retired from physically-demanding jobs are likely to gain
weight if they do not compensate the direct reduction in job-related exercise by increasing their
leisure-time physical activity or by decreasing their food intake. In order to test for this, we
re-run our FEIV models by adding an interaction term of retirement status with a measure of
previous job’s physical strenuousness.29 The physical strenuousness of work is measured using
a question asking workers their opinion about the following statement : “My job is physically
demanding”. Four answers are available ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.
We dichotomise the responses into strenuous work (strongly agree/agree) and sedentary work
(disagree/strongly disagree). As this information is only available in SHARE for individuals
who were working at baseline, FEIV models are estimated on a smaller sample – 934 men and
808 women across three waves. Among these individuals working at baseline, 56.4% had a
sedentary job and 43.6% had a strenuous job. Table 2.11 shows the results when interacting
retirement status with our indicator of job strenuousness. It reports the FEIV estimates for the
BMI (columns 1 and 2), the probability of being either overweight or obese (columns 3 and 4)
and the probability of being obese (columns 5 and 6) for the baseline speciﬁcation only. The
ﬁrst column of each pair presents the results for men, while the second column presents the
results for women. As shown in column (5), the retirement eﬀect on obesity seems to be mainly
driven by men having retired from strenuous jobs. The coeﬃcient associated with retirement is
equal to 0.16 and insigniﬁcant at conventional levels, but the interaction term is equal to 0.10
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Both coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Overall,
retirement causes a 26 percentage point increase in the probability of being obese among men
having retired from strenuous jobs within a two to four-year period (at the 5% signiﬁcance
level). However, it does not seem to have a signiﬁcant impact on neither their BMI nor their
probability of being either overweight or obese. Retiring from a sedentary job does not seem
to aﬀect men’s weight outcomes. Overall, our results suggest that retiring from a strenuous job
has a triggering eﬀect on obesity for men. As for women, columns (2), (4) and (6) show that
they do not experience weight changes following retirement, whether they have retired from
29We derive an additional instrument for this interaction term by interacting our instrument Zict with our
indicator of job’s physical strenuousness. This is only valid if the strenuousness of job is exogeneous with respect
to weight change. It might be the case that individuals gaining weight between two subsequent waves of the
survey switch to less demanding occupations prior to retirement. However, given that employment perspectives
and career mobility are low among the elderly, this might not happen very often.
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strenuous or sedentary jobs. The coeﬃcients associated with the retirement indicator and the
interaction term are never signiﬁcant, whatever the outcome.
The impact of retirement on weight outcomes is also likely to be highly heterogeneous across
weight at baseline. Additional results show that the causal impact of retirement on the probabil-
ity of being obese is only signiﬁcant for men who already had a BMI higher than 24 at baseline
– whether we estimate the model with the interaction term retirement*job strenuousness or
not.30 The “marginal” individual – the individual likely to become obese through retirement –
is thus a man already at risk of obesity at baseline, i.e., already overweight or not far from the
overweight threshold before retirement.
Overall, our results show that retirement eﬀects can be highly heterogeneous across gender,
previous occupational strenuousness and baseline weight category. In particular, our results
show that retiring from a strenuous job while being at risk of obesity before retirement (having
a BMI higher than 24 at baseline) has a triggering eﬀect on obesity for men.
2.4. Underlying mechanisms
According to our results, retirement increases the probability of being obese among men, but
has no eﬀect on women’s weight outcomes. This section further investigates this heterogeneous
response to retirement according to gender. As retirement is likely to operate on weight through
physical activity and food intake, we try to assess whether changes in food intake and physical
activity following retirement are gender-speciﬁc.
As a ﬁrst step, we focus on changes in leisure-time physical activity after retirement. Leisure-
time physical activity is captured in SHARE by the following question : “How often do you
30When considering men who already had a BMI higher than 24 at baseline, our sample goes down to 1054
men across the three waves. We re-run our FEIV models on this subsample to estimate the eﬀect of retirement
on the probability of being obese. The coeﬃcient associated with retirement is equal to 0.15 (standard error :
0.07) and signiﬁcant the 5% level. The coeﬃcient associated with retirement is insigniﬁcant on the subsample of
men who had a BMI lower than 24 at baseline (299 men across the three waves). We also re-run our FEIV models
including the interaction term retirement status*job strenuousness. When considering men who already had a
BMI higher than 24 and who were working at baseline, our sample goes down to 721 men across the three waves.
When estimating the eﬀect of retirement on obesity, the coeﬃcient associated with retirement is equal to 0.17
(standard error : 0.14) and insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. The coeﬃcient associated with the interaction
term is equal to 0.11 (standard error : 0.06) and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Both coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant
on the subsample of men who had a BMI lower than 24 and who were working at baseline (213 men across the
three waves).
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engage in activities that require a moderate level of energy such as gardening, cleaning the
car, or doing a walk?”. Four answers are available ranging from “more than once a week” to
“hardly ever, or never”. We dichotomize the responses into high (more than once a week/once a
week) and low leisure-time physical activity (one to three times a month/hardly ever, or never).
When using this speciﬁc indicator, our FEIV models show that women tend to increase their
leisure-time physical activity following retirement, while men do not. Our results imply that
retirement causes a 14 percentage-point increase in the probability of performing a moderate
physical activity at least once a week (at the 5% signiﬁcance level) among women. The corre-
sponding ﬁgure for men is equal to 7 percentage points and insigniﬁcant at conventional levels.
This would be suggestive evidence that the heterogeneous impact of retirement across genders
is partly explained by women’s higher propensity to engage in leisure-time physical activity
following retirement. However, when using alternative dichotomisations of leisure-time physical
activity, our results show that both men and women tend to increase their physical activity
following retirement.31
Overall, whether the heterogeneous impact of retirement across gender is explained by gender-
speciﬁc patterns in leisure-time physical activity is not clear.
We then look at changes in food intake after retirement. SHARE contains two measures of
food consumption : the monthly household expenditure on food consumed away from home and
the monthly household expenditure on food consumed at home. These two measures, however,
are hard to interpret, as they reﬂect a household joint decision concerning food consumption.
They do not necessarily reﬂect an individual change in food consumption – and even less an
individual change in food intake. Due to these data limitations, the results obtained have to
be interpreted with caution. Quite interestingly though, we ﬁnd that men tend to increase the
amount of food consumed at home after retirement. Our FEIV models show that men increase
by 170 euros (corresponding to a 30% increase) their monthly consumption of food consumed at
home (p-value : 0.052). As for women, the coeﬃcient associated with retirement is positive – a
35-euro-increase – but far from signiﬁcant. When turning to the monthly household expenditure
on food consumed away from home, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of retirement, neither
for men, nor for women.
31In particular, when redeﬁning the leisure-time physical activity variable (as hardly never or never versus
more than once a week/once a week/one to three times a month), we ﬁnd that retirement causes a 11 (12)
percentage point increase in the probability of performing a moderate physical activity at least one to three times
a month among men (women). Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
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These results, however, are quite hard to interpret. As we do not have any information re-
garding the quality of food consumed away and at home, it is diﬃcult to know whether this
increase in men’s expenditure on food consumed at home corresponds to a healthier diet (or
conversely, to a more detrimental diet, e.g. by increasing snacking in-between meal times after
retirement). A possible interpretation, however, can be found in the role of time constraint
in food choice. According to Mancino (2003), time pressure or the need for convenience can
be situational factors leading individuals to forgo good intentions (healthy eating) for more
immediate gratiﬁcation, e.g. through consuming food prepared away from home, or consuming
prepared food. Welch et al. (2009) indeed show that time pressure is reported as a barrier
to healthy eating by 41% of women in Australia. Cawley and Liu (2012) ﬁnd that employed
women – as compared to women not in the labour force – spend signiﬁcantly less time cooking
and are more likely to purchase prepared foods in the US. Now, retirement typically relieves
the pressure of time constraints and lowers the opportunity cost of time. To this extent, there
are good chances that men and women’s response to it be diﬀerent. Women typically spend
more time cooking than men. When single, they consume less prepared food than single men –
see Ricroch (2012) for empirical evidence in France. Because the time constraint in food choice
was actually binding for them, women may respond to retirement by cooking more. Although
they probably eat more often at home following retirement, their monthly household expendi-
ture on food consumed at home may not change, as their consumption of prepared food (which
is on average more expensive) is likely to decrease. As for men – who generally retire earlier
than their wives and hence have to feed themselves following retirement –, they may not be
that sensitive to the relief of the time constraint. Few of them actually cook – especially as
we consider older cohorts. Consequently, they may respond to retirement by consuming more
prepared food, which would explain the increase in the monetary amount of food consumed at
home after retirement.
Overall, our data lead to inconclusive results as regards gender-speciﬁc patterns of food
intake and leisure-time physical activity following retirement. It is not surprising, as only
very precise measures of food intake and physical activity would have allowed us to investigate
this matter in greater detail. For instance, whether women and men compensate the direct
reduction in job-related exercise to a diﬀerent extent by increasing leisure-time physical activity
is diﬃcult to study using only self-reported items of physical activity measured on a ﬁve-point
scale. Thus, data limitations make it diﬃcult to explore the underlying mechanisms through
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which retirement aﬀects weight.
2.5. Robustness checks
Our estimation strategy is likely to yield unbiased results if properly controlling for the age
trend. As one may worry that our results be driven by an inadequate estimation of the age
eﬀect, we have tried linear, quadratic (presented) and quartic age terms in robustness checks.
Results are qualitatively similar.32
As underweight status is associated with a higher risk of morbidity and mortality for the elderly
(Corrada et al. (2006)), one could be afraid that underweight individuals have a diﬀerent re-
sponse to retirement. It might be the case that underweight individuals lose weight because of
retirement, thus leading to an overall insigniﬁcant impact of retirement on BMI. We check that
our results are robust to the exclusion of underweight individuals by re-running our IV estimates
on normal, overweight and obese individuals at baseline. Results are virtually unchanged.33
Until now, retirement has been deﬁned using a question on self-declared current job situation
(see Data section). According to this deﬁnition, anyone who declares herself to be retired is
considered as retired. One concern could be that individuals declare themselves as retired even
when working full or part-time, simply because they have left their “career” job. We use an al-
ternative deﬁnition according to which anyone who declares herself as “retired” and who did not
do any paid work during the month preceding the interview is considered as retired (see Data
section). The point estimates obtained on the retirement indicator when using this alternative
deﬁnition do not signiﬁcantly vary as compared to those presented in Table 2.9. In particular,
when considering the probability of being obese as an outcome, the coeﬃcient associated with
retirement in the FEIV model for men is equal to 0.13 (standard error : 0.09) and signiﬁcant
at the 15% level. Given that only 395 individuals retire between 2004 and 2010 according to
this alternative deﬁnition, this result is likely to be due to a power problem.
An additional concern is that our model does not control for country-speciﬁc time trends (e.g.
32When introducing age as a linear term, the point estimate associated with the eﬀect of retirement on the
probability of being obese in FEIV models for men is very similar to the one obtained when introducing age as a
quadratic term (presented). The coeﬃcient associated with retirement is equal to 0.13 (standard error : 0.06) and
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The corresponding ﬁgure when introducing age as a quartic term is 0.14 (standard
error : 0.08), signiﬁcant at the 10% level. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant results for men’s BMI nor men’s probability of
being either overweight or obese. No signiﬁcant results are found for women.
33When considering the probability of being obese as the outcome in the FEIV model for men, the coeﬃcient
associated with retirement is equal to 0.13 (standard error : 0.06) and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. When
considering either the BMI or the probability of being obese as the outcome, the coeﬃcient associated with the
retirement indicator in FEIV models for men is still insigniﬁcant. No signiﬁcant results are found for women.
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diﬀerential trends in food supplies, health policies or early life conditions). If these country-
speciﬁc trends cause a nonlinear relationship between weight and age at the country-speciﬁc
ERAs, our model may not estimate the true eﬀect of retirement on weight. Given that we
consider country and time-varying ERAs as well as several cohorts, it seems highly unlikely.
However, an imperfect way to test for this is to introduce the age*country and age2*country
terms in our FEIV models. By doing so, we test whether age has a diﬀerential impact on weight
across countries. All coeﬃcients associated with these additional terms are insigniﬁcant in our
FEIV models. The point estimates obtained on the retirement indicator do not signiﬁcantly
vary as compared to those presented in Table 2.9. In particular, when considering the probabil-
ity of being obese as an outcome, the coeﬃcient associated with retirement in the FEIV model
for men is equal to 0.14 (standard error : 0.15) and signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
One may worry that our results may be driven by the particular strong eﬀect of retirement on
weight in a speciﬁc country. Our results, however, are virtually unchanged when dropping one
country at a time from our sample. Similarly, one may worry that the reforms undertaken in
Italy and Austria – i.e. the stepwise increase in ERAs between 2004 and 2011 – may lead to
anticipatory behaviour, which would bias our results. Our results are unchanged when exclud-
ing Italy and Austria from our sample.
Finally, we conduct a placebo test to back the reliance of our results. We evaluate the im-
pact of retirement in a ﬁctive state of the world where ERAs would be interchanged across
countries.34 We re-run our FEIV regressions with this ﬁctive instrument. As expected, the
coeﬃcient associated with this ﬁctive instrument in the ﬁrst stage is close to 0 and insigniﬁcant
at conventional levels. The F-stat of the excluded instrument is equal to 2.24 – below the stan-
dard requirement of 10 (Bound et al. (1995)) – thus suggesting a weak instrument problem. As
expected, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects of retirement on weight outcomes in the second stage.
In this paragraph, we run additional robustness checks. In particular, we check that our
FEIV results are robust to the presence of serial correlation in the error terms. We also consider
an unbalanced panel and alternative estimation strategies.
If the error terms in the FEIV model were serially correlated, the usual standard errors ob-
tained from it could be very misleading. We re-run our FEIV models allowing for clusters at
34The design of the placebo reform is as follows. We interchange ERAs across countries, e.g. we assign to
each country an ERA in force in another country of the sample. France’s ERA is set to 61. The corresponding
ERAs for Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Austria, Italy and Belgium are 57, 60, 60, 63, 59, 62 and 62,
respectively.
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the individual level. Results are virtually unchanged.35
As mentioned earlier, attrition rates are non-negligible in SHARE. In our setup, high attrition
rates are a concern if non-response is systematically related to weight. We deal with panel
attrition by using the approach developed by Becketti et al. (1988) and Fitzgerald et al. (1998).
This approach is based on the assumption that all determinants of attrition can be controlled for
(selection on observables). In the test, the value of the BMI at the initial wave of the survey is
regressed on future attrition A (i.e. whether the individual later attrites). The test for attrition
selection is simply based upon the signiﬁcance of A in that model. The results (available upon
request) indicate that A is not signiﬁcant in that model, suggesting that people with higher BMI
are no less likely to participate in further waves of SHARE. This is evidence of the absence of
attrition bias due to weight. As an additional robustness check, we re-run our FEIV models on
an unbalanced sample36 to back the reliance of our results. The point estimate obtained on the
retirement indicator when considering the probability of being obese as the outcome does not
signiﬁcantly vary as compared to the one presented in Table 2.9 : it is equal to 0.08 (standard
error : 0.05) and signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Finally, we check that our results are robust to alternative estimation strategies. More specif-
ically, we consider a pooled-IV model. If our instrument Zict was truly exogeneous – i.e., if it
was uncorrelated with the error term uit in equation (1) – the results obtained in the pooled-IV
model should not be markedly diﬀerent from the FEIV model. We run a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) model where the retirement status is instrumented by the dummy indicator Zict. The
covariates included in the model are, as usual, age, age squared, marital status, occupation, ed-
ucation, as well as time and country dummies. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
individual level. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant results neither for men’s BMI, nor for men’s probability
of being either overweight or obese. As for the probability of being obese, the coeﬃcient associ-
ated with the retirement indicator is in the same range of magnitude than the one obtained in
the FEIV model : it is equal to 0.12 (standard error : 0.15) but not signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. No signiﬁcant results are found for women. We further investigate the impact of retire-
ment on the probability of being obese in the pooled-IV setting by implementing a bivariate
probit with Zict as an identifying variable. Both the 2SLS and the bivariate models are consis-
35In particular, when considering the probability of being obese as the outcome in the FEIV model for men
and when clustering at the individual level, the coeﬃcient associated with retirement is equal to 0.12 (standard
error : 0.06) and signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
36Once conditioning on having no missing values on weight, height and any covariate included in the model
and having at least two observations per individual across the three waves, the unbalanced sample consists of
18,199 observations in eight countries (9,693 men and 8,506 women).
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tent, but only the bivariate model is eﬃcient in our case, as both endogeneous variables (the
retirement and the obesity indicator) are dichotomous. The marginal eﬀect associated with the
retirement indicator after implementing the endogeneous bivariate probit is equal to 0.10 and
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Overall, our results seem to be robust to alternative estimation
strategies and conﬁrm the positive and signiﬁcant impact of retirement on the risk of obesity.
The estimated impact of retirement on the probability of being obese always lies in the same
range of magnitude, between 0.10 and 0.13.
2.5. Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀect of retirement on several weight outcomes using the 2004, 2006 and
2010 waves of SHARE. It exploits the European variation in ERAs and the stepwise increase in
ERAs in Austria and Italy during the period under study to produce an exogeneous shock on
retirement behaviour. This allows us to estimate the short-term causal impact of retirement on
weight. Our results show that retirement induced by social security rules causes a 13 percentage
point increase in the probability of being obese within a two to four-year period among 50-69
year-old men. Our ﬁndings suggest that retirement has a non-linear impact on men’s BMI,
mostly aﬀecting the right-hand side of the BMI distribution. We give evidence that this eﬀect
is highly heterogeneous and driven by men having retired from strenuous jobs who were already
at risk of obesity. No signiﬁcant eﬀects are found among women.
A straightforward interpretation of our ﬁndings is that the impact of retirement among men
having retired from strenuous jobs is driven by a direct reduction in job-related exercise. How-
ever, an alternative interpretation would be that these men also share social norms that shape
their response to retirement in terms of food intake, leisure-time physical activity or mental
health. In our view, these two interpretations are highly complementary and both explain the
higher risk of obesity faced by men having retired from strenuous jobs. Another interpretation
of our results has to do with reporting bias in BMI : men and women tend to underestimate
their weight in surveys (Niedhammer et al. (2000); Gorber et al. (2007)). Yet, if retirement is
associated with a higher propensity to go to the doctor, new retirees are likely to have their
weight measured by a physician following retirement and may acquire an accurate knowledge of
their “true” weight. When interviewed in subsequent waves of the survey, they may adjust their
self-reported weight and thus declare a higher weight. In this context, the impact of retirement
on self-reported BMI would result rather from a decline in the reporting bias in weight than
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from a true increase in BMI. However, this interpretation relies on several assumptions which
do not necessarily hold. First, there is no evidence that retirement increases the use of medical
care.37 Second, there is no evidence that misreporting bias in weight results from a lack of
knowledge; there is no evidence either that individuals adjust their self-reported weights when
obtaining accurate knowledge about it (Niedhammer et al. (2000)).38
Interestingly enough, we ﬁnd that women’s weight outcomes are not aﬀected by retirement.
There is some evidence in the literature that women adjust to retirement more successfully than
men (Barnes and Parry (2004)). Women may adjust their food diet and physical activity to a
better extent than men. Due to data limitations, we were not able to investigate this question
in greater detail. However, a promising avenue for future research would consist in investigating
gender-speciﬁc responses to retirement, especially in terms of food intake and physical activity.
Health is multidimensional; its dimensions can be diversely aﬀected by retirement. If retiring
reduces the amount of stress and physical strain, it may improve subjective measures of health
(self-rated health, mental health or well-being). If, at the same time, retirement reduces the
amount of physical activity and mentally stimulating activities an individual experiences from
work, it may deteriorate objective ones (cognitive or cardiovascular functioning for instance). A
number of papers in the literature seem to support this idea.39 Our results are highly consistent
with this interpretation : although declared, the BMI can be seen as an objective measure of
health. The direct reduction in job-related exercise following retirement is likely to deteriorate
this speciﬁc dimension of health, along with other dimensions of objective health.
A limitation to this study is that we only consider the traditional and more frequent pattern
of retirement, where individuals transit directly from work to retirement. We do not consider
more complex pathways to retirement (via unemployment, disability or inactivity). This sample
selection implies that our results do not necessarily generalise to other transitions to retirement.
Further research would be needed to get a fuller picture of the impact of diﬀerent patterns of
37On the contrary, Fe and Hollingsworth (2012) ﬁnd that retirement decreases primary care use in the UK.
38In a study on the validity of self-reported weight and height in the French GAZEL cohort, Niedhammer
et al. (2000) provide convincing evidence that “the reporting bias in BMI results more from inexact reporting of
weight and height that are accurately known than from lack of knowledge”.
39Although some ﬁndings in the literature are not consistent with this interpretation. See for instance Dave
et al. (2006), who ﬁnd negative eﬀects of retirement on both objective and subjective measures on health or Coe
and Zamarro (2011), who ﬁnd positive eﬀects on both objective and subjective measures on health.
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retirement on subsequent weight and health changes.
In a context where half of OECD countries are increasing retirement ages or will do so in the
coming decades, an important policy question is whether retiring at older ages have a stronger
impact on weight. As we have country and time-varying ERAs, we investigate this further by
allowing for diﬀerent retirement eﬀects depending on the age at which an individual is entitled
to retire (below or above age 60). The results obtained are to be interpreted with caution, as the
standard errors in our model are rather large and coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. However, our results suggest an age-gradient story : men retiring after age 60 when their
country allows for retirement have a 0.5 percentage point higher probability of being obese than
men retiring before age 60.
Our results have some important policy implications. Given the increasing number of people
approaching retirement age and the upward trend in obesity rates (where each cohort is heavier
than the previous one), men already at risk of obesity and retiring from strenuous jobs will be
likely to suﬀer from health disorders in the near future – especially as obesity is a major risk
factor for cardiovascular diseases among men in their sixties. From an inequality perspective, the
heterogeneous impact of retirement may exacerbate weight and health disparities, as retirement
seems to aﬀect the most vulnerable individuals (men in strenuous jobs and at risk of obesity).
Public health policies speciﬁcally targeted at this population should be considered in order to
guarantee healthy ageing and healthy life years following retirement.
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Figure 2.1 – Distribution of weight change (in kg) among individuals having retired across
waves and individuals either employed or retired in all waves, for men and women respectively.
Figure 2.2 – Counterfactual distributions of men’s BMI standardised by age for the subpopu-
lation of compliers.
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Table 2.1 – Oﬃcial (ORA), Earliest (ERA) and Eﬀective retirement ages; Proportion of in-
dividuals retired below and above the ERA cutoﬀ and proportion of individuals retiring when
reaching the ERA between two subsequent waves of the survey.
Country Official retirement Earliest retirement Effective retirement % of retired % of retired % of individuals
ages (ORA)a ages (ERA)a agesd,e below ERAd above ERAd retiring when
reaching ERA
across wavesf
Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Austria 65 60 61.5b 56.5b 61.3 59.5 31.4 94.2 28.6
Belgium 65 63 60 60 61.4 61.4 21.1 81.6 34.3
France 65 65 60 60 60.5 62.1 17.0 88.0 44.5
Germany 65 65 63 60 63.6 62.6 11.5 79.9 38.6
Italy 65 60 57c 57c 61.4 61.4 18.6 81.6 27.2
Spain 65 65 61 61 65 63 8.9 68.9 21.6
Sweden 65 65 61 61 65.5 65.9 6.5 50.7 19.4
Switzerland 65 64 63 62 65 65 5.4 65.4 39.0
a Oﬃcial and earliest retirement ages are provided by Keese (2006) and OECD (2011) reports. They
concern workers retiring in 2005 under the main mandatory pension schemes and exclude special ar-
rangements for public-sector workers and other workers such as the long-term unemployed or disabled.
b In 2004, workers in Austria could retire at ages 61.5 (men) and 56.5 (women). The 2004 pension reform
in Austria introduced a gradual increase in the ERAs for men and women. The ERAs were increased by
two months for each quarter of birth for men born in the ﬁrst two quarters of 1943 and women born in
the ﬁrst two quarters of 1948. Following these increases, the ERAs were increased by one month for each
quarter of birth for men born in the third quarter of 1943 and later and for women born in the third
quarter of 1948 and later. Furthermore, the 2004 pension reform also created special corridor pensions
for men born in the last quarter of 1943 and later. The minimum entry age for these corridor pensions
was 62, thereby making the ERA beyond age 62 non-binding in many cases (Manoli and Weber (2012)).
Greater details about the reform can be found in Manoli and Weber (2012). We assign to each individual
living in Austria the ERA corresponding to his quarter of birth and sex. We take age 62 as the binding
age for men for the 2006 and 2010 waves.
c Before 2008, workers in Italy could retire at age 57 if they had contributed to the system for 35 years.
According to a recent reform, approved as part of the 2008 budget process, the minimum age to request
early retirement in Italy has increased from 57 to 61 years old in 2013. The minimum age to request
early retirement in Italy was 59 years old from July 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010 and 60 years old from
January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012 (OECD (2011)). We thus consider age 57 as the ERA in force in
Italy when waves 1 and 2 of SHARE were conducted on the ﬁeld. As almost all the individuals of the
2010-2011 wave of SHARE were surveyed in 2011, we take age 60 as the ERA in force when wave 3 of
the SHARE survey was conducted on the ﬁeld.
d Figures in columns 5-8 are computed using the pooled sample, i.e, 7479 observations. We do not use
the panel structure of the data to compute these estimates.
e We compute the eﬀective retirement age as the average age of individuals who retired between 2004
and 2006 or between 2006 and 2010 in our data. As we do not have reliable information on the month
and year in which the individuals retire, we cannot give the actual average age at which they retire.
For this reason, ﬁgures in column 5-6 can be misleading because they systematically over-estimate the
eﬀective retirement age, which is calculated in 2006 for individuals having retired between 2004 and 2006
and calculated in 2010-11 for individuals having retired between 2006 and 2010-11.
f The panel structure of our data allows us to compute the proportion of individuals actually retiring
between two subsequent waves of the survey when reaching the ERA in force in their country during the
same period.
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Table 2.2 – Summary statistics for the pooled sample of men.
Characteristics Whole sample Employed Retired Retiring
in all in all between
waves waves wavesa
Average Average Average Average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Age 59.82 56.84 62.87 60.32
Marital status Lives with spouse/partner 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.90
Doesn’t live with spouse/partner 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.10
Education Post-secondary 0.32 0.41 0.22 0.32
Upper secondary 0.33 0.29 0.33 0.37
Lower secondary 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
Primary education 0.17 0.11 0.27 0.15
Occupation Managers and professionals 0.34 0.43 0.24 0.32
Technicians 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.21
White collars 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.13
Blue collars 0.33 0.27 0.41 0.33
Employment
Retirement status Retired 0.45 0.00 1.00 .
Employed or self-employed 0.55 1.00 0.00 .
Weight related measures
Weight category Underweight 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Normal 0.32 0.36 0.30 0.30
Overweight 0.49 0.48 0.50 0.50
Obese 0.18 0.15 0.21 0.19
Body Mass Index 26.95 26.49 27.38 27.08
Country Austria 0.08 0.05 0.12 0.08
Belgium 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.24
France 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.15
Germany 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.09
Italy 0.16 0.09 0.27 0.12
Spain 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08
Sweden 0.16 0.24 0.04 0.17
Switzerland 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.07
Observations 4059 1497 1245 1317
a An individual retiring between waves is deﬁned as an individual having retired either between 2004
and 2006 or between 2004 and 2006.
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Table 2.3 – Summary statistics for the pooled sample of women.
Characteristics Whole sample Employed Retired Retiring
in all in all between
waves waves wavesa
Average Average Average Average
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Age 59.68 56.45 63.06 60.41
Marital status Lives with spouse/partner 0.72 0.73 0.69 0.75
Doesn’t live with spouse/partner 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.25
Education Post-secondary 0.35 0.42 0.25 0.37
Upper secondary 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29
Lower secondary 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19
Primary education 0.17 0.11 0.27 0.15
Occupation Managers and professionals 0.29 0.34 0.24 0.28
Technicians 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.23
White collars 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.30
Blue collars 0.20 0.15 0.26 0.19
Employment
Retirement status Retired 0.43 0.00 1.00 .
Employed or self-employed 0.57 1.00 0.00 .
Weight related measures
Weight category Underweight 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
Normal 0.49 0.53 0.38 0.53
Overweight 0.33 0.30 0.37 0.31
Obese 0.17 0.14 0.24 0.14
Body Mass Index 25.79 25.43 26.89 25.22
Country Austria 0.07 0.02 0.15 0.06
Belgium 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.17
France 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.20
Germany 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.13
Italy 0.13 0.07 0.24 0.11
Spain 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03
Sweden 0.21 0.27 0.10 0.24
Switzerland 0.07 0.11 0.02 0.06
Observations 3420 1299 990 1131
a An individual retiring between waves is deﬁned as an individual having retired either between 2004
and 2006 or between 2004 and 2006.
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Table 2.4 – First-stage results : Impact of reaching the Earliest Retirement Age (ERA) on
retirement status.
Retired
Men Women
(1) (2)
Above the ERA .209*** .277***
(.019) (.021)
Age -.054* -.142****
(.031) (.031)
Age squared .000** .001***
(.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 .049 .040
(.045) (.046)
Time dummy for 2010 .188 .151
(.129) (.134)
Lives with spouse/partner .012 .021
(.040) (.037)
R-squared 0.30 0.34
F-Stat of excluded instruments 122.18 169.36
Observations 4059 3420
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust. (3) Columns 1-2 are estimated by ﬁxed-eﬀect linear
probability models.
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Table 2.5 – Pooled OLS results for men : the impact of retirement on BMI, the probability of
being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese.
Men
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
(1) (2) (3)
Retirement .499** .048* .038*
(.223) (.025) (.022)
Age .152 .053 -.003µ
(.273) (.034) (.028)
Age squared -.002 -.001* .000
(.002) (.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 .159** .018µ .032***
(.081) (.012) (.009)
Time dummy for 2010 .544*** .065*** .050**
(.193) (.023) (.019)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse/partner)
Lives with spouse/partner .217 .072** .009
(.323) (.035) (.028)
Education (Ref : Primary education)
Post secondary education -1.378*** -.133*** -.113***
(.356) (.040) (.035)
Upper secondary education -.606* -.069* -.050µ
(.347) (.036) (.033)
Lower secondary education -.634* -.028 -.043
(.351) (.037) (.034)
Occupation (Ref : Blue collars)
Managers and professionals .002 .015 -.021
(.290) (.033) (.028)
Technicians .391 .054µ .013
(.332) (.034) (.031)
White collars .365 .033 .042
(.337) (.035) (.034)
Country ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.03
Observations 4059 4059 4059
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level, µ : signiﬁcant at the 15% level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual
level. (3) Columns 2-3 are estimated by linear probability models.
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Table 2.6 – Pooled OLS results for women : the impact of retirement on BMI, the probability
of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese.
Women
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
(1) (2) (3)
Retirement .691** .048µ .052**
(.301) (.030) (.023)
Age -.060 -.025 .007
(.381) (.038) (.030)
Age squared .000 .000 -.000
(.003) (.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 .272*** .023* .019*
(.034) (.013) (.010)
Time dummy for 2010 .164 .005 .012
(.067) (.026) (.019)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse/partner)
Lives with spouse/partner .248 .008 -.008
(.276) (.029) (.022)
Education (Ref : Primary education)
Post secondary education -2.544*** -.179*** -.160***
(.542) (.053) (.042)
Upper secondary education -1.653*** -.133*** -.113***
(.513) (.048) (.040)
Lower secondary education -1.094** -.066
-.097**
(.513) (.047) (.041)
Occupation (Ref : Blue collars)
Managers and professionals -.475 -.133*** -.033
(.499) (.051) (.039)
Technicians .181 -.044 -.012
(.501) (.050) (.041)
White collars -.487 -.070* -.026
(.433) (.042) (.035)
Country ﬁxed-eﬀects yes yes yes
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.04
Observations 3420 3420 3420
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level, µ : signiﬁcant at the 15% level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual
level. (3) Columns 2-3 are estimated by linear probability models.
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Table 2.7 – Fixed-eﬀects results for men : the impact of retirement on BMI, the probability
of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese.
Men
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
(1) (2) (3)
Retirement -.122 -.002 .020
(.107) (.019) (.014)
Age .358* .089*** .009
(.188) (.032) (.021)
Age squared -.002 -.001*** .000
(.001) (.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 -.201 -.010 -.011
(.214) (.041) (.027)
Time dummy for 2010 -.482 -.011 -.078
(.605) (.119) (.080)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse/partner)
Lives with spouse-partner -.214 -.064 -.013
(.208) (.043) (.030)
R-squared 0.91 0.80 0.83
Observations 4059 4059 4059
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust. (3) Columns 2-3 are estimated by ﬁxed-eﬀect linear
probability models.
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Table 2.8 – Fixed-eﬀects results for women : the impact of retirement on BMI, the probability
of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese.
Women
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
(1) (2) (3)
Retirement .251** .008 .024*
(.100) (.017) (.014)
Age .175 .014 -.018
(.188) (.032) (.022)
Age squared -.002 .000 .000
(.001) (.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 .367 .061 .035
(.271) (.043) (.032)
Time dummy for 2010 .544 .125 .059
(.785) (.127) (.096)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse-partner)
Lives with spouse/partner .439* .022 -.002
(.230) (.032) (.032)
R-squared 0.93 0.86 0.84
Observations 3420 3420 3420
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust. (3) Columns 2-3 are estimated by ﬁxed-eﬀect linear
probability models.
94
Chapter 2 : Gaining weight through retirement? Results from the SHARE
survey.
Table 2.9 – Second-stage results for men : the causal impact of retirement on BMI, the
probability of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese.
Men
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
(1) (2) (3)
Retirement .474 .057 .129**
(.447) (.073) (.060)
Age .407** .094*** .018
(.198) (.032) (.022)
Age squared -.002* -.001*** .000
(.001) (.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 -.245 -.014 -.019
(.237) (.042) (.029)
Time dummy for 2010 -.624 -.025 -.104
(.676) (.121) (.085)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse/partner)
Lives with spouse/partner -.226 -.065 -.015
(.206) (.041) (.030)
Observations 4059 4059 4059
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust. (3) Columns 2-3 are estimated by FEIV linear
probability models. (4) As the xtivreg2 command in Stata (Schaﬀer (2010)) only computes the whithin
R-squared, the overall R-squared is not reported here.
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Table 2.10 – Second-stage results for women : the causal impact of retirement on BMI, the
probability of being either overweight or obese and the probability of being obese.
Women
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
(1) (2) (3)
Retirement .176 .022 .014
(.360) (.057) (.044)
Age .167 .016 -.019
(.193) (.031) (.024)
Age squared -.002 .000 .000
(.001) (.000) (.000)
Time dummy for 2006 .370 .061 .036
(.286) (.042) (.033)
Time dummy for 2010 .553 .124 .060
(.823) (.124) (.098)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse/partner)
Lives with spouse/partner .440** .021 -.002
(.216) (.030) (.030)
Observations 3420 3420 3420
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust. (3) Columns 2-3 are estimated by FEIV linear
probability models. (4) As the xtivreg2 command in Stata (Schaﬀer (2010)) only computes the whithin
R-squared, the overall R-squared is not reported here.
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Table 2.11 – Second-stage results for men and women : the impact of retirement by occupation
type (strenuous/sedentary) before retirement.
BMI Overweight or Obese (BMI≥30)
Obese (BMI≥25)
Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Retirement .419 .733 .050 .085 .162 .088
(.894) (.734) (.139) (.126) (.116) (.090)
Retirement*strenuous occupation .461 .033 .012 -.078 .104** -.037
(.371) (.360) (.058) (.064) (.053) (.045)
Age .728 .552 .112 .030 .127 .024
(.739) (.620) (.102) (.112) (.087) (.076)
Age squared -.005 -.005 -.001 .000 -.001 .000
(.006) (.005) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Time dummy for 2006 -.431 .360 -.016 .070 -.058 .017
(.441) (.389) (.065) (.059) (.050) (.042)
Time dummy for 2010 -.935 .492 -.026 .154 -.222 -.011
(1.21) (1.08) (.181) (.168) (.140) (.121)
Marital status
(Ref : Does not live with a spouse/partner)
Lives with spouse/partner 0.009 .524** -.037 -.021 .012 .003
(.261) (.236) (.054) (.032) (.039) (.036)
Observations 2802 2424 2802 2424 2802 2424
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Standard errors in parentheses are robust. (3) Columns 3-6 are estimated by FEIV linear
probability models. (4) Information on the physical strenuousness of work before retirement is only
available for individuals who were working at baseline, i.e, 2802 men and 2424 women in the pooled
sample. (5) As the xtivreg2 command in Stata (Schaﬀer (2010)) only computes the whithin R-squared,
the overall R-squared is not reported here.
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A-2.1. Estimating Outcome Distributions for Compliers in Instrumental Vari-
ables (IV) Models.
Imbens and Rubin (1997b) extend the results of the IV literature (Imbens and Angrist (1994);
Imbens and Rubin (1997a); Angrist et al. (1996)) by showing that under the usual assumptions,
one can estimate the entire marginal distribution of the outcome under diﬀerent treatments for
the subpopulation of compliers. We brieﬂy explain this method below.40
Let Zi be a binary instrument. Let the pair Di(0) and Di(1) denote the values of the
treatment for individual i that would be obtained given the instrument Zi = 0 and Zi = 1
respectively. If Di(0) = 0 and Di(1) = 1, unit i is called a complier. Let us denote Yi(0) the
outcome that would be observed if the treatment were Di = 0, and Yi(1) the outcome that
would be observed if the treatment were Di = 1.
The population is partitioned by the eﬀect of the treatment assignment on treatment re-
ceived; for never-takers (units with Di(0) = 0, Di(1) = 0), let Ci = n; for always-takers (units
with Di(0) = 1, Di(1) = 1), let Ci = a; ﬁnally for compliers (units with Di(0) = 0, Di(1) = 1);
let Ci = c. Assuming the monotonicity assumption (the “no deﬁers” assumption), these three
types exhaustively partition the population. Let φn, φa and φc denote the populations frequen-
cies of the three types of individuals. These proportions are known to the econometrician.
Although we cannot identify the compliers from the observed data, we can identify some of the
non-compliers. If Zobs,i = 0 and Dobs,i = 1, then individual i must be an always-taker with
Ci = a and if Zobs,i = 1 and Dobs,i = 0, then individual i must be a never-taker with Ci = n.
Because of randomisation, the instrument is independent of Ci. Hence, in large samples, we
know the distribution of Yi(1) for always-takers (denoted as ga(y)) and the distribution of Yi(0)
for never-takers (denoted as gn(y)).
We are interested in the distributions of Yi(0) and Yi(1) among the compliers, denoted
as gc0(y) and gc1(y). These distributions cannot be observed directly from the data because
among those assigned to Zobs,i = 0, both never-takers and compliers will be observed to have
40This discussion heavily borrows from Imbens and Rubin (1997b).
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Dobs,i = 0. Analogously, among those assigned to Zobs,i = 1, both always-takers and compliers
will be observed to have Dobs,i = 1.
We write the directly estimable distributions of Yi for the subsample deﬁned by Zobs,i = z and
Dobs,i = d as fz,d(y). This implies that ga(y) = f01(y) and gn(y) = f10(y). Imbens and Rubin
(1997b) show that the distributions for the winning and losing compliers can be expressed in
terms of the directly estimable distributions in the following way:
gc0(y) =
φn+φc
φc
f00(y)−
φn
φc
f10(y)
gc1(y) =
φa+φc
φc
f11(y)−
φa
φc
f01(y)
(2.4)
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Does job insecurity deteriorate
health?
Abstract
This paper estimates the causal eﬀect of perceived job insecurity – i.e. the fear of involuntary
job loss – on health in a sample of men from 22 European countries. We rely on an original
instrumental variable approach based on the idea that workers perceive greater job security
in countries where employment is strongly protected by the law, and relatively more so if em-
ployed in industries where employment protection legislation is more binding, i.e. in industries
with a higher natural rate of dismissals. Using cross-country data from the 2010 European
Working Conditions Survey, we show that when the potential endogeneity of job insecurity is
not accounted for, the latter appears to deteriorate almost all health outcomes. When tackling
the endogeneity issue by estimating an IV model and dealing with potential weak-instrument
issues, the health-damaging eﬀect of job insecurity is conﬁrmed for a limited subgroup of health
outcomes, namely suﬀering from headaches or eyestrain and skin problems. As for other health
variables, the impact of job insecurity appears to be insigniﬁcant at conventional levels.
This chapter was jointly written with Ève Caroli. It has been accepted for publication in Health Economics.
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3.1. Introduction
“There’s nothing more deadly than slow growing fear.” Phoebe Killdeer and the Short Straws.
There is evidence in the recent literature that losing one’s job has health-damaging eﬀects1
which may go as far as inducing a higher risk of mortality.2 Although job loss is a highly
traumatizing event, it is fortunately not very frequent. In contrast, the fear of involuntary job
loss, i.e. perceived job insecurity, is likely to be much more widespread and one may wonder
whether its health impact is as negative as that of actual job loss.
This is an important question from a policy point of view since perceived job insecurity has
increased in a large number of industrialised countries over the past twenty years. Following
several downsizing episodes in the USA and in Europe, a widely shared view has developed
according to which employment relationships have become more unstable than they used to be.
Internal labour markets characterised by long careers within ﬁrms (Doeringer and Piore (1971))
have been undermined. Long-term employer-employee relationships have declined (Cappelli
(1999); Givord and Maurin (2004)) and the labour market seems to have been increasingly
working like a spot market (Atkinson (2001)). Correspondingly, the perception of job insecurity
has increased in most OECD countries since the 1990s (OECD (2004)).
The importance of job insecurity for workers’ well-being has been underlined in the litera-
ture. Böckerman et al. (2011) provide evidence of a strong negative impact of job insecurity
on job satisfaction. This impact is actually much stronger than that of the actual type of work
contract held by workers – permanent vs. temporary – (Bardasi and Francesconi (2004); Chadi
and Hetschko (2013)). In a recent paper, Origo and Pagani (2009) have shown that the level
of job satisfaction of workers who do not experience job insecurity3 is not statistically diﬀerent
whether they have a permanent or a temporary contract. In contrast, workers who feel that
their job is insecure are signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed than workers who do not, whatever their type
of work contract. This suggests that perceived job insecurity is at least as important as the
type of work contract in determining workers’ job satisfaction. Since the latter has been shown
1See Eliason and Storrie (2009b), Eliason and Storrie (2009a) and Deb et al. (2011).
2See Sullivan and Von Wachter (2009) and Browning and Heinesen (2012).
3Workers are considered as not experiencing job insecurity if they report that it is not very likely or not at
all likely that they lose their job in the next 12 months.
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to impact individual health (see Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009a)), perceived job insecurity is
also likely to be a key determinant of the health status – potentially even more important than
the actual type of work contract.
The literature in epidemiology, occupational psychology and public health has indeed long
suggested that job insecurity may be harmful to health because it increases stress (Sverke and
Hellgren (2002)). Psychologists have shown that the anticipation of a stressful event repre-
sents an equally important or even greater source of anxiety than the event itself (Lazarus and
Folkman (1984)). Consistently, job insecurity appears to raise self-reported general and psy-
chological morbidity but also sickness absence and health service use – see the review of the
literature by Ferrie (2001). In particular, it is strongly associated with speciﬁc symptoms such
as eyestrain, skin and ear problems, stomach and sleep disorders (Cheng et al. (2005)). It is
also negatively correlated with mental health, as measured by a 30-item psychiatric morbidity
scale and a subscale for depressive factors (Ferrie et al. (2005)).
However, evaluating the causal impact of job insecurity on health raises a challenge which
requires an adequate identiﬁcation strategy. Perceived job insecurity is indeed likely to be en-
dogenous. If pessimistic individuals perceive higher job insecurity and, at the same time, report
a lower health status, results are likely to be biased. Reverse causality is also likely to be a
concern if unhealthy individuals are more likely to be employed in insecure (or, on the contrary,
more secure) jobs or if negative health shocks make individuals more likely to fear that they
could be ﬁred. In all cases, standard OLS or probit estimates will be biased and will only
capture the mere correlation between health and job insecurity.
In this paper, we implement an original identiﬁcation strategy based on an instrumental
variable approach in order to estimate the causal eﬀect of job insecurity on health in a sample
of men from 22 European countries. We consider that workers are likely to feel more secure with
respect to their job if living in a country where employment is strongly protected by the law,
and relatively more so if employed in sectors where employment protection legislation (EPL) is
more binding. We thus instrument perceived job insecurity by the stringency of the employment
protection legislation in the country where the individual lives interacted with the natural rate
of dismissals in the sector where she is employed. This instrument is valid if workers do not
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self-select into sectors-by-country on the basis of characteristics correlated with their health.
We show that this condition holds so that our instrument is truly exogenous. Using cross-
country data from the 2010 European Working Conditions Survey (European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2012)), we show that when the potential
endogeneity of job insecurity is not accounted for, the latter appears to deteriorate almost all
health outcomes (self-rated health, suﬀering from back problems, muscular pain, headaches or
eyestrain, stomach ache, depression or anxiety, overall fatigue and insomnia). When tackling
the endogeneity issue by estimating an IV model and dealing with potential weak-instrument
issues, the health-damaging eﬀect of job insecurity is conﬁrmed for a limited subgroup of health
outcomes, namely suﬀering from headaches or eyestrain and skin problems. As for other health
variables, the impact of job insecurity appears to be insigniﬁcant at conventional levels.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. To our knowledge, we are
the ﬁrst to provide a causal estimate of the impact of perceived job insecurity on health. Most
of the literature on this topic estimates mere correlations. Part of it focuses on “attributed”
job insecurity as captured by atypical employment (i.e. temporary rather than permanent work
contracts) and ﬁnds no association between temporary work and general health, but a positive
correlation with ill mental health (Bardasi and Francesconi (2004)). The largest strand in this
literature deals with perceived job insecurity, as we do. A meta-analysis conducted by Sverke
et al. (2002) on 72 papers shows that both physical and mental health are found to decrease
as perceived job insecurity increases. However, the magnitude of the eﬀects appears to be am-
biguous. On Taiwanese data, Cheng et al. (2005) ﬁnd that job insecurity is associated with
poor self-rated health, with the coeﬃcient being larger for men than for women and, among
women, for those employed in managerial and professional occupations. Using a cross-national
survey, László et al. (2010) ﬁnd diﬀerences across countries : job insecurity is associated with
poor health in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Poland
while the correlation is insigniﬁcant in countries such as Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Spain
and Switzerland. In all cases, these papers estimate multivariate linear or logistic models disre-
garding the possibility that job insecurity be endogenous. Mandal et al. (2011) use a diﬀerent
approach : they estimate a random-eﬀect model and use a lagged measure of job insecurity,
arguing that this measure is not endogeneous in their data. They ﬁnd that subjective expec-
tation of job loss is a signiﬁcant predictor of depression among older workers aged 55 to 65
years old. A few papers take into account the fact that time-invariant omitted variables may
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bias their results and estimate ﬁxed-eﬀect models. Using such an approach on Australian data,
Green (2011) ﬁnds that perceived job insecurity negatively aﬀects mental health. On German
data, Reichert and Tauchmann (2012) try to tackle endogeneity issues by instrumenting job
insecurity by recent staﬀ reductions in the company where the worker is employed. Thus doing,
they show that employees who are concerned about losing their jobs are less psychologically
healthy than those in secure jobs. One may wonder, however, whether staﬀ reductions in the
company are really uncorrelated with psychological health conditional on job insecurity, which
is a necessary condition for their instrument to be exogeneous.
Another attempt to deal with endogeneity issues is made by Ferrie et al. (1995) in a study
considering the health impact of in-ﬁrm changes potentially incurring job insecurity. The au-
thors use the British Whitehall II sample and exploit the foreseen privatisation of the Property
Services Agency, which used to be part of the London-based civil service. More speciﬁcally,
they use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach and compare the health outcomes of those workers
who knew they would be aﬀected by privatisation and a control group of civil servants who
knew they would not, before and after privatisation was announced. This set-up allows them
to estimate the eﬀect of an exogenous shock on ﬁrm ownership and organisation on health.
The authors ﬁnd major negative eﬀects on a large range of health outcomes for men, whereas
health-damaging eﬀects appear to be milder for women. They interpret these results as pro-
viding evidence that job insecurity damages health since expected privatisation must have been
associated by civil servants to an increased risk of involuntary job loss. However, Ferrie et al.
(1998) show that this very episode of privatisation was associated with major organisational
changes. More recent work by Rathelot and Romanello (2012) considers the eﬀect of an episode
of major in-ﬁrm restructuration in French energy utilities. They ﬁnd that these restructurations
have a strong negative eﬀect on the mental health conditions of the civil servants employed in
these companies. As a consequence, using anticipated privatisation as an exogenous shock does
not permit to identify the eﬀect of rising job insecurity – as opposed to anticipated organisa-
tional changes – on health.
We improve with respect to this literature in two respects. First, using an IV strategy allows
us to control for both time-invariant and time-varying omitted variables and/or reverse causal-
ity. Second, we are able to identify the causal impact of perceived job insecurity as opposed to
any organisational change since our instrument is strongly correlated with the former while it
has no reason to vary with ﬁrm organisation.
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Our research relates in a more indirect way to the literature on job loss and health. Sullivan
and Von Wachter (2009) consider the impact of job displacement on mortality in a cohort of
Pennsylvanian workers. In order to control for potential selection of displaced workers, they
include the mean and variance of individual wages in their estimates as a proxy of productive
ability. They show that high-tenure male workers displaced during the early and mid-1980s
in the course of mass layoﬀs experience a 50 to 100% increase in the mortality hazard during
the years immediately following job loss. The eﬀect decreases as time passes but converges to
a 10-15% increase in the long run. Another strand of literature considers plant closure events
in which the whole of the ﬁrm’s workforce is made redundant. Scholars use propensity score
matching (or weighting) methods and compare health outcomes for workers who have been
displaced because of closing plant and workers who have stayed in their job in a continuously
living plant. On Danish data, Browning et al. (2006) ﬁnd no evidence of higher risk of hospital-
ization for stress-related diseases following displacement. Similarly, Eliason and Storrie (2009b)
ﬁnd that displacement does not signiﬁcantly increase the risk of severe cardiovascular diseases
in Sweden. In contrast, they ﬁnd evidence of a higher probability of hospitalization due to
alcohol-related conditions. In a companion paper, they also ﬁnd higher mortality from alcohol-
related conditions and suicides and, to some extent, from ischemic diseases (Eliason and Storrie
(2009a)). Similar results for mortality are found by Browning and Heinesen (2012) on Danish
data: the risk of mortality is much higher in the displacement group than in the control group.
Beyond mortality and hospitalization, Salm (2009) considers a variety of health outcomes and
compares those of individuals who lost their job due to plant closure with individuals who did
not, before and after the closure of the plant. The results display no signiﬁcant impact of job
loss on health whatever the type of health outcome. Deb et al. (2011) use what they consider a
more exogenous measure of job loss than mass layoﬀs or plant closing, namely business closing.
They show that a majority of individuals experience no negative eﬀect of business closing on
their BMI and alcohol consumption, while a small minority reports adverse changes. Overall,
the literature on job loss has dedicated a lot of eﬀort to properly identify its eﬀect on health
outcomes even if the exogeneity of plant or even business closure is still debated - see Deb et al.
(2011).
In the present paper, we also try to identify causal eﬀects on health but we focus on perceived
job insecurity rather than job loss as the key variable of interest. Both variables are clearly
related since job loss may generate job insecurity for survivors or for workers expecting to be
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ﬁred. However, job insecurity is likely to aﬀect a much larger group of workers since it is a
subjective feeling which may not coincide with eﬀective job loss.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our empirical strategy.
Section 3 describes the data that we use. Section 4 reports our results and Section 5 concludes.
3.2. Empirical Specification
We investigate the impact of perceived job insecurity on health. As a ﬁrst step, we estimate
the following model by a standard probit4:
Health∗ijs = α+ γJobInsijs +Xijsβ +Dj +Ds + uijs (3.1)
where Health∗ijs denotes the latent health status of individual i in country j and industry s
and is only observed as:
Healthijs = 1{Health∗ijs>0}
(3.2)
JobInsijs denotes the perceived job insecurity of individual i in country j and industry s.
Xijs is a vector of individual and ﬁrm characteristics. Dj and Ds are respectively country and
industry dummies and uijs is an error term.
In some speciﬁcations we control for working conditions and psychosocial environment charac-
teristics. The former capture adverse physical working conditions. The latter include indicators
of job strain (job pressure, decision latitude and skill discretion) consistent with the Job Demand
Control Model proposed by Karasek (1979) as well as a measure of Eﬀort-Reward Imbalance
which may be an additional source of job strain according to Siegrist (1996). Both working
conditions WorkCondijs and psychosocial work environment PsychoSocijs are indeed likely to
be correlated with health and perceived job insecurity. If jobs which are insecure are simply
lousy jobs, they may also be characterised by bad working conditions and high job strain. In
that case, omitting the latter two variables generates an upward bias in the estimate of γ. In
order to control for both physical working conditions and psychosocial work environment, we
estimate the following equation :
Health∗ijs = α+ γJobInsijs+Xijsβ+µWorkCondijs+PsychoSocijsξ+Dj +Ds+ vijs (3.3)
4All health outcomes are binary variables. Further details are available in the data section.
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However, perceived job insecurity JobInsijs is likely to be endogeneous in which case the
probit estimate of γ is inconsistent. Endogeneity may arise either from omitted variable bias or
reverse causality. As job insecurity and health variables are both self-declared, our estimates are
biased if pessimistic individuals systematically tend to report higher job insecurity and lower
health status (and the reverse holds for optimistic individuals). Reverse causality is another
potential source of bias if unhealthy individuals are more likely to be employed in more insecure
(or more secure) jobs. This is also a concern if negative health shocks make individuals fear
that they could be ﬁred.
In order to overcome potential endogeneity problems, we jointly estimate the following IV
system of 2 equations by conditional maximum likelihood:
Health∗ijs = α+ γJobInsijs +Xijsβ +Dj +Ds + uijs (3.4)
JobInsijs = δEPRCj ∗DRs,USA +Xijsζ +Dj +Ds + ηijs (3.5)
where Health∗ijs is the latent health status and is only observed as a dichotomous variable (see
equation 3.2), JobInsijs is assumed to be continuous5, DRs,USA is the dismissal rate in industry
s in the USA and EPRCj denotes the employment protection legislation for regular contracts
and collective dismissals in country j. Equation (3.4) is the same as (3.1) and equation (3.5) is
a linear regression with EPRCj ∗DRs,USA as the instrument.
The intuition behind the choice of the instrument is the following. Perceived job insecurity
JobInsijs is likely to be higher in countries where employment protection legislation EPRCj
is less stringent.6 The index for employment protection legislation is provided by the OECD –
see Venn (2009) – and refers to the legislation regarding individual and collective dismissals of
workers on regular labour contracts. An additional component of overall employment protection
5Our results are robust to dichotomising job insecurity – by opposing those who either disagree or strongly
disagreee with the idea that they may lose their job in the next six months and those who neither agree nor
disagree, agree and strongly agree with this statement – and running a 2SLS estimation of equation (3.4) where
dichotomised job insecurity is instrumented by EPRCj ∗DRs,USA.
6In contrast, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009) suggest that employment protection legislation is negatively
correlated with the satisfaction with job security. According to them this negative correlation is due to the fact
that their satisfaction variable captures two components of job security : the probability of job loss and the cost
of it. The former decreases with EPL – which is consistent with our assumption – but the latter strongly rises
with EPL since ﬁnding a new job is quite harder in countries where employment is strongly regulated.
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legislation has to do with regulations of temporary work contracts. We do not include it in our
EPL index (and restrict our sample accordingly to permanent workers) because it is not clear
whether the rules restricting the use of temporary contracts actually protect temporary workers
or rather permanent ones, by making temporary work either more costly or less convenient to
use (OECD (2014)).
Of course, the stringency of employment protection legislation cannot be used, per se, as an
instrument since its variability would be very low and it would capture all heterogeneity existing
across countries. This is why we instrument job insecurity by the stringency of employment pro-
tection legislation EPRCj in the country where the individual lives interacted with the extent
to which EPL is binding in the sector where the individual is employed. As is classical in the
job and worker ﬂow literature – see Bassanini et al. (2009) and Haltiwanger et al. (2014) – we
consider that EPL is particularly binding in sectors where the natural rate of dismissal is high.
We proxy the latter by the industry-level dismissal rate in the USA. The reason for choosing
this country as a benchmark is that EPL is almost nonexistent in the USA – see Venn (2009)
– so that the observed dismissal rates may be considered as capturing the natural dismissal
propensity in the corresponding industries.
Overall, the assumption underlying our instrument is that workers living in countries with a
strong employment protection legislation will feel comparatively more secure, as far as their job
is concerned, when employed in industries with a high natural rate of dismissal because this is
where the stringency of EPL makes more diﬀerence. Our instrument is valid if workers do not
self-select into sectors-by-country on the basis of characteristics which may be correlated with
their health. We will provide evidence that this is not the case in Section 3.3..
Note that our instrument captures the risk of being dismissed which is likely to be a good
predictor of the perceived risk of losing one’s job, i.e. our job insecurity indicator. Finding a
good instrument would have been more complicated should our variable of interest have been the
individual’s satisfaction with her job security. The latter is indeed likely to be determined not
only by the risk of losing one’s job, but also by the expected level of unemployment beneﬁt and
the probability of re-employment if dismissed. In the present case, our job insecurity variable
captures the perceived risk of dismissal which is easier to predict since it does not depend
on expectations about future well-being but only on the actual risk of dismissal faced by the
individual.
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3.3. Data
3.1. Presentation of the sample
We use the ﬁfth wave of the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS). Since its launch in
1990, the EWCS measures and monitors trends and changes in working conditions in Europe.
It has been conducted every ﬁve years on a random sample of workers (salaried employees and
self-employed) in a growing number of European countries (from 12 in 1990 to 34 in 2010).
The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions com-
missioned the ﬁfth wave of the EWCS to be carried out in winter-spring 2010. Face-to-face
interviews were conducted with persons in employment in the 28 member states as well as in
Norway, Macedonia, Turkey, Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro. The questionnaire covers issues
such as employment status and the general job context : working time, work organisation, earn-
ings and ﬁnancial security, job insecurity, psychosocial work environment, work-life imbalance
and access to training. It also covers several aspects of health, well-being and psychological
conditions as well as demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Importantly, the 2010
EWCS questionnaire includes a detailed health module. Previously, the EWCS had only a few
questions related to health, such as “Do you think your health or safety is at risk because of
your work?” or “Does your work aﬀect your health, or not?”. The formulation of these ques-
tions was problematic, as it was likely to suﬀer from framing eﬀects. This is why we do not use
EWCS waves prior to the 2010 one. Response rates in the 2010 wave vary substantially across
countries from 31.3% in Spain to 73.5% in Latvia with an average response rate of 44.2% across
all countries – see the Fifth EWCS Technical Report (2010). As underlined in the technical
report, “EWCS had lower-than-desired response rates particularly in countries reporting low
response rates in similar random face-to-face social surveys : Poland, Slovenia, the United-
Kingdom, France, Belgium and the Netherlands”. In the 2010 wave almost 44,000 workers were
interviewed. The original sample included all persons aged 15 and above who were resident in
the country that was being surveyed and who were in employment7 during the reference week.
Our empirical strategy uses the employment protection legislation index for individual and
collective dismissals of workers on regular work contracts (EPRC). This index is available for
7Being in employment was deﬁned as having done any work for pay or proﬁt during the reference week for
at least one hour.
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only 22 countries (out of 34).8 Moreover, as it is deﬁned only for individuals employed with a
regular contract in the business sector, we exclude from the sample self-employed individuals,
individuals working in non-business sectors9, as well as individuals who did not have a regular
work contract at the time of the survey. As is standard in the literature – see OECD (2010b) – we
also exclude individuals working very short hours (less than 15 hours during the reference week).
We further restrict our sample to men only since in our data women are overrepresented in very
small establishments (less than 5 employees)10 for which the scope of employment protection
legislation is reduced in most countries. Overall, our ﬁnal sample consists of 5,541 men across
22 countries. Once conditioning on having no missing value on any dependent variable and/or
covariate, our sample goes down to 4,749 observations for all health outcomes. Table A-3.1
gives a overview of the sample restrictions we make and displays the number of observations
dropped after each sample restriction.
3.2. Variables
Perceived job insecurity is assessed by asking workers their opinion about the following state-
ment : “I might lose my job in the next 6 months”. Five answers are available ranging from
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”.11 We standardise job insecurity to mean 0 and 1 stan-
dard deviation.
Measuring health using survey data is always a challenge. The EWCS questionnaire includes
a question on self-rated health where respondents are asked to rate their health on a 5-point
scale : very good, good, fair, bad or very bad. We dichotomise the responses into good (very
good and good) and bad health (fair, bad or very bad). There is evidence in the literature that
self-rated health is a good indicator of individual overall health (Ferrie et al. (1995)). It has been
found to be a good predictor of mortality even after controlling for more objective measures of
health (Idler and Kasl (1991); Idler and Benyamini (1997); Bath (2003)). However, the proba-
bility of reporting good or bad health may suﬀer from individual reporting heterogeneity (Etilé
and Milcent (2006); Tubeuf et al. (2008)). This is why we also use more objective measures
8The EPRC index is available for the following countries : Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the United-Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Turkey, Slovenia and Estonia.
9Agriculture, mining and fuel are excluded too because of problems of data reliability, so that the sectors
included in our study correspond to sectors 15 to 74 in the NACE Rev. 1 classiﬁcation.
10They have a 60% higher probability than men to be employed in very small establishments.
11This is a standard way to measure perceived job insecurity in the literature. For example, in the Karasek’s
Job Content Questionnaire (JCQ), job insecurity is measured on a 4-point scale by the proposition “My job is
secure”, where response categories range from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” (Karasek et al. (1998)).
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of health capturing speciﬁc diseases or symptoms. In the EWCS database, respondents are
asked whether they have suﬀered over the last 12 months from either backache, skin problems,
muscular pain in shoulders, neck and/or upper limbs, muscular pain in lower limbs, headache
or eyestrain, stomach ache, cardiovascular diseases, depression or anxiety, overall fatigue, or
insomnia or general sleep diﬃculties. For each above-mentioned health disorder, we build a
corresponding dummy variable taking value 1 if the individual suﬀered from it, 0 otherwise.
We also use some information on individuals’ well-being. We build a dummy variable equal to
1 if the individual answers “All the time”, “Most of the time” or “More than half of the time”
to at least one of the following assertions : “[Over the past two weeks] I have felt cheerful and
in good spirits”; “I have felt calm and relaxed”; “I woke up feeling fresh and rested”; “My daily
life has been ﬁlled with things that interest me”. Our well-being dummy indicator is equal to 0
otherwise.
Our baseline speciﬁcation includes a set of covariates capturing individual and ﬁrm charac-
teristics. Some speciﬁcations also control for working conditions and psychosocial work envi-
ronment.
Individual and ﬁrm characteristics include age (entered as a continuous variable), the presence
of a spouse or partner in the household, occupation12 (managers and professionals, technicians
and supervisors, white collars, blue collars) and education13 (higher education, secondary edu-
cation, below secondary). As the income variable in the EWCS has many missing values and
is not quite reliable, we use a question on the “household’s ability to make ends meet given its
total monthly income”. We build a dummy variable equal to 1 if individuals report that their
household makes ends meet “with some diﬃculty”, “with diﬃculty” or “with great diﬃculty”,
and equal to 0 otherwise. We interpret this indicator as a measure of households’ deprivation.
We also use a question reporting whether the individual was unemployed immediately before
this job (dummy variable equal to 1 if so, 0 otherwise), information on establishment size (ﬁve
classes) and the presence of an employee representative at the workplace (dummy variable equal
to 1 if so, 0 otherwise).
Working conditions are captured by an index taking values 0 to 10, where 10 denotes adverse
working conditions. It is the normalised sum of 15 dummy variables taking value 1 if the indi-
vidual is exposed half of the time or more to a given working condition, and 0 otherwise. The 15
12Based on the 1988 International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO 88).
13Based on the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED).
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working-condition components are : being exposed to vibrations from hard tools or machinery;
to noise so loud that one would have to raise one’s voice to talk to people; high temperatures
which make one perspire even when not working; low temperatures whether indoors or outdoors;
breathing in smoke, fumes, powder or dust; in vapors such as solvents and thinners; handling
or being in skin contact with chemical products or substances; breathing tobacco smoke from
other people; handling or being in direct contact with materials which can be infectious, such as
waste, bodily ﬂuids, laboratory materials; having a job that involves tiring or painful positions;
lifting or moving people; carrying or moving heavy loads; standing; performing repetitive hand
or arm movements; handling angry clients or patients.
As for psychosocial work environment characteristics, they are measured through a series of
indicators adapted from the Job Content Instrument of Karasek (Karasek (1979)) and the
Eﬀort-Reward Imbalance Questionnaire (Siegrist (1996)). These indicators include job pres-
sure, decision latitude, skill discretion and reward, and are measured as follows. Job pressure
is built out of three components : not having enough time to get the job done (measured on a
5-point scale where response categories range from “always” to “never”), working at high speed
(7-point scale ranging from “all the time” to “never”), and working to tight deadlines (7-point
scale ranging from “all the time” to “never”). We combine the responses into a summary scale
and normalise it to [0;10], where 10 denotes high job pressure. We then divide the scale into
tertiles, i.e. low job pressure, moderate job pressure and high job pressure. A measure of de-
cision latitude is obtained using three dummy variables : the ability to choose or change the
order of tasks, the methods of work and the speed or rate of work (all variables taking value
1 if the individual has control over the corresponding decision, 0 otherwise). We combine the
responses into a summary scale, normalise it to [0;10], where 10 denotes high decision latitude,
and divide it into tertiles. Skill discretion is measured by a single question asking whether
one’s job involves learning new things (dummy variable equal to 1 if so, 0 otherwise). Finally,
workers’ reward is assessed by two questions : being well paid to do one’s work (measured on
a 5-point scale where response categories range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”);
having a job that oﬀers good prospects for career advancements (5-point scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). Responses are summed into a summary scale that is
normalised to [0;10] and divided into tertiles.
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3.3. Instrument
We instrument perceived job insecurity by the stringency of employment protection legislation
EPRC in the country where the worker lives interacted with the US rate of dismissals in the in-
dustry where he is employed. We borrow US dismissal rates from Bassanini and Garnero (2013).
Their database contains dismissal rates over 1996-2006 and uses an industry classiﬁcation that
can be matched, at a suﬃciently disaggregated level, to the Nace Rev. 1 classiﬁcation used in
the EWCS. To capture the natural dismissal propensity at the industry level, we compute a
quantitative indicator equal to the average US industry dismissal rate between 2000 and 2006.14
Overall, we have information on 23 industry-level US dismissal rates.
Data on employment protection legislation are provided by the OECD. The EPRC index
that we use refers to the legislation regarding individual and collective dismissals of workers
on regular labour contracts and varies at the country level. As regards individual dismissals,
it is built out of information on notiﬁcation procedures, delays before the notice period can
start, the length of the notice period and size of severance payments, the circumstances under
which a dismissal is considered unfair and compensation and extent of reinstatement following
unfair dismissal. Regarding collective dismissals, the index takes into account the number of
workers above which dismissals are considered as collective as well as additional notiﬁcation and
delay requirements and other special costs to employers.15 The theoretical value of the EPRC
index varies from 0 to 6 (where 6 is the most stringent legislation).16 The list of industries and
countries that we use, together with the US sectoral dismissal rates and the national EPRC
indices can be found in Appendix Table A-3.5.
3.4. Descriptive statistics
Figure 3.1 and Tables A-3.2, A-3.3 and A-3.4 provide the descriptive statistics for our sample.
As shown in Figure 3.1, 32% of the workers strongly disagree with the statement that they
might lose their job in the next six months, while 34% simply disagree, 18% neither agree nor
14Following the evidence provided by Bassanini et al. (2009), we assume that the natural dismissal propensity
in the USA is stable over time and we average it over a complete cycle, 2000-2006.
15Further details on the construction of the employment protection index can be found in Venn (2009).
16The EPRC index that we use refers to year 2008. We pre-date it because, over the period under study, a
number of EU countries implemented reforms of employment protection legislation. Given that it takes a while
for employees to understand how the new rules really work, people tend to base their expectations on prior
information.
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disagree, 12% agree and 4% strongly agree. In the sample, the average age is 41 years old,
71% of our individuals live with a spouse or partner, and 35% report having diﬃculties to
make ends meet. 7% report having had a period of unemployment immediately before their
current job, and 48% have an employee representative at their workplace. A majority of workers
in our sample (61%) are employed in establishments with less than 50 employees, while only
9% are employed in large establishments (more than 500 employees). While 78% of individuals
declare being in good health (good or very good self-rated health), we do see a number of health
disorders – see Table A-3.3. 47% of workers report suﬀering from backache, 43% from muscular
pain in upper limbs, 30% from muscular pain in lower limbs, 34% from headache or eyestrain,
34% from overall fatigue and 18% from insomnia or sleep diﬃculties. However, fewer workers
report suﬀering from skin problems (8%), stomach ache (12%), cardiovascular diseases (5%),
or depression or anxiety (8%). 93% of the individuals in the sample experienced well-being the
week preceding the interview. We also control for the industry where the worker is employed.
The largest proportions of respondents are found in the construction sector (15%), in renting
and business activities (10%) and in retail trade (10%) – see Table A-3.4. We also provide
a country-by-country breakdown of our sample. Belgium, France and Germany are the most
represented countries and Ireland is the country with fewest respondents.
3.4. Results
3.1. Probit estimates
Probit estimates of equations (3.1) and (3.3) are reported in Table 3.1. Each line presents the
point estimate (resp. standard error) of perceived job insecurity (γˆ) for a diﬀerent health out-
come.17 In column 1 we only control for individual and ﬁrm characteristics, i.e. age, education,
occupation, marital status, diﬃculties to make ends meet, period of unemployment immediatly
before current job, establishment size, presence of an employee representative in the establish-
ment where the person is employed, industry and country dummies. Job insecurity appears to
17The point estimates and standard errors on individual and ﬁrm controls are reported in Appendix Table A-
3.6 for one particular health outcome, namely self-rated health. As could be expected, age is negatively correlated
with self-rated health. When controlling for education, occupation does not appear to be signiﬁcantly correlated
with health. Living with a spouse or partner, establishment size and the presence of employee representatives
in the establishment do not seem to signiﬁcantly aﬀect self-rated health either. In contrast, having problems to
make ends meet is associated with poorer self-rated health which is unsurprising if this variable captures to some
extent low income levels. Suprisingly enough, being unemployed immediately before the current job is associated
with better health (at the 10% signiﬁcance level).
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be positively correlated with all health disorders in our data except skin problems and cardio-
vascular diseases. In particular, it is associated with a long series of physical troubles (back
problems, muscular pain, headaches or eyestrain, stomach ache) as well as with depression or
anxiety, overall fatigue and insomnia, all of these at the 1% signiﬁcance level. When computing
average marginal eﬀects18, we ﬁnd that the impact of a one-standard-deviation increase in job
insecurity on the probability of reporting health disorders ranges from 1.9% for stomach ache
to 4.2% for muscular pain in upper limbs. Unsurprisingly, job insecurity is also associated with
poorer self-rated health. Coeﬃcients in Table 3.1 imply that when job insecurity increases by 1
standard deviation, the probability of reporting bad self-rated health increases by 3% on average
in our sample. Beyond its health-damaging eﬀect, we also ﬁnd that job insecurity decreases the
probability of reporting at least one dimension of well-being over the past two weeks (either
feeling cheerful or relaxed or rested or having an interesting life). So, job insecurity appears to
be uniformly harmful to health and to our measure of well-being.
Results are very similar when controlling for bad physical working conditions – see column
(2). Whatever the health outcome or well-being variable we consider, the point estimate on job
insecurity is slightly lower than when we do not include any indicator of working conditions.
However, its magnitude remains in the same range as in column (1) and it is highly signiﬁcant
at conventional levels, except for skin problems and cardiovascular diseases. The same pattern
of results is also found when adding psychosocial factors to our speciﬁcation – see column (3).
A one-standard-deviation increase in job insecurity increases the probability of reporting bad
self-rated health by 1.9%.19
Overall, the results from these simple probit estimates are consistent with most ﬁndings in
the literature suggesting that job insecurity is associated with ill physical and mental health
and with lower well-being (Ferrie (2001)).
18Average marginal eﬀects are computed by ﬁrst calculating the marginal eﬀect for each observation and then
averaging over the entire sample.
19The point estimates and standard errors on working conditions and psychosocial work environment charac-
teristics are reported in Appendix Table A-3.6 for one speciﬁc health outcome – i.e. self-rated health. Unsur-
prisingly, bad working conditions deteriorate self-rated health. Low job pressure is associated with better health
than high job pressure. As suggested by Siegrist (1996), higher rewards for given eﬀort levels are important
to workers’ well-being and they appear to be correlated with better self-rated health. The same holds for high
decision latitude which appears to be positively correlated with self-reported health.
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3.2. IV estimates
3.2..1 Baseline estimates
However, as mentioned in section 3.2., job insecurity is likely to be endogenous both because
of potential omitted variable bias and of reverse causality. In order to deal with this issue, we
estimate an instrumental variable probit in which JobInsijs is instrumented by the stringency
of employment protection legislation in the country where worker i lives interacted with the nat-
ural rate of dismissals in the industry where he is employed. Results obtained when estimating
equation (3.5) are reported in Table 3.2.20 As expected, we ﬁnd that workers living in countries
with more strigent EPL feel comparatively less insecure when employed in sectors characterised
by a high natural rate of dismissals. When controlling for both bad working conditions and
psychosocial work environment, the estimates yield very similar results.
When instrumenting job insecurity, our estimates21 of equation (3.4) suggest that it does
damage a limited number of health outcomes – see Table 3.3. Results in column (1) show
that job insecurity increases the probability of reporting poor self-rated health and this eﬀect
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. It also raises the frequency of a couple of more speciﬁc health
symptoms, namely skin problems and headaches and/or eyestrain – with both point estimates
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.22 Surprisingly, overall fatigue seems to decrease with job insecurity,
although the eﬀect is not highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. As regards the other health out-
comes, the coeﬃcients of job insecurity are not statistically signiﬁcant. As evidenced in columns
(2) and (3), these ﬁndings are robust to controlling for working conditions and/or psychosocial
work environment : the point estimates remain stable across speciﬁcations.23
20Equation (3.5) is jointly estimated with equation (3.4). The estimates shown in Table 3.2 are obtained when
the health outcome on the left-hand side of equation (3.4) is self-rated health. The coeﬃcients and standard
errors on all control variables are reported in Appendix Table A-3.7. All standard errors are clustered at the
country*industry level (466 clusters).
21All standard errors are clustered at the country*industry level.
22These results are robust to removing one country at a time from our sample. When doing so, the point
estimates remain in the same order of magnitude – ranging from 0.719 to 0.926 for skin problems and from 0.629
to 0.871 for headaches and/or eyestrain and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The same holds for self-assessed health
with coeﬃcients ranging from -0.606 to -0.911 – signiﬁcant at the 5% level – except when removing Slovenia,
Denmark or Finland in which case the point estimates get lower (around -0.500) and are no longer signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. The fact that our results are not quite as robust for self-assessed health as for skin problems
and headaches/eyestrain will be conﬁrmed lower down in this section when estimating weak-instrument-robust
conﬁdence intervals.
23This suggests that the IV exclusion restriction is likely to hold without conditioning on working conditions
and psychosocial work environment.
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One concern with these results is that the point estimates reported in Table 3.3 are much
larger than those estimated by naive probit24 and the corresponding standard errors are also
quite large.25 This increase in the coeﬃcients when estimating the IV model may, of course,
be due to the combined outcome of many potential sources of endogeneity. Measurement er-
ror may be one of those (Card (2001)). Another source of endogeneity may also arise from
unhealthy individuals self-selecting into more secure jobs, in which case the naive probit coef-
ﬁcients would underestimate the true health eﬀect of job insecurity. It should also be noted
that each IV estimate can be given a causal interpretation as a Local Average Treatment Ef-
fect (LATE) without requiring constant treatment assumption. In our case, the “treatment”
is deﬁned as being job insecure, and the IV estimate is identiﬁed on the subset of individu-
als whose behaviour is shifted by the instrument, i.e, the compliers. The observed increase in
the IV coeﬃcients may be explained by the compliers’ speciﬁc characteristics. More speciﬁ-
cally, the compliers in our setup are individuals whose perceived job insecurity is determined
by the interaction between EPL and the natural rate of dismissals in the sector where they are
employed. Although it is not an easy task to characterize them, we hypothesize that the interac-
tion between EPL and the industry-speciﬁc layoﬀ rate is probably more binding for individuals
whose subjective expectations depend on the law. If job insecurity is particularly harmful to
health for this speciﬁc subset of individuals, this may explain the increase in our IV estimates.26
However, one could also worry that our large IV estimates be due to a weak instrument
problem since the F-test of the excluded instrument in equation (3.5) is slightly below 10.27 To
tackle this issue, we derive weak-instrument-robust conﬁdence intervals for the impact of job
insecurity on each of our health outcomes. In doing this, we follow the method proposed by
24This increase in the coeﬃcients does not seem to be due to the estimation method that we use : when
estimating our model by 2SLS the coeﬃcients we obtain are in the same range of magnitude as the average
marginal eﬀects corresponding to the point estimates presented in Table 3.3. Results are available upon request.
25Note that, using our complete speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients estimated for self-rated health, skin problems
and headaches/eyestrain are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those estimated by probit since the conﬁdence intervals
do not overlap. For self-rated health, the conﬁdence interval of the IV estimate is [-1.227;-0.252] whereas it
is [-0.122;-0.031] for the probit estimate. For skin problems the corresponding intervals are [0.512;1.213] and
[-0.040;0.079]. For headache/eyestrain, they are [0.449;1.138] and [0.035;0.115]. In contrast, for overall fatigue,
the IV and probit estimates are not statistically diﬀerent.
26Another way to look at this issue is to determine which sectors or countries are the most shifted by the
instrument. To investigate this, we compute the correlation between observed and predicted job insecurity both
at the country and industry level. Note that for simplicity’s sake, we predict job insecurity using the ﬁrst stage
of a 2SLS model. We ﬁnd that observed job insecurity is particularly well-predicted in countries such as Belgium,
Germany, Denmark and Greece; and in industries such as renting and business activities, transport and storage
as well as in the construction sector.
27For all health outcomes, the F-test of the excluded instrument is about 9 in the baseline speciﬁcation, 9
when controlling for working conditions and 11 when controlling both for working conditions and psychosocial
factors.
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Boeri et al. (2012) who extend to non-linear models the reduced-form approach developed by
Angrist and Krueger (2001) and Chernozhukov and Hansen (2008) for linear models.
More speciﬁcally, as suggested by Boeri et al. (2012), we ﬁrst deﬁne A as a wide enough range
of potential values for γ in equation (3.4). For each a ∈ A, we rewrite equation (3.4) as follows :
Health∗ijs = α+ (γ − a)JobInsijs + aJobInsijs +Xijsβ +Dj +Ds + uijs (3.6)
We then replace the ﬁrst instance of JobInsijs by its expression in equation (3.5) :
Health∗ijs = α+ δ(γ − a)EPRCj ∗DRs,USA + aJobInsijs +Xijs[ζ(γ − a) + β]
+Dj +Ds + (γ − a)ηijs + uijs (3.7)
We then estimate equation (3.7) as a constrained probit, forcing the coeﬃcient of the en-
dogenous variable JobInsijs to equal a. By doing so, the endogeneity of JobInsijs becomes
irrelevant for the consistent estimation of δ(γ − a). In such a modiﬁed reduced-form equation,
the usual test statistics for the signiﬁcance of δ(γ−a) tests the null γ = a (conditional on δ 6= 0).
Iterating over several values of a allows constructing a conﬁdence interval for γ that is robust
to weak instruments since it does not use information about the strength of the correlation
between the instrument and the endogenous variable.
In practice, we proceed as follows :
1. We set A as the set of real numbers in [m1;m2]28, spaced 0.01.
2. We estimate equation (3.7) for each a ∈ A and retain the z-statistics for δ(γ − a).29
3. We construct the 1−p conﬁdence interval as the set of a’s such that the z-statistics is smaller
than c(1− p) where c(1− p) is the (1− p)th percentile of a χ21 distribution.
Applying this procedure yields a 95% conﬁdence interval for γ. For headaches or eyestrain,
this interval is [0.37;2.46] which has to be compared to the narrower interval [0.45;1.14] derived
from the usual maximum likelihood asymptotics. As regards skin problems the corresponding
intervals are [0.1;2.66] and [0.51;1.21]. What matters here is that, for both health outcomes,
the intervals only contain strictly positive values, which conﬁrms that the positive impact of job
28For each health outcome, we choose [m1;m2] so that it contains a wide enough range of potential values for
γ. For headaches and/or eyestrain it is set, for example, to [-1;2.5].
29Note that under the null, the term (γ−a)ηijs disappears from equation (3.7), thus simplifying its estimation.
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insecurity on headache and/or eyestrain and skin problems that we estimate is robust to poten-
tially weak instruments. In contrast, for all other health outcomes – including self-rated health
and overall fatigue – the weak-instrument-robust conﬁdence intervals systematically contain 0
so that the impact of job insecurity is not signiﬁcant at conventional levels when estimated in
this conservative way.
Overall, this method allows us to derive weak-instrument-robust conﬁdence intervals from
reduced-form estimates. The price to pay for this is that we cannot derive precise point esti-
mates for the impact of job insecurity on health outcomes since the corresponding conﬁdence
intervals are very large. In contrast, it allows us to claim with a high degree of conﬁdence that
job insecurity has a positive causal impact on the probability of reporting headaches and/or
eyestrain and skin problems.
3.3. Robustness checks
One may worry that unhealthy workers might self-select into low-dismissal industries and that
this selection pattern may vary according to country-speciﬁc levels of EPL. If this were the case,
our instrument would no longer be valid since the identifying assumption – according to which
workers do not self-select into sectors-by-country on the basis of a characteristic correlated with
health – would not hold anymore. In order to test for this, we estimate the following equation :
HighDismissijs = λ+ ξHealthijs + ψHealthijs ∗ EPRCj +Xijsθ +Dj + υijs (3.8)
where HighDismissijs is a dummy variable equal to 1 if worker i is employed in a high-
dismissal industry and 0 otherwise. Other variables are deﬁned as in Section 3.2.. We use
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of high-dismissal industries : industries with dismissal rates higher than
(i) the median, (ii) the third quartile and (iii) the upper decile. Whatever the threshold we
use for deﬁning high-dismissal industries and whether or not we control for job insecurity in
the regression, ψˆ is never signiﬁcant at conventional levels.30 In an alternative speciﬁcation,
30When high-dismissal industries are deﬁned as industries with dismissal rates higher than the median, the
point estimate of ψˆ is -0.071 – with standard error 0.061 – when controlling for ﬁrm and individual characteristics
along with working conditions and psychosocial factors. When adding job insecurity as an additional control,
the point estimate of ψˆ is -0.074 with standard error 0.061.
3.4. Results 119
we estimate a multinomial probit where the outcome variable is the sector in which the worker
is employed.31 The point estimates associated with the interaction term Healthijs ∗ EPRCj
are never signiﬁcant. This suggests that workers do not self-select into industries on the basis
of their health status in a diﬀerent way according to the level of EPL in their home country.
Hence, our IV is valid to uncover the causal impact of job insecurity on health.
Another concern has to do with potential sample selection bias. If high-dismissal indus-
tries tend to rely more on temporary contracts in high-EPL countries in order to meet their
needs in terms of labour force turnover, a disproportionate part of their workforce will be left
out of our sample to the extent that we exclude temporary workers. If unhealthy workers
are more likely to be employed on temporary contracts than healthy ones, workers employed
in high-dismissal/high-EPL sectors*countries in our sample are likely to enjoy a better health
status than those employed in high-dismissal/low-EPL sectors*countries. To the extent that
our instrument predicts a lower job insecurity for workers employed in high-dismissal/high-
EPL sectors*countries, we may overestimate the negative health impact of job insecurity. We
check that the probability of being employed on a temporary contract is not higher in high-
dismissal/high-EPL sectors*countries than in high-dismissal/low-EPL sectors*countries. On
the sample of permanent and temporary workers, we regress the probability of holding a tem-
porary contract on the EPRCj ∗ DRs,USA interaction.32 The coeﬃcient on the interaction
term is insigniﬁcant with a point estimate of 0.058 (standard error : 0.070), which suggests that
our results are unlikely to be driven by selection bias due to the exclusion of temporary workers.
Our results derive from estimates run on a sample of workers aged 15 years old and above.
However, senior workers may overreact to job insecurity since in most countries, their probabil-
ity to get back to employment if dismissed is lower than for younger workers (OECD (2011)).
In this case, one could be afraid that our results be driven by a particularly strong eﬀect of job
insecurity on health for this speciﬁc age group. We check that our ﬁndings are robust to the
exclusion of older workers by re-running our complete IV estimates33 on the group of prime-age
31Sectors are aggregated as follows : “Manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply”, “Construction”,
“Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household goods”, “Hotels
and restaurants”, “Transport, storage and communication” and “Financial intermediation, real estate, renting
and business activities”.
32This speciﬁcation includes controls for individual and ﬁrm characteristics together with working conditions
and psychosocial factors, as well as country and industry dummies.
33This speciﬁcation includes controls for individual and ﬁrm characteristics together with working conditions
and psychosocial factors, as well as country and industry dummies.
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workers (aged 25 to 59). The results are virtually unchanged.34 Unfortunately, we cannot run
similar estimates on the younger and older age groups since the number of observations is too
low (294 and 215 respectively) to allow us to properly estimate our model.
Controlling for a measure of income when explaining individual health diﬀerences is standard
in the literature (Lundborg (2013)). Given the scarce quality of income data in the European
Working Conditions Survey, we use information on “problems to make ends meet” as an alter-
native in our baseline speciﬁcation. However, one could be concerned that this variable might
be endogenous if unhealthy workers have got problems making a living. In order to make sure
that this does not generate a bias in our estimates, we re-estimate our complete IV speciﬁcation
dropping this covariate. The results are essentially unaﬀected.35
3.5. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence of the causal eﬀect of perceived job insecurity on various
health outcomes in a sample of men from 22 European countries. We instrument perceived
job insecurity by the stringency of employment protection legislation in the country where the
individual lives interacted with the natural rate of dismissals in the industry where he is em-
ployed. Using cross-country data from the 2010 European Working Conditions Survey, we show
that when the potential endogeneity of job insecurity is not accounted for, the latter appears
to deteriorate almost all health outcomes (self-rated health, suﬀering from back problems, mus-
cular pain, headaches or eyestrain, stomach ache, depression or anxiety, overall fatigue and
insomnia). When tackling the endogeneity issue by estimating an IV model and deriving weak-
instrument-robust conﬁdence intervals, ﬁndings are more mixed. The health-damaging eﬀect of
job insecurity is conﬁrmed for a limited subgroup of health outcomes, namely the probability of
suﬀering from headaches or eyestrain and skin problems. In contrast, the impact of job insecu-
rity on other health variables comes out as insigniﬁcant. Our results are robust to controlling
for individual and ﬁrm characteristics but also for adverse working conditions and psychosocial
environment characteristics.
34The point estimates (resp. standard errors) are -0.869 (0.173) for self-rated health, 0.839 (0.219) for skin
problems and 0.800 (0.190) for headaches and eyestrain.
35The point estimates (resp. standard errors) of the job insecurity variable are -0.735 (0.250) for self-rated
health, 0.855 (0.179) for skin problems and 0.788 (0.176) for headaches and eyestrain.
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The method that we use does not allow us to derive precise point estimates. However, we
show that the fear of involuntary job loss has clear worsening eﬀects on two speciﬁc health disor-
ders, i.e. headaches and/or eyestrain and skin problems. As regards other health outcomes, job
insecurity does not seem to have any signiﬁcant impact. This could suggest that feeling insecure
with respect to one’s job is not quite as bad for health as losing it. However, let us underline
that the method that we use to derive weak-instrument-robust conﬁdence intervals is extremely
conservative, so that our results cannot be interpreted as ruling out any damaging impact of
job insecurity on those outcomes. Moreover, we only capture short-term eﬀects here, so that
we cannot exclude that job insecurity might have a more negative impact in the longer-run if
its health-damaging eﬀects cumulate over the years.
Overall, our ﬁndings conﬁrm the results obtained in epidemiology and occupational health,
i.e. that low job security is related to somatic morbidity (Mohren et al., 2003; Ferrie et al.,
2002). Karasek (1979) suggested long ago that “work’s psychological burden consists not only
of the work of carrying out the task but also in the human costs of adapting to labor market
dynamics”. Our results are evidence of that.
The health-damaging eﬀects that we ﬁnd for a couple of health outcomes raise the issue of
the mechanisms through which perceived job insecurity aﬀects both mental and physical health.
The psychology literature has long emphasised the role of stress. Another (complementary) ex-
planation might be that workers who are afraid of losing their job tend to increase precautionary
savings and hence reduce investments, in particular in health. The lack of information about
health consumption in our data does not allow us to test such a hypothesis. Moreover, it is
unclear how relevant this mechanism may be since time is one of the most important inputs
in health investments. In any case, investigating the consequences of job insecurity for health
investments would be extremely valuable and improve our understanding of the mechanisms
through which the fear of job loss deteriorates health.
Whatever the mechanism through which perceived job insecurity aﬀects health, this eﬀect
is likely to be stronger for workers with low employability, i.e. with a low probability of ﬁnding
a new job if losing the current one. According to Green (2011) employability is indeed a key
determinant of the impact of job insecurity upon job satisfaction. Unfortunately, the information
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available in the EWCS database does not allow us to tackle this issue properly. A promising
avenue for future research would consist in investigating the potential role of employability on
the health-damaging eﬀects of perceived job insecurity using reliable measures of employability.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1 – Descriptive statistics : Job insecurity distribution.
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Table 3.1 – Probit model : Coeﬃcients of job insecurity
Health outcome Baseline Baseline Baseline
+Working conditions +Working conditions
+Psychosocial factors
(1) (2) (3)
Self-rated health -.116*** -.110*** -.077***
(.023) (.023) (.023)
Backache .095*** .084*** .068***
(.020) (.020) (.021)
Skin problems .042 .033 .019
(.029) (.029) (.030)
Muscular pain in upper limbs .114*** .105*** .084***
(.020) (.020) (.021)
Muscular pain in lower limbs .073*** .061*** .047**
(.021) (.021) (.022)
Headaches, eyestrain .096*** .091*** .075***
(.020) (.020) (.020)
Stomach ache .098*** .096*** .081***
(.025) (.025) (.025)
Cardiovascular diseases -.009 -.014 -.026
(.039) (.039) (.040)
Depression, anxiety .181*** .173*** .147***
(.029) (.029) (.029)
Overall fatigue .095*** .087*** .062***
(.021) (.021) (.021)
Insomnia, sleep diﬃculties .133*** .127*** .104***
(.023) (.023) (.023)
Well-being -.156*** -.153*** -.128***
(.030) (.030) (.031)
Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the
10% level. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (3) Baseline speciﬁcations include controls for
individual and ﬁrm characteristics : age, education, occupation, marital status, diﬃculties to make ends
meet, period of unemployment immediately before this job, establishment size, presence of an employee
representative in the establishment where the person is employed, industry and country dummies. (4)
Working conditions is a summary indicator of 15 adverse working conditions. (5) Psychosocial factors
include job pressure, decision latitude, skill discretion and reward.
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Table 3.2 – Instrumenting perceived job insecurity
Dependent variable : Job insecurity Baseline Baseline Baseline
+Work. cond. +Work. cond.
+Psychosoc. fact.
(1) (2) (3)
Country-speciﬁc EPRC
Sectoral US dismissal rate -.087*** -.088*** -.096***
(.029) (.029) (.028)
Controls for individual & ﬁrm characteristics yes yes yes
Controls for working conditions no yes yes
Controls for psychosocial factors no no yes
Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749
Notes : (1) The results shown here are obtained when estimating equation (3.5) – jointly with equation
(3.4) – by conditional maximum-likelihood. The estimates are obtained when the health outcome on the
left-hand side of equation (3.4) is self-rated heath. (2) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
country*industry level. (4) EPRC denotes employment protection legislation (5) Individual and ﬁrm
characteristics include age, education, occupation, marital status, diﬃculties to make ends meet, period of
unemployment immediately before this job, establishment size, presence of an employee representative in
the establishment where the person is employed, industry and country dummies. (6) Working conditions
is a summary indicator of 15 adverse working conditions. (7) Psychosocial factors include job pressure,
decision latitude, skill discretion and reward.
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Table 3.3 – IV coeﬃcients of job insecurity
Health outcome Baseline Baseline Baseline
+Working conditions +Working conditions
+Psychosocial factors
(1) (2) (3)
Self-rated health -.689** -.734*** -.740***
(.311) (.278) (.249)
Backache .178 .224 .207
(.488) (.465) (.426)
Skin problems .888*** .899*** .862***
(.165) (.152) (.179)
Muscular pain in upper limbs -.201 -.141 -.123
(.516) (.499) (.453)
Muscular pain in lower limbs .263 .311 .224
(.523) (.505) (.476)
Headaches, eyestrain .821*** .831*** .794***
(.177) (.167) (.176)
Stomach ache .614 .627* .580
(.394) (.382) (.382)
Cardiovascular diseases -.667 -.623 -.699
(.526) (.581) (.465)
Depression, anxiety -.409 -.393 -.377
(.542) (.564) (.548)
Overall fatigue -.613** -.589* -.558*
(.308) (.318) (.310)
Insomnia, sleep diﬃculties -.071 -.042 -.041
(.551) (.552) (.498)
Well-being .077 .012 .011
(.880) (.885) (.854)
Observations 4,749 4,749 4,749
Notes : (1) The results shown here are obtained when estimating equation (3.4) – jointly with equation
(3.5) – by conditional maximum-likelihood. (2) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the
5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the coun-
try*industry level. (4) Baseline speciﬁcations include controls for individual and ﬁrm characteristics :
age, education, occupation, marital status, diﬃculties to make ends meet, period of unemployment im-
mediately before this job, establishment size, presence of an employee representative in the establishment
where the person is employed, industry and country dummies. (5) Working conditions is a summary in-
dicator of 15 adverse working conditions. (6) Psychosocial factors include job pressure, decision latitude,
skill discretion and reward.
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A-3.1. Tables
Table A-3.1 – Sample restriction
Type of sample restriction Number of observations Remaining number
dropped of observations
No restriction 0 43,816
No information on EPL (12 countries) 12,295 31,521
Drop ind. working in non-business sectorsa 12,643 18,878
Drop self-employed ind. 3,534 15,344
Drop ind. working less than 15 hours 473 14,871
Drop public sector, public-private sector and NGO 2,234 12,637
Drop ﬁxed-term contracts and temporary contracts 2,845 9,792
Missing values for job insecurity 529 9,263
Drop women 3,722 5,541
Unique sampleb 792 4,749
Notes : a Agriculture, mining and fuel are excluded too because of problems of data reliability. b “Unique
sample” denotes a sample with no missing values on any of the control variables.
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Table A-3.2 – Descriptive statistics : Individual and ﬁrm characteristics, working conditions
and psychosocial factors.
Mean Standard deviation
(1) (2)
Job insecurity (standardised) 0 (1)
Age 40.93 (11.09)
Education
Higher education .29 (.45)
Secondary education .66 (.47)
Below secondary .05 (.22)
Occupation
Managers and professionals .17 (.38)
Technicians and supervisors .14 (.35)
White collars .18 (.38)
Blue collars .51 (.50)
Marital status
Lives with a spouse or partner .71 (.45)
Diﬃculties to make ends meet .35 (.48)
Establishment size
Less than 10 employees .28 (.45)
Betweeen 10 and 49 employees .33 (.47)
Between 50 and 99 employees .12 (.32)
Between 100 and 499 employees .17 (.38)
More than 500 employees .09 (.29)
Period of unemployment immediatly before this job .07 (.26)
Presence of an employee representative .48 (.50)
Bad working condition index (0 to 10) 3.24 (2.90)
Job pressure index (0 to 10) 4.45 (2.42)
Decision latitude index (0 to 10) 6.48 (3.94)
Reward index (0 to 10) 5.05 (2.32)
Skill discretion .71 (.45)
Observations 4,749 4,749
Notes : (1) Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table A-3.3 – Descriptive statistics : Health variables.
Mean Standard deviation
(1) (2)
Good self-rated health .78 (.41)
Backache .47 (.50)
Skin problems .08 (.27)
Muscular pain in upper limbs .43 (.50)
Muscular pain in lower limbs .30 (.46)
Headache, eyestrain .34 (.47)
Stomach ache .12 (.32)
Cardiovascular diseases .05 (.21)
Depression, anxiety .08 (.27)
Overall fatigue .34 (.47)
Insomnia, sleep diﬃculties .18 (.39)
Well-being .93 (.25)
Observations 4,749 4,749
Notes : (1) Standard deviations in parentheses. (2) All variables are binary so that the mean can be
interpreted as the average frequency in the sample.
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Table A-3.4 – Descriptive statistics : Countries and industries.
Country Frequency(%) Industry Frequency(%)
Austria 3.35 Food and beverages 3.92
Belgium 13.86 Textiles, wearing app. and leather 1.45
Czech Republic 2.80 Wood and wood products 1.20
Denmark 4.63 Paper, printing and publishing 2.13
Estonia 2.48 Chemicals and chemical products 2.27
Finland 3.81 Rubber and plastics 1.47
France 10.80 Non-metallic mineral products 1.24
Germany 10.44 Basic metals and fabricated metal 5.26
Greece 2.46 Machinery 3.20
Hungary 3.87 Electrical and optical equipment 2.55
Ireland 2.17 Transport equipment 3.26
Italy 4.25 Manufacturing, recycling 2.82
Netherlands 3.05 Electricity, gas and water supply 2.23
Norway 3.94 Construction 15.46
Poland 3.58 Motor trade and repair 5.41
Portugal 3.50 Wholesale trade 5.05
Slovak Republic 2.88 Retail trade 10.17
Slovenia 3.92 Hotels and restaurants 4.61
Spain 3.33 Transport and storage 8.82
Sweden 3.24 Post and telecommunications 1.79
Turkey 3.26 Financial intermediation 4.38
United Kingdom 4.36 Real estate activities 1.03
Renting and business activities 10.25
Observations 4,749 4,749
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Table A-3.5 – Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPRC) in Europe (2008) and
industry-level US dismissal rates (mean value for 2000-2006).
Country EPRC index Industry US dismissal rate
Austria 2.62 Food and beverages 2.83
Belgium 2.42 Textiles, wearing app. and leather 6.06
Czech Republic 2.79 Wood and wood products 5.16
Denmark 2.06 Paper, printing and publishing 3.61
Estonia 2.69 Chemicals and chemical products 3.22
Finland 2.23 Rubber and plastics 3.28
France 2.37 Non-metallic mineral products 3.47
Germany 3.21 Basic metals and fabricated metal 4.08
Greece 2.59 Machinery 4.76
Hungary 2.19 Electrical and optical equipment 5.93
Ireland 1.82 Transport equipment 3.08
Italy 2.66 Manufacturing, recycling 4.58
Netherlands 2.80 Electricity, gas and water supply 1.78
Norway 2.43 Construction 5.09
Poland 2.51 Motor trade and repair 2.67
Portugal 3.52 Wholesale trade 3.80
Slovak Republic 2.86 Retail trade 2.98
Slovenia 3.07 Hotels and restaurants 2.99
Spain 2.65 Transport and storage 3.35
Sweden 3.11 Post and telecommunications 4.16
Turkey 2.51 Financial intermediation 2.56
United Kingdom 1.62 Real estate activities 2.06
Renting and business activities 4.19
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Table A-3.6 – Probit model : Self-rated health and job insecurity – Coeﬃcients on control
variables.
Dependent variable :
Dichotomised Self-Rated Health
Coeﬀ S.e
(1) (2)
Job insecurity -.077*** (.023)
Age -.027*** (.002)
Education (Ref : Below secondary)
Higher education .443*** (.122)
Secondary education .509*** (.109)
Occupation (Ref : Blue collars)
Managers and professionals .074 (.084)
Technicians and supervisors -.013 (.083)
White collars .045 (.075)
Marital status (Ref : Does not live with a spouse nor a partner)
Lives with a spouse or partner -.036 (.052)
Diﬃculties to make ends meet -.289*** (.052)
Period of unemployment immediately before this job .167* (.090)
Establishment size (Ref : Less than 10 employees
Betweeen 10 and 49 employees -.078 (.059)
Between 50 and 99 employees -.050 (.081)
Between 100 and 499 employees .031 (.077)
More than 500 employees -.167* (.095)
Presence of an employee representative -.021 (.053)
Bad working condition index -.067*** (.009)
Job pressure (Ref : High job pressure)
Low job pressure .217*** (.059)
Moderate job pressure .051 (.056)
Decision latitude (Ref : Low decision latitude)
High decision latitude .156*** (.056)
Moderate decision latitude -.013 (.064)
Reward (Ref : Low reward)
High reward .473*** (.070)
Moderate reward .293*** (.051)
Skill discretion .002 (.053)
Controls for country dummies yes yes
Controls for industry dummies yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.16
Observations 4,749
Notes : (1) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10%
level. (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A-3.7 – Instrumenting perceived job insecurity – Coeﬃcients on control variables
Dependent variable :
Job insecurity
Coeﬀ S.e
(1) (2)
Sectoral US dismissal rate*country-speciﬁc EPRC -.096*** (.028)
Age -.001 (.001)
Education (Ref : Below secondary)
Higher education .078 (.080)
Secondary education .027 (.075)
Occupation (Ref : Blue collars)
Managers and professionals .080* (.048)
Technicians and supervisors -.005 (.049)
White collars .047 (.050)
Marital status (Ref : Does not live with a spouse nor a partner)
Lives with a spouse or partner -.091*** (.029)
Diﬃculties to make ends meet .235*** (.031)
Period of unemployment immediately before this job .071 (.058)
Establishment size (Ref : Less than 10 employees
Betweeen 10 and 49 employees -.052 (.040)
Between 50 and 99 employees -.085 (.052)
Between 100 and 499 employees -.024 (.050)
More than 500 employees -.124** (.063)
Presence of an employee representative .016 (.031)
Bad working condition index .007 (.007)
Job pressure (Ref : High job pressure)
Low job pressure -.197*** (.034)
Moderate job pressure -.153*** (.034)
Decision latitude (Ref : Low decision latitude)
High decision latitude -.134*** (.036)
Moderate decision latitude -.086** (.044)
Reward (Ref : Low reward)
High reward -.337*** (.039)
Moderate reward -.157*** (.034)
Skill discretion .049 (.034)
Controls for country dummies yes yes
Controls for industry dummies yes yes
Observations 4,749
Notes : (1) The results shown here are obtained when estimating equation (3.5) – jointly with equation
(3.4) – by conditional maximum-likelihood. The estimates are obtained when the health outcome on the
left-hand side of equation (3.4) is self-rated heath. (2) *** : signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** : signiﬁcant
at the 5% level, * : signiﬁcant at the 10% level. (3) Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the
country*industry level.

General Conclusion
This thesis establishes several results on career shocks and their impact on health. We present
the main results obtained, before turning to their limitations. We conclude by suggesting several
implications in terms of public policy.
Main results
Does leaving school in a bad economy deteriorate health? We show that leaving school
in a bad economy is an early socio-economic risk with long-lasting consequences on health –
in particular among low-educated women. Our results show that women who faced higher
unemployment rates at labour-market entry during the 1970s crisis in the UK were in worse
health during the whole period under study (1983-2001). They had a higher probability of
reporting poor health and of consulting a GP over the whole period, i.e. from 7 to 26 years
after school-leaving. Additional results suggest that they were also more likely to suﬀer from
long-standing illnesses. Our results for men are more mixed, ranging from health-damaging
eﬀects to insigniﬁcant ones, depending on the speciﬁcation used. However, we never ﬁnd a
positive eﬀect of leaving school in a bad economy on men’s health. Overall, we provide evidence
that the low-educated – at least women – are strongly aﬀected by poor economic conditions
at labour-market entry, in line with previous results by Cutler et al. (2015). Importantly, we
provide evidence that our ﬁndings are not biased by endogeneous timing.
Gaining weight through retirement? At the other end of the age spectrum, we show
that retirement acts as a ﬁnal career shock for the most vulnerable individuals. Men in strenuous
jobs and already at risk of obesity are at a higher risk of becoming obese following retirement
(two to four years after retirement). Women’s weight is not aﬀected by retirement. We pro-
vide evidence that our results are not driven by selection into retirement. Given the increasing
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number of people approaching retirement age and the upward trend in obesity rates (where
each cohort is heavier than the previous one), men already at risk of obesity and retiring from
strenuous jobs will be likely to suﬀer from health disorders in the near future – especially as
obesity is a major risk factor for cardiovascular diseases among men in their sixties.
Is job insecurity harmful to health? In-between these two critical periods, we focus
on prime-age workers who hold permanent contracts. We show that even an anticipated career
shock can be health-damaging. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the fear of involuntary job loss
triggers mild health symptoms, such as headaches or eyestrain and skin problems. Once again,
our results are not driven by selection eﬀects or other potential endogeneity biases. Although
job insecurity is not a highly traumatising event such as job loss, it is much more widespread,
and our results show that its impact is not trivial.
Limitations
Mechanisms and heterogeneity. Each chapter has produced a causal estimate of a diﬀerent
career shock – or anticipated career shock – on health. A common limitation to these chapters
is that the mechanisms by which career shocks translate into worse health are not clear, at least
from an empirical point of view. This is due both to data limitations and methodological issues.
In the ﬁrst chapter, the mechanisms by which poor economic conditions at labour-market entry
cause worse health in the long-term are not fully understood. Our results are consistent with the
“initial shock” hypothesis, according to which high labour-market uncertainty at school-leaving
leads to greater stress and triggers addictive behaviours and mental disorders in the short-run.
In this scenario, health falls immediately after school-leaving, and this fall is not compensated
over the lifecourse. But, our empirical ﬁndings are also consistent with the “cumulative eﬀect”
hypothesis. In this scenario, poor economic conditions at school-leaving lead to lower life-time
earnings and job quality. The negative health impact of lower wages and lesser job quality cu-
mulates over the lifecourse and generates health disparities in the long-run. Overall, our results
do not permit to determine which hypothesis – the initial eﬀect or the cumulative one – is most
likely to prevail in the data. Data over the whole lifecourse – before and after school-leaving –
would help, of course; however, this kind of data is rare. In any case, modelling the link between
work and health from the time individuals leave school is not an easy task. This is mainly due
to endogeneity issues – reverse causality between health and work, typically – that plague the
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analysis. Overall, the mechanisms by which poor economic conditions at school-leaving have a
lasting and negative impact on health are not understood. Answering this question, however,
would be crucial to develop eﬃcient mitigation strategies.
Our second chapter makes an attempt to explore the mechanisms by which retirement causes
obesity. It investigates the respective role of food consumption and physical activity. The
results, however, are somewhat disappointing, mainly because of data limitations. Only very
precise measures of food intake or physical activity would have been useful to our purpose.
Such data are usually not available in surveys, and SHARE is no exception. A way to in-
vestigate the potential mechanisms at play in the retirement-obesity connection is to split the
sample according to some relevant characteristics. Typically, we split our sample by occupa-
tional strenuousness before retirement and ﬁnd that our results are driven by men who retired
from strenuous jobs. This indicates that job-related physical activity before retirement is an
important channel through which retirement aﬀects health. However, splitting our sample by
potentially endogeneous characteristics – e.g. being in a strenuous job – is problematic. Men
may indeed select into strenuous jobs according to some speciﬁc characteristics. To the extent
that this selection is dynamic, our results will be biased.
The last chapter hypothesises that the mechanisms by which job insecurity leads to worse health
include stress as well as the increase in precautionary savings. Our data do not enable us to
test for this, empirically : the EWCS survey contains few reliable measures of stress and no in-
formation whatsoever on health consumption. We argue that whatever the mechanism through
which perceived job insecurity aﬀects health, this eﬀect is likely to be stronger for workers with
low employability, that is, with a low probability of ﬁnding a new job if losing the current one.
To investigate further this matter, one would like to split the sample according to individuals’
employability. Unfortunately, ﬁnding an exogeneous measure of employability – i.e. not related
to worker’s characteristics – is not an easy task. In particular, the information available in
the EWCS database does not allow us to tackle this issue properly. Overall, the heterogeneous
impact of job insecurity on health according to employability cannot be dealt with properly,
mainly because of data limitations and methodological issues. This is a limitation to our study
to the extent that the policy implications would not be the same if (i) individuals were neg-
atively aﬀected by job insecurity, regardless of their employability or (ii) if only workers with
low employability were negatively aﬀected by job insecurity. Only in the second scenario would
policies aiming at improving the employability of individuals (e.g. through active labour-market
policies) smooth out the eﬀects of job insecurity.
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Policy relevance
My thesis has several implications in terms of public policy.
Generally speaking, it shows that at least some part of the relationship between careers and
health reﬂects causation from careers to health. To provide such causal evidence is important
from a policy point of view, so that policies directed at securing careers or at increasing the
quality of jobs can be empirically grounded. In particular, our results suggest that policy mak-
ers should pay attention to critical periods – such as the ﬁrst entry on the labour-market or
retirement.
Our ﬁrst chapter suggests that policies that target youth unemployment might have partic-
ularly large payoﬀs over the long term in reducing health disparities, especially among the
low-educated. Whether job training and other programs really improve the labour-market suc-
cess of young low-educated individuals is debated in the literature (Card et al., 2011). Cutler
et al. (2015) suggest that (i) the evaluation of such programmes should include health and
health behaviours as outcomes (ii) and that non-labour market programs could help disadvan-
taged youth in bad economic times by, for instance, improving mental health and preventing
the development of poor health habits. Of course, the extent to which our results can be gener-
alized to the current context – and in particular to young people who entered the labour market
during the Great Recession – is a relevant issue. Our results hold for individuals who left school
at compulsory age in the 1970s. By then, 50% of pupils left school at compulsory age, while
less than 20% do so nowadays. Moreover, there is some evidence that the 1973 oil crisis and
the current Great recession did not have the same eﬀects on unemployment rates, wages and
working conditions in the UK Gregg and Wadsworth (2011). To the extent that we focus on
the long-term health impact of leaving school in a bad economy, however, we have no choice
but exploiting an historical natural experiment – even if the external validity of the results is
at stake.
The second chapter suggests that men already at risk of obesity and retiring from strenuous
jobs will be likely to suﬀer from health disorders in the near future – as obesity has a particu-
larly strong impact on morbidity and disability among adults aged 50 and older (Peytremann-
Bridevaux and Santos-Eggimann, 2008; Jenkins, 2004; Andreyeva et al., 2007) and is a major
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risk factor for cardiovascular diseases among men in their sixties. From an inequality perspec-
tive, this heterogeneous impact of retirement may exacerbate post-retirement weight and health
disparities, as retirement seems to aﬀect the most vulnerable individuals – men in strenuous
jobs and at risk of obesity. Public health policies speciﬁcally targeted at this population should
be considered in order to guarantee healthy ageing and healthy life years following retirement.
From a more general perspective, recent evidence suggests that while disability prevalence has
declined in recent years among the “oldest old”, it is increasing among the “young old” (Freed-
man et al., 2013; Martin et al., 2010). One recent trend that could aﬀect both morbidity and
mortality among future cohorts is the increasing rate of obesity (Hudson, 2005). This upward
trend in obesity rates combined with an increasing number of men approaching retirement age
could jointly explain this phenomenon.
Our last chapter considers individuals who hold a permanent contract and investigate whether
the fear of involuntary job loss is harmful to health. We show that job insecurity triggers mild
health symptoms – such as skin problems, headaches or eyestrain. This is quite worrying, as
the perception of job insecurity has steadily increased in most OECD countries since the 1990s.
We argue that the impact of job insecurity is likely to be stronger for workers with low employ-
ability, i.e with a low probability of ﬁnding a new job if losing the current one. Although we
do not provide any empirical evidence of this, this suggests that the impact of job insecurity is
likely to be particularly strong in a country with a dual labour market like France36, where job
loss – especially at advanced ages – is a dangerous event, which entails a high risk of downward
mobility (see on this topic the essay by Eric Maurin La Peur du Déclassement (Maurin, 2009)).
Finally, it is particularly interesting to interpret our results in a context where populations
are rapidly ageing. Cohorts who graduated in the 1970s underwent several recessions and had
more insecure careers (high unemployment rates, more frequent temporary employment etc.)
than previous ones. They are now ageing and close to retirement. If the cumulative eﬀect of
insecure careers across the lifecourse is particularly harmful to health, it will be problematic
for two reasons : (i) post-retirement health will be poor, especially if retirement acts as a ﬁnal
shock on most vulnerable individuals – e.g. men in strenuous jobs and at risk of obesity (ii)
measures aiming at increasing the economic activity of theses cohorts will not necessarily be
eﬀective, especially if ill health is a motive of labour market withdrawal at old age.
36See Le Barbanchon and Malherbet (2013) on this topic. The emergence of dual employment protection can
be broadly deﬁned as the coexistence of both long-term contracts, which beneﬁt from stringent protection, and
short-term contracts with little or no protection.

Bibliography
Almond, D. (2006): “Is the 1918 Inﬂuenza pandemic over? Long-term eﬀects of in utero
Inﬂuenza exposure in the post-1940 US population,” Journal of political Economy, 114, 672–
712.
Anderson, L. and J. Mellor (2008): “Predicting health behaviors with an experimental
measure of risk preference,” Journal of Health Economics, 27, 1260–1274.
Andreyeva, T., P. Michaud, and A. Van Soest (2007): “Obesity and health in Europeans
aged 50 years and older,” Public Health, 121, 497–509.
Angrist, J. and A. Krueger (2001): “Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identiﬁca-
tion: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
15, 69–85.
Angrist, J. D., G. W. Imbens, and D. B. Rubin (1996): “Identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects
using instrumental variables,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 91, 444–472.
Askenazy, P., F. de Coninck, and M. Gollac (2006): Organisation et intensité du travail,
Octarès.
Atkinson, A. (2001): “A critique of the transatlantic consensus on rising income inequality,”
The World Economy, 24, 433–452.
Bardasi, E. and M. Francesconi (2004): “The impact of atypical employment on individual
wellbeing: Evidence from a panel of British workers,” Social Science & Medicine, 58, 1671–
1688.
Barnay, T. (2014): “Health, work and working conditions: A review of the European economic
literature,” OECD Working papers No. ECO/WKP(2014)44.
142 Bibliography
Barnes, H. and J. Parry (2004): “Renegotiating identity and relationships: Men and
women’s adjustments to retirement,” Ageing and Society, 24, 213–233.
Bassanini, A. and E. Caroli (2014): “Is work bad for health? The role of constraint vs
choice,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 7891, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Bassanini, A. and A. Garnero (2013): “Dismissal protection and worker ﬂows in OECD
countries: Evidence from cross-country/cross-industry data,” Labour Economics, 21, 25–41.
Bassanini, A., L. Nunziata, and D. Venn (2009): “Job protection legislation and produc-
tivity growth in OECD countries,” Economic Policy, 24, 349–402.
Bath, P. (2003): “Diﬀerences between older men and women in the self-rated health–mortality
relationship,” The Gerontologist, 43, 387–395.
Baudelot, C., M. Gollac, and C. Bessière (2003): Travailler pour être heureux?: le
bonheur et le travail en France, Fayard.
Becketti, S., W. Gould, L. Lillard, and F. Welch (1988): “The panel study of income
dynamics after fourteen years: An evaluation,” Journal of Labor Economics, 6, 472–492.
Behncke, S. (2011): “Does retirement trigger ill health?” Health Economics, 21, 282–300.
Bell, D. N. and D. G. Blanchflower (2011): “Young people and the Great Recession,”
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 27, 241–267.
Berger, M. C. (1985): “The eﬀect of cohort size on earnings growth: A reexamination of the
evidence,” The Journal of Political Economy, 93, 561–573.
——— (1989): “Demographic cycles, cohort size, and earnings,” Demography, 26, 311–321.
Betts, J. R. and L. L. McFarland (1995): “Safe Port in a Storm: The Impact of Labor
Market Conditions on Community College Enrollments,” The Journal of Human Resources,
30, pp. 741–765.
Bhattarai, K. (2011): “Impact of exchange rate and money supply on growth, inﬂation and
interest rates in the UK,” International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, 4,
355–371.
Bibliography 143
Blake, H. and C. Garrouste (2012): “Collateral eﬀects of a pension reform in France,”
Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 12/16, HEDG, c/o Depart-
ment of Economics, University of York.
Böckerman, P., P. Ilmakunnas, and E. Johansson (2011): “Job security and employee
well-being: Evidence from matched survey and register data,” Labour Economics, 18, 547–554.
Böckerman, P., E. Johansson, P. Jousilahti, and A. Uutela (2008): “The physical
strenuousness of work is slightly associated with an upward trend in the BMI,” Social Science
& Medicine, 66, 1346–1355.
Boeri, T., M. De Philippis, E. Patacchini, and M. Pellizzari (2012): “Moving to
segregation : Evidence from 8 Italian cities,” IZA Working paper No. 68/34, forthcoming
Economic Journal.
Bonsang, E., S. Adam, and S. Perelman (2012): “Does retirement aﬀect cognitive func-
tioning?” Journal of health economics, 31, 490–501.
Bound, J. and D. A. Jaeger (1996): “On the Validity of Season of Birth as an Instrument
in Wage Equations: A Comment on Angrist & Krueger’s ‘Does compulsory school attendance
aﬀect schooling and earnings?’,” National bureau of economic research (NBER) Working
Paper No. 5835.
Bound, J., D. A. Jaeger, and R. M. Baker (1995): “Problems with instrumental variables
estimation when the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous explanatory
variable is weak,” Journal of the American statistical association, 90, 443–450.
Bradford, L. (1979): “Can You Survive Your Retirement?” Harvard Business Review, 57,
103–109.
Browning, M. and E. Heinesen (2012): “Eﬀect of job loss due to plant closure on mortality
and hospitalization,” Journal of Health Economics, 31, 599–616.
Browning, M., A. Moller Dano, and E. Heinesen (2006): “Job displacement and stress-
related health outcomes,” Health Economics, 15, 1061–1075.
Brunello, G. and B. d’Hombres (2007): “Does body weight aﬀect wages? Evidence from
Europe,” Economics & Human Biology, 5, 1–19.
144 Bibliography
Brunello, G., D. Fabbri, and M. Fort (2013): “The causal eﬀect of education on body
mass: Evidence from Europe,” Journal of Labor Economics, 31, 195–223.
Buchmueller, T. C., M. Grignon, F. Jusot, and M. Perronnin (2007): “Unemploy-
ment and mortality in France, 1982-2002,” Centre for Health Economics and Policy Analysis
(CHEPA) Working paper 07/04, McMaster University.
Burkhauser, R. and J. Cawley (2006): “The importance of objective health measures in
predicting early receipt of social security beneﬁts: The case of fatness,” Michigan Retirement
Research Center Working Papers WP No. 148, University of Michigan.
——— (2008): “Beyond BMI: The value of more accurate measures of fatness and obesity in
social science research,” Journal of Health Economics, 27, 519–529.
Cappelli, P. (1999): “Career jobs are dead,” California Management Review, 42, 146–167.
Card, D. (2001): “Estimating the return to schooling: Progress on some persistent econometric
problems,” Econometrica, 69, 1127–1160.
Card, D., P. Ibarraran, F. Regalia, D. Rosas-Shady, and Y. Soares (2011): “The
labor market impacts of youth training in the Dominican Republic,” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics, 29, 267–300.
Card, D. and T. Lemieux (2001): An Economic Analysis of Risky Behavior Among Youth,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, chap. Dropout and enrollment trends in the post-war
period: what went wrong in the 1970s, pp 439–432.
Caroli, E. and M. Godard (2014): “Does Job Insecurity Deteriorate Health? A causal
approach for Europe.” Forthcoming in Health Economics, doi: 10.1002/hec.3122.
Cawley, J. (2004): “The impact of obesity on wages,” Journal of Human Resources, 39,
451–474.
Cawley, J. and F. Liu (2012): “Maternal employment and childhood obesity: A search for
mechanisms in time use data,” Economics & Human Biology, 10, 352–364.
Cawley, J., J. Moran, and K. Simon (2010): “The impact of income on the weight of
elderly Americans,” Health Economics, 19, 979–993.
Bibliography 145
Chadi, A. and C. Hetschko (2013): “Flexibilisation without hesitation? Temporary con-
tracts and workers’ satisfaction,” IAAEU Discussion Papers from Institute of Labour Law
and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), No. 201304.
Charles, K. (2004): “Is retirement depressing?: Labor force inactivity and psychological well-
being in later life,” Research in Labor Economics, 23, 269–299.
Charles, K. K. and P. DeCicca (2008): “Local labor market ﬂuctuations and health: is
there a connection and for whom?” Journal of Health Economics, 27, 1532–1550.
Cheng, Y., C. Chen, C. Chen, and T. Chiang (2005): “Job insecurity and its associa-
tion with health among employees in the Taiwanese general population,” Social Science &
Medicine, 61, 41–52.
Chernozhukov, V. and C. Hansen (2008): “The reduced form: A simple approach to infer-
ence with weak instruments,” Economics Letters, 100, 68–71.
Chung, S., M. Domino, and S. Stearns (2009): “The eﬀect of retirement on weight,” The
Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 64, 656–665.
Chung, S., B. Popkin, M. Domino, and S. Stearns (2007): “Eﬀect of Retirement on
Eating Out and Weight Change: An Analysis of Gender Diﬀerences,” Obesity, 15, 1053–1060.
Clark, A. and F. Postel-Vinay (2009): “Job security and job protection,” Oxford Economic
Papers, 61, 207–239.
Clark, D. and H. Royer (2013): “The eﬀect of education on adult mortality and health :
evidence from Britain,” American Economic Review, 103, 2087–2120.
Coe, N. and M. Lindeboom (2008): “Does retirement kill you? Evidence from early retire-
ment windows,” IZA Discussion Papers No. 3817.
Coe, N. and G. Zamarro (2011): “Retirement eﬀects on health in Europe,” Journal of Health
Economics, 30, 77–86.
Colchero, M., B. Caballero, and D. Bishai (2008): “The eﬀect of income and occupation
on body mass index among women in the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Surveys
(1983-2002),” Social Science & Medicine, 66, 1967–1978.
146 Bibliography
Corrada, M., C. Kawas, F. Mozaffar, and A. Paganini-Hill (2006): “Association of
body mass index and weight change with all-cause mortality in the elderly,” American Journal
of Epidemiology, 163, 938–949.
Currie, J. (2009): “Healthy, Wealthy, and Wise: Socioeconomic Status, Poor Health in Child-
hood, and Human Capital Development,” Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 87–122.
Currie, J. and B. Madrian (1999): Handbook of Labor Economics, vol 3, part C, Oxford:
Elsevier, chap. Health, health insurance and the labor market, pp. 3309–3415.
Cutler, D., W. Huang, and A. Lleras-Muney (2015): “When Does Education Matter?
The Protective Eﬀect of Education for Cohorts Graduating in Bad Times,” Social Science &
Medicine, 127, 63–73.
Cutler, D. M. and A. Lleras-Muney (2006): “Education and health: evaluating theories
and evidence,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No. 12352.
Cutler, D. M., A. Lleras-Muney, and T. Vogl (2008): “Socioeconomic status and health:
dimensions and mechanisms,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)Working Paper
No. 14333.
Dave, D., I. Rashad, and J. Spasojevic (2006): “The eﬀects of retirement on physical and
mental health outcomes,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper
No. 12123.
Dave, D. M. and I. R. Kelly (2012): “How does the business cycle aﬀect eating habits?”
Social Science & Medicine, 74, 254–262.
Deb, P., W. Gallo, P. Ayyagari, J. Fletcher, and J. Sindelar (2011): “The eﬀect of
job loss on overweight and drinking,” Journal of Health Economics, 30, 317–327.
Dee, T. S. (2001): “Alcohol abuse and economic conditions: evidence from repeated cross-
sections of individual-level data,” Health Economics, 10, 257–270.
Del Bono, E. and F. Galinda-Rueda (2007): “The long-term impacts of compulsory school-
ing : evidence from a natural experiment in school leaving dates.” CEE Discussion Papers
0074, Centre for the Economics of Education, LSE.
Denman, J. and P. McDonald (1996): “Unemployment statistics from 1881 to the present
day,” Labour Market Trends, 104, 5–18.
Bibliography 147
Devereux, P. J. and R. A. Hart (2010): “Forced to be rich? Returns to compulsory school-
ing in Britain,” The Economic Journal, 120, 1345–1364.
DGT (2011): “Conditions de travail, 2011,” Bilans & Rapports, Direction générale du travail,
Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi et de la Santé.
Doblhammer, G. and J. W. Vaupel (2001): “Lifespan depends on month of birth,” Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98, 2934–2939.
Dodu, N. (2005): “Is employment good for well-being? a literature review,” Journal of occu-
pational psychology, employment and disability, 7, 17–33.
Doeringer, P. and M. Piore (1971): Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, D.C.
Heath.
Duleep, H. O. (1986): “Measuring the eﬀect of income on adult mortality using longitudinal
administrative record data,” Journal of Human Resources, 21, 238–251.
Eibich, P. (2014): “Understanding the eﬀect of retirement on health using Regression Discon-
tinuity Design,” SOEP papers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research No. 669.
Eliason, M. and D. Storrie (2009a): “Does job loss shorten life?” Journal of Human Re-
sources, 44, 277–302.
——— (2009b): “Job loss is bad for your health–Swedish evidence on cause-speciﬁc hospital-
ization following involuntary job loss,” Social Science & Medicine, 68, 1396–1406.
Emery, C., J. Dinet, A. Lafuma, C. Sermet, B. Khoshnood, and F. Fagnani (2007):
“Évaluation du coût associé à l’obésité en France,” La Presse Médicale, 36, 832–840.
Etilé, F. and C. Milcent (2006): “Income-related reporting heterogeneity in self-assessed
health: Evidence from France,” Health Economics, 15, 965–981.
EUCommission (2007): “Improving quality and productivity at work: Community strategy
2007-2012 on health and safety at work,” Commission staﬀ working document, Accompanying
document to the communication from the commission, SEC(2007) 216/2.
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
(2012): 5th European Working Conditions Survey, 2010, UK Data Archive.
148 Bibliography
Fe, E. and B. Hollingsworth (2012): “Estimating the eﬀect of retirement on mental health
via panel discontinuity designs,” Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 38162.
Ferrie, J. (2001): “Is job insecurity harmful to health?” Journal of the Royal Society of
Medicine, 94, 71–76.
Ferrie, J., M. Shipley, M. Marmot, S. Stansfeld, and G. Smith (1995): “Health eﬀects
of anticipation of job change and non-employment: Longitudinal data from the Whitehall II
study,” British Medical Journal, 311, 1264–1269.
Ferrie, J., M. Shipley, K. Newman, S. Stansfeld, M. Marmot, et al. (2005): “Self-
reported job insecurity and health in the Whitehall II study: Potential explanations of the
relationship,” Social Science & Medicine, 60, 1593–1602.
Ferrie, J. E., M. J. Shipley, M. G. Marmot, S. Stansfeld, and G. D. Smith (1998):
“The health eﬀects of major organisational change and job insecurity,” Social Science &
Medicine, 46, 243–254.
Ferrie, J. E., M. J. Shipley, S. A. Stansfeld, and M. G. Marmot (2002): “Eﬀects of
chronic job insecurity and change in job security on self reported health, minor psychiatric
morbidity, physiological measures, and health related behaviours in British civil servants: the
Whitehall II study,” Journal of epidemiology and community health, 56, 450–454.
Finkelstein, E., I. Fiebelkorn, and G. Wang (2003): “National medical spending at-
tributable to overweight and obesity: how much, and who’s paying?” Health Aﬀairs, 22,
3–219.
Fischer, J. and A. Sousa-Poza (2009a): “Does job satisfaction improve the health of work-
ers? New evidence using panel data and objective measures of health,” Health Economics, 18,
71–89.
Fischer, J. A. and A. Sousa-Poza (2009b): “Does job satisfaction improve the health of
workers? New evidence using panel data and objective measures of health,” Health Economics,
18, 71–89.
Fitzgerald, J., P. Gottschalk, and R. A. Moffitt (1998): “An analysis of sample
attrition in panel data: The Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics,” Journal of Human
Resources, 33, 251–299.
Bibliography 149
Fletcher, J. M., J. L. Sindelar, and S. Yamaguchi (2011): “Cumulative eﬀects of job
characteristics on health,” Health Economics, 20, 553–570.
Forman-Hoffman, V., K. Richardson, J. Yankey, S. Hillis, R. Wallace, and
F. Wolinsky (2008): “Retirement and weight changes among men and women in the Health
and Retirement Study,” The Journals of Gerontology Series B: Psychological Sciences and
Social Sciences, 63, 146–153.
Freedman, V. A., B. C. Spillman, P. M. Andreski, J. C. Cornman, E. M. Crimmins,
E. Kramarow, J. Lubitz, L. G. Martin, S. S. Merkin, R. F. Schoeni, et al. (2013):
“Trends in late-life activity limitations in the United States: an update from ﬁve national
surveys,” Demography, 50, 661–671.
Friedmann, E. and R. Havighurst (1954): The meaning of work and retirement, University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Gaini, M., A. Leduc, and A. Vicard (2012): “A scarred generation? French evidence on
young people entering into a tough labour market,” Institut National de la Statistique et des
Etudes Economiques (INSEE), Working Paper DESE G 2012/05.
Galama, T. J. and H. Van Kippersluis (2010): “A theory of socioeconomic disparities in
health over the life cycle,” Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 10-079/3.
García-Gómez, P., H. Van Kippersluis, O. ODonnell, and E. Van Doorslaer (2013):
“Long-term and spillover eﬀects of health shocks on employment and income,” Journal of
Human Resources, 48, 873–909.
Gardner, J. and A. J. Oswald (2007): “Money and mental wellbeing: A longitudinal study
of medium-sized lottery wins,” Journal of Health Economics, 26, 49–60.
Genda, Y., A. Kondo, and S. Ohta (2010): “Long-term eﬀects of a recession at labor
market entry in Japan and the United States,” Journal of Human Resources, 45, 157–196.
Gerdtham, U. and C. Ruhm (2006): “Deaths rise in good economic times : Evidence from
the OCDE,” Economic and Human Biology, 4, 298–316.
Gibbons, R. and M. Waldman (2006): “Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dy-
namics inside Firms,” Journal of Labor Economics, 24, 59–108.
150 Bibliography
Givord, P. and E. Maurin (2004): “Changes in job security and their causes: An empirical
analysis for France, 1982–2002,” European Economic Review, 48, 595–615.
Gluckman, P. D., M. A. Hanson, C. Cooper, and K. L. Thornburg (2008): “Eﬀect
of in utero and early-life conditions on adult health and disease,” New England Journal of
Medicine, 359, 61–73.
Goldman, D., D. Lakdawalla, and Y. Zheng (2008): “Retirement and Weight,” mimeo.
Gorber, S. C., M. Tremblay, D. Moher, and B. Gorber (2007): “A comparison of
direct vs. self-report measures for assessing height, weight and body mass index: a systematic
review,” Obesity reviews, 8, 307–326.
Green, F. (2011): “Unpacking the misery multiplier: How employability modiﬁes the impacts
of unemployment and job insecurity on life satisfaction and mental health,” Journal of Health
Economics, 30, 265–276.
Gregg, P. and J. Wadsworth (2011): The labour market in winter: the state of working
Britain, Oxford University Press.
Grenet, J. (2013): “Is extending compulsory schooling alone enough to raise earnings? Evi-
dence from French and British compulsory Laws,” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
115, 176–210.
Grossman, M. (1972): “On the concept of health capital and the demand for health,” The
Journal of Political Economy, 80, 223–255.
Gruber, J. and D. Wise (1999): Social Security and Retirement around the World., University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Gueorguieva, R., J. Sindelar, R. Wu, and W. Gallo (2010): “Diﬀerential changes in
body mass index after retirement by occupation: hierarchical models,” International Journal
of Public Health, 56, 111–116.
Gustman, A. L. and T. Steinmeier (2009): “Integrating retirement models,” NBER Work-
ing Paper No. 15607.
Gustman, A. L. and T. L. Steinmeier (1981): “The impact of wages and unemployment on
youth enrollment and labor supply,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 63, 553–561.
Bibliography 151
Hair, F. J. J., R. E. Anderson, R. L. Tatham, and W. C. Black (1995): Multivariate
data analysis, 3rd edn. New York: Maxwell Macmillan.
Haltiwanger, J., S. Scarpetta, and H. Schweiger (2014): “Cross country diﬀerences in
job reallocation: the role of industry, ﬁrm size and regulations,” Labour Economics, 26, 11–25.
Harmon, C. and I. Walker (1995): “Estimates of the economic returns to schooling in the
United Kingdom,” American Economic Review, 85, 1278–1296.
Herborn, K. A., B. J. Heidinger, W. Boner, J. C. Noguera, A. Adam, F. Daunt,
and P. Monaghan (2014): “Stress exposure in early post-natal life reduces telomere length:
an experimental demonstration in a long-lived seabird,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 281, 20133151.
Hessel, P. and M. Avendano (2013): “Are economic recessions at the time of leaving school
associated with worse physical functioning in later life?” Annals of Epidemiology, 23, 708–715.
Hudson, R. B. (2005): The new politics of old age policy, Cambridge Univ Press.
Hurst, E. (2008): “The retirement of a consumption puzzle,” NBER Working papers No.
13789.
IASO/IOTF (2002): “Obesity in Europe. The Case for Action.” Available at
http://www.iaso.org/site_media/uploads/Sep_2002_Obesity_in_Europe_Case_for_
Action_2002.pdf.
——— (2010): “Obesity and overweight,” Available at http://www.iaso.org/iotf/obesity/
obesitytheglobalepidemic/.
Idler, E. and Y. Benyamini (1997): “Self-rated health and mortality: A review of twenty-
seven community studies,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 38, 21–37.
Idler, E. and S. Kasl (1991): “Health perceptions and survival: Do global evaluations of
health status really predict mortality?” Journal of Gerontology, 46, 55–65.
Ikeda, S., M. Kang, and F. Ohtake (2010): “Hyperbolic discounting, the sign eﬀect, and
the body mass index,” Journal of health economics, 29, 268–284.
Imbens, G. W. and J. D. Angrist (1994): “Identiﬁcation and estimation of local average
treatment eﬀects,” Econometrica, 62, 467–476.
152 Bibliography
Imbens, G. W. and D. B. Rubin (1997a): “Bayesian inference for causal eﬀects in randomized
experiments with noncompliance,” Annals of Statistics, 25, 305–327.
——— (1997b): “Estimating outcome distributions for compliers in instrumental variables mod-
els,” The Review of Economic Studies, 64, 555–574.
Jenkins, K. R. (2004): “Body-weight change and physical functioning among young old
adults,” Journal of Aging and Health, 16, 248–266.
Kahn, L. B. (2010): “The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from college in
a bad economy,” Labour Economics, 17, 303–316.
Kalleberg, A. L. (2009): “Precarious work, insecure workers: Employment relations in tran-
sition,” American sociological review, 74, 1–22.
Karasek, R. (1979): “Job demands, job decision latitude, and mental strain: Implications for
job redesign,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 285–308.
Karasek, R., C. Brisson, N. Kawakami, I. Houtman, P. Bongers, and B. Amick
(1998): “The Job Content Questionnaire (JCQ): An instrument for internationally compara-
tive assessments of psychosocial job characteristics.” Journal of Occupational Health Psychol-
ogy, 3, 322–355.
Keese, M. (2006): Live longer, work longer, Paris, OECD.
Kestenbaum, B. (1987): “Seasonality of birth: two ﬁndings from the decennial census.” Social
Biology, 34, 244–8.
Kesternich, I., B. Siflinger, J. P. Smith, and J. K. Winter (2014): “The eﬀects of
World War II on economic and health outcomes across Europe,” Review of Economics and
Statistics, 96, 103–118.
Kondo, A. (2007): “Diﬀerential eﬀects of graduating during a recession across race and gen-
der,” Institute for Social and Economic Research and Policy (ISERP) Working Paper No.
07-05.
Korenman, S. and D. Neumark (1997): “Cohort crowding and youth labor markets: a
cross-national analysis,” National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper No.
6031.
Bibliography 153
La Berge, A. E. F. (2002): Mission and method: the early nineteenth-century french public
health movement, Cambridge University Press.
Lallukka, T., E. Lahelma, O. Rahkonen, E. Roos, E. Laaksonen, P. Martikainen,
J. Head, E. Brunner, A. Mosdol, M. Marmot, et al. (2008a): “Associations of job
strain and working overtime with adverse health behaviors and obesity: evidence from the
Whitehall II Study, Helsinki Health Study, and the Japanese Civil Servants Study,” Social
Science & Medicine, 66, 1681–1698.
Lallukka, T., S. Sarlio-Lähteenkorva, L. Kaila-Kangas, J. Pitkäniemi, R. Luukko-
nen, and P. Leino-Arjas (2008b): “Working conditions and weight gain: a 28-year follow-
up study of industrial employees,” European Journal of Epidemiology, 23, 303–310.
László, K., H. Pikhart, M. Kopp, M. Bobak, A. Pajak, S. Malyutina, G. Salavecz,
and M. Marmot (2010): “Job insecurity and health: A study of 16 European countries,”
Social Science & Medicine, 70, 867–874.
Layard, R. (2004): “Good jobs and bad jobs,” Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
Occasional Paper No. 19, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Lazarsfeld, P. F., M. Jahoda, and H. Zeisel (1933): “Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal,”
Ein soziographischer Versuch. Leipzig.
Lazarus, R. and S. Folkman (1984): Stress, appraisal, and coping, Springer Publishing
Company.
Le Barbanchon, T. and F. Malherbet (2013): “An anatomy of the French labour market:
country case studies on labour market segmentation,” International Labour Organization
(ILO) Employment working paper No.142.
Lechner, M. (2010): “The estimation of causal eﬀects by diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods,”
University of St. Gallen, Department of Economics working paper series (2010-28).
Lindeboom, M., F. Portrait, and G. J. Van den Berg (2010): “Long-run eﬀects on
longevity of a nutritional shock early in life: the Dutch Potato famine of 1846–1847,” Journal
of health economics, 29, 617–629.
Llena-Nozal, A. (2009): “The eﬀect of work status and working conditions on mental health
in four OECD countries,” National Institute Economic Review, 209, 72–87.
154 Bibliography
Lundborg, P. (2013): “The health returns to schooling-what can we learn from twins?” Jour-
nal of Population Economics, 26, 673–701.
Maclean, J. C. (2013): “The health eﬀects of leaving school in a bad economy,” Journal of
Health Economics, 32, 951–964.
——— (2014a): “Does leaving school in an economic downturn impact access to employer-
sponsored health insurance?” IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 3, 19.
——— (2014b): “Does leaving school in an economic downturn persistently aﬀect body weight?
Evidence from panel data,” mimeo.
——— (2014c): “The Lasting Eﬀects of Leaving School in an Economic Downturn on Alcohol
Use,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, doi: 10.1177/0019793914556243.
Macunovich, D. J. (1999): “The fortunes of one’s birth: Relative cohort size and the youth
labor market in the United States,” Journal of Population Economics, 12, 215–272.
Mancino, L. (2003): Americans’ food choices: the interaction of information, intentions, and
convenience., PhD dissertation, Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota.
Mandal, B., P. Ayyagari, and W. T. Gallo (2011): “Job loss and depression: The role of
subjective expectations,” Social Science & Medicine, 72, 576–583.
Manoli, D. and A. Weber (2012): “The Eﬀects of Increasing the Early Retirement Age on
Social Security Claims and Job Exits,” mimeo.
Marcus, J. (2012): “Does job loss make you smoke and gain weight?” SOEP papers on Mul-
tidisciplinary Panel Data Research No. 432.
Martin, L. G., V. A. Freedman, R. F. Schoeni, and P. M. Andreski (2010): “Trends
in disability and related chronic conditions among people ages ﬁfty to sixty-four,” Health
Aﬀairs, 29, 725–731.
Maurin, E. (2009): La peur du déclassement: une sociologie des récessions, Seuil.
McMichael, A., R. Spirtas, and L. Kupper (1974): “An epidemiologic study of mortality
within a cohort of rubber workers, 1964-72.” Journal of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine, 16, 458–464.
Bibliography 155
McMichael, A. J. (1976): “Standardized Mortality Ratios and the’Healthy Worker Eﬀect’:
Scratching Beneath the Surface.” Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 18,
165–168.
McVicar, D. and P. Rice (2001): “Participation in further education in England and Wales:
an analysis of post-war trends,” Oxford Economic Papers, 53, 47–66.
Micklewright, J., M. Pearson, and S. Smith (1989): “Has Britain an early school-leaving
problem?” Fiscal Studies, 10, 1–16.
Mohren, D. C., G. M. Swaen, L. G. van Amelsvoort, P. J. Borm, and J. M. Galama
(2003): “Job insecurity as a risk factor for common infections and health complaints,” Journal
of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 45, 123–129.
Morgan, S. L. and C. Winship (2014): Counterfactuals and causal inference, Cambridge
University Press.
Morin, L.-P. (2011): “Cohort size and youth earnings: evidence from a quasi-experiment,”
Canadian Labour Market and Skills Researcher Network (CLSRN) Working Paper No. 85.
Morris, S. (2006): “Body mass index and occupational attainment,” Journal of Health Eco-
nomics, 25, 347–364.
Muenster, E., H. Rueger, E. Ochsmann, S. Letzel, and A. Toschke (2011): “Asso-
ciation between overweight, obesity and self-perceived job insecurity in German employees,”
BMC public health, 11, 162.
Must, A., J. Spadano, E. Coakley, A. Field, G. Colditz, and W. Dietz (1999): “The
disease burden associated with overweight and obesity,” JAMA: the Journal of the American
Medical Association, 282, 1523–1529.
Neuman, K. (2008): “Quit your job and get healthier? The eﬀect of retirement on health,”
Journal of Labor Research, 29, 177–201.
Neumayer, E. (2004): “Recessions lower (some) mortality rates : evidence from Germany,”
Social Science & Medicine, 58, 1037–1047.
Niedhammer, I., I. Bugel, S. Bonenfant, M. Goldberg, and A. Leclere (2000): “Va-
lidity of self-reported weight and height in the French GAZEL cohort,” International Journal
of Obesity, 24, 1111–1118.
156 Bibliography
Nooyens, A., T. Visscher, A. Schuit, C. Van Rossum, W. Verschuren,
W. Van Mechelen, and J. Seidell (2005): “Eﬀects of retirement on lifestyle in rela-
tion to changes in weight and waist circumference in Dutch men: a prospective study,” Public
Health Nutrition, 8, 1266–1274.
Nordenmark, M. and M. Strandh (1999): “Towards a sociological understanding of mental
well-being among the unemployed: the role of economic and psychosocial factors,” Sociology,
33, 577–597.
OECD (2004): “More and Better Jobs? Aggregate Performance during the Past Decade,”
Employment Outlook, Paris, OECD.
——— (2010a): Health at a glance: Europe 2010, Paris, OECD.
——— (2010b): “Institutional and Policy Determinants of Labour Market Flows,” Employment
Outlook, Paris, OECD.
——— (2011): Pensions at a Glance 2011 : Retirement-Income Systems in OECD and G20
Countries, Paris, OECD, available at www.oecd.org/els/social/pensions/PAG.
——— (2014): “Non-regular employment, job security and the labour market divide,” Employ-
ment Outlook, Paris, OECD, forthcoming.
Oreopoulos, P. (2006): “Estimating average and local average treatment eﬀects of education
when compulsory schooling laws really matter,” American Economic Review, 96, 152–175.
Oreopoulos, P., T. von Wachter, and A. Heisz (2012): “The short-and long-term career
eﬀects of graduating in a recession,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4,
1–29.
Origo, F. and L. Pagani (2009): “Flexicurity and job satisfaction in Europe: The importance
of perceived and actual job stability for well-being at work,” Labour Economics, 16, 547–555.
Peytremann-Bridevaux, I. and B. Santos-Eggimann (2008): “Health correlates of over-
weight and obesity in adults aged 50 years and over: results from the Survey of Health, Ageing
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE),” Swiss Medical Weekly, 138, 261–266.
Plug, E. J. (2001): “Season of birth, schooling and earnings,” Journal of Economic Psychology,
22, 641–660.
Bibliography 157
Prentice, A. and S. Jebb (2001): “Beyond body mass index,” Obesity Reviews, 2, 141–147.
Rathelot, R. and L. Romanello (2012): “Organizational Change and Employee Health,”
mimeo.
Reichert, A. and H. Tauchmann (2012): “The causal impact of fear of unemployment on
psychological health,” Ruhr Economic Papers, No. 266.
Ribet, C., M. Zins, A. Gueguen, A. Bingham, M. Goldberg, P. Ducimetiere, and
T. Lang (2003): “Occupational mobility and risk factors in working men: selection, causality
or both? Results from the GAZEL study,” Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health,
57, 901–906.
Ricroch, L. (2012): “En 25 ans, moins de tâches domestiques pour les femmes, l’écart de
situation avec les hommes se réduit,” Regards sur la parité, INSEE. Available at www.insee.
fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/ref/FHPARIT12g_D3tachesd.pdf.
Robone, S., A. M. Jones, and N. Rice (2011): “Contractual conditions, working conditions
and their impact on health and well-being,” The European Journal of Health Economics, 12,
429–444.
Rohwedder, S., R. Willis, et al. (2010): “Mental retirement,” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 24, 119–138.
Rosin, O. (2008): “The economic causes of obesity: a survey,” Journal of Economic Surveys,
22, 617–647.
Ruhm, C. (2000): “Are Recessions Good For Your Health?” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 115, 617–650.
Ruhm, C. J. (2003): “Good times make you sick,” Journal of Health Economics, 22, 637–658.
——— (2004): “Macroeconomic conditions, health and mortality,” National bureau of economic
research (NBER) Working Paper No. 11007.
——— (2005): “Healthy living in hard times,” Journal of Health Economics, 24, 341–363.
Salm, M. (2009): “Does job loss cause ill health?” Health Economics, 18, 1075–1089.
Sanz-de Galdeano, A. (2005): “The obesity epidemic in Europe,” IZA Discussion paper No.
1814.
158 Bibliography
Sanz de Galdeano, A. (2007): “An economic analysis of obesity in Europe: health, medical
care and absenteeism costs,” Fundacion de Estudios de Economia Aplicada (FEDEA)Working
Paper No. 38.
Schaffer, M. (2010): “xtivreg2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and
AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression for panel data models.” Available at http://ideas.
repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456501.html.
Schmeiser, M. (2009): “Expanding wallets and waistlines: the impact of family income on
the BMI of women and men eligible for the earned income tax credit,” Health economics, 18,
1277–1294.
Schmid, A., H. Schneider, A. Golay, and U. Keller (2005): “Economic burden of obesity
and its comorbidities in Switzerland,” Sozial-und Präventivmedizin/Social and Preventive
Medicine, 50, 87–94.
Schoar, A. and L. Zuo (2011): “Shaped by booms and busts: How the economy impacts
CEO careers and management styles,” National bureau of economic research (NBER)Working
Paper No. 17590.
Schulte, P., G. Wagner, A. Ostry, L. Blanciforti, R. Cutlip, K. Krajnak, M. Lus-
ter, A. Munson, J. O’Callaghan, C. Parks, et al. (2007): “Work, obesity, and occu-
pational safety and health,” American Journal of Public Health, 97, 428–436.
Sharp, C., D. Hutchison, and W. Keys (2002): “Comparing School Systems to Explain
Enduring Birth Date Eﬀects: A Response to McDonald (2001),” Compare, 32, 239–241.
Siegrist, J. (1996): “Adverse health eﬀects of high-eﬀort/low-reward conditions.” Journal of
Occupational Health Psychology, 1, 27–41.
Smith, J. P. (2004): “Unraveling the SES: health connection,” Population and Development
Review, 30, 108–132.
Smith, P., B. Bogin, and D. Bishai (2005): “Are time preference and body mass index
associated?: Evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,” Economics & Human
Biology, 3, 259–270.
Stancanelli, E. (2012): “Spouses’ Retirement and Hours of Work Outcomes : Evidence from
Twofold Regression Discontinuity,” Documents de travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sor-
bonne No.2012/74.
Bibliography 159
Stevens, K. (2007): “Adverse Economic Conditions at Labour Market Entry: Permanent
Scars or Rapid Catch-up,” Department of Economics, University College London, Job Market
Paper.
Sullivan, D. and T. Von Wachter (2009): “Job displacement and mortality: An analysis
using administrative data,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 1265–1306.
Sverke, M. and J. Hellgren (2002): “The nature of job insecurity: Understanding employ-
ment uncertainty on the brink of a new millennium,” Applied Psychology, 51, 23–42.
Sverke, M., J. Hellgren, and K. Näswall (2002): “No security: A meta-analysis and
review of job insecurity and its consequences,” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 7,
242–264.
Touvier, M., S. Bertrais, H. Charreire, A. Vergnaud, S. Hercberg, and J. Oppert
(2010): “Changes in leisure-time physical activity and sedentary behaviour at retirement:
a prospective study in middle-aged French subjects,” International Journal of Behavioral
Nutrition and Physical Activity, 7, 14.
Tubeuf, S., F. Jusot, M. Devaux, and C. Sermet (2008): “Social heterogeneity in self-
reported health status and measurement of inequalities in health,” IRDES Working Papers
No. DT12, IRDES (Institut for Research and Information in Health Economics).
Valletta, R. G. (1999): “Declining job security,” Journal of Labor Economics, 17, S170–S197.
Van den Berg, G. J., M. Lindeboom, and F. Portrait (2006): “Economic conditions
early in life and individual mortality,” The American Economic Review, 96, 290–302.
Venn, D. (2009): “Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement: Updating the OECD em-
ployment protection indicators,” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers,
DT89, available at www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers.
Waddell, G. and A. K. Burton (2006): Is work good for your health and well-being?, The
Stationery Oﬃce.
Welch, F. (1979): “Eﬀects of cohort size on earnings: the baby boom babies’ ﬁnancial bust,”
The Journal of Political Economy, 87, S65–S97.
160 Bibliography
Welch, N., S. A. McNaughton, W. Hunter, C. Hume, and D. Crawford (2009):
“Is the perception of time pressure a barrier to healthy eating and physical activity among
women?” Public health nutrition, 12, 888–895.
WHO (2000): “The implications for training of embracing : a life course approach to health,”
World Health Organization (WHO).
——— (2012): “Obesity and overweight,” Fact sheet N°311, Available at http://www.who.
int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs311/en/.

Titre : Trajectoires professionnelles et santé en Europe
Résumé : Cette thèse se propose d’analyser les eﬀets des ruptures dans les trajectoires pro-
fessionnelles sur l’état de santé des individus en Europe. Nous considérons ici deux ruptures :
l’une en début de carrière – l’entrée sur le marché du travail dans une économie dégradée –
et l’autre en ﬁn de carrière – le passage à la retraite. Entre ces deux périodes critiques, nous
portons un intérêt spéciﬁque à l’impact sur la santé d’une rupture cette fois anticipée : la peur
de perdre son emploi. Nos analyses empiriques combinent des données d’enquêtes Européennes
et Britanniques. Aﬁn de pallier les problèmes d’endogénéité propres à toute analyse empirique
du lien entre santé et trajectoire professionnelle, nous exerçons des chocs exogènes sur la car-
rière des individus. Nous utilisons ainsi une expérience naturelle (la crise pétrolière de 1973)
et les caractéristiques institutionnelles telles qu’elles sont déﬁnies dans la législation de chaque
pays Européen (âges légaux de passage à la retraite, degrés de protection de l’emploi, règles
de scolarité obligatoire). Les résultats soulignent l’eﬀet néfaste des ruptures au cours de la vie
professionnelle sur la santé des individus, à la fois à court et à long terme.
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Title : Essays on careers and health in Europe
Abstract : The main objective of this thesis is to analyse the health consequences of career
shocks in Europe. It considers two actual career shocks over the lifecourse : leaving full-time
education in a bad economy, and, at the other end of the age spectrum, retiring. In-between
these two critical periods, it investigates how an anticipated career shock – i.e. anticipated
job loss – damages health. Empirical analyses are conducted using large European and British
surveys. We use institutional features and natural experiments to ﬁnd neat instruments for
causal identiﬁcation : the existence of compulsory schooling laws, the cross-country variation in
employment protection legislations, the cross-country variation in retirement systems and the
1973 oil crisis. The results emphasise the causal and health-damaging impact of career shocks,
both in the short and in the long-term.
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